 | Around the World in 80 Ideas |
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 14: Zero tolerance Cutting crime by fixing the broken windows The problem: fear on the streets The United States has long been thought by other countries to be the world's centre for crimes of violence. Actually this is not true, but fuelled by drugs and other modern evils, it certainly has been true in some of America's large cities. Thus in 1990, the cover of Time magazine called New York City 'The Rotten Apple'. Violent crime, murder, and drug-dealing seemed to be growing uncontrollably. The subway cars were covered in graffiti, the stations populated by down-and-outs and (often aggressive) beggars; burned-out cars and trash littered the highways. There was a climate of fear; New York had lost control of its own streets. And it was by no means unique in the world. The idea: fix the broken windows New York's immediate response was to hire more police officers. But many of the new recruits were young and inexperienced at dealing with the complex problems that plagued the metropolis. Crime started to fall, but too slowly. It came as no surprise when Rudolph Guiliani, who had campaigned on crime and disorder issues, was elected Mayor. It had become clear that a more radical approach was needed if New Yorkers were to reclaim their city: a change in the way New York was policed and in the way the NYPD was structured. Three years later, the City's crime rate had dropped by 37%, with homicide alone down by 50%. A lesson for other crime-plagued cities? Example: zero tolerance in New York Administrative reforms. It fell to the incoming Police Commissioner, William J Bratton, to try some of these radical solutions. He flattened the command structure, devolved control to local precinct commanders, upgraded the crime-management information, and took the view that the petty offences that occurred in full view on the streets contributed to the climate of lawlessness in New York and should no longer be ignored. Community policing. The last part of Bratton's programme, of treating minor crimes seriously, has become branded the 'zero tolerance' approach - though this phrase is highly misleading. The approach actually stemmed from the 1982 theory of George Kelling and James Q Wilson (known, equally misleadingly, as the 'broken windows' theory). This suggested that if minor incivilities (such as public drunkenness, begging, vandalism and litter) were not controlled, they would produce a local atmosphere in which more serious crime would grow. Bratton certainly instructed his officers to be more confident in policing such behaviour. But the phrase 'zero tolerance' suggests that even these minor incivilities can be eliminated (which they cannot), and that simply 'being tough' is the answer. Bratton knew that toughness would work up to a point - it could reduce the idea that the police had lost control of the city, but it would not work if policing became so over-zealous that the support of local people was lost. Within those limits, however, it became clear that turning attention to the 'broken window' offences did much to improve the quality of life in New York, to drive out the culture of fear and hopelessness, and to demonstrate to petty offenders that law-breaking could not be the answer to their complex problems. In reality, the New York strategy was a return to 'community policing'. Pressed to deliver fast response times to emergency calls, the police in New York - as in almost every developed country in the world - had been taken off the 'beat' and put into cars. But this had isolated them from the general public, and made it harder to interact positively with the local people in their neighbourhood. The Bratton approach was to rebuild the interaction and trust with the community by solid partnership, problem-solving, and crime prevention. Re-engineering the NYPD. A second strand of the approach was to decentralize the structure of the police force itself. Responsibility and accountability were pushed down to the 76 precinct commanders - all of them experienced local officers. They were instructed to pay attention to quality-of-life signs as well as serious crime, and to aim for crime reduction, not just improved detection rates. Precinct commanders were given new levels of freedom over how to deploy their officers and develop their own strategies for solving the complex but unique problems facing each precinct. Better information. A third strand was to improve the collection, processing, and use of crime statistics. Computer statistics showing crime rates and performance were reviewed at twice-weekly meetings involving precinct commanders and top departmental officials. Problems were converted into plans for action: and the figures would soon show if those plans were working or if fresh approaches were needed. Assessment: difficult, but promising During the first four years of the programme, robberies and burglaries dropped by nearly half. By the end of 2001, crime in New York was at a historic low: robberies were down by 67 per cent in less than a decade. It is debatable how much the structural changes contributed to this, how much was due to the new community policing, how much to better information and being tougher on internal corruption, and how much due to the high-profile personality of Bratton, his deputy Jack Maple, and Mayor Guiliani. Again, it may be argued that the 'broken window' approach can have large effects in cities where petty crime is a serious blot on the quality of life, but that once the situation has been 'normalized', it cannot do much more - and if taken to extremes, could potentially undermine community relations. Clearly, it can produce results only as part of a wider fresh approach to policing. Nevertheless, the stunning improvement in crime statistics and the quality of life in New York within a few years of the policy being adopted has led to other districts in other countries adopting the community policing and devolved structure models for themselves.. In the United Kingdom, Detective Superintendent Ray Mallon brought his own version to Middlesbrough, promising to cut crime by 20% within 18 months. But his aggressive style - he was dubbed 'Robocop' by the media - upset many people, and he was eventually forced from office on charges of misconduct. In Spain, a national police squad was formed in 2001 to crack down on street crime, especially in Madrid's key tourist areas. Within six months there was a 15% drop in muggings and bag-snatchings. In Australia, the increased police presence made necessary by the staging of the Olympics in 2000 has endured in Sydney. Patrols, dog squads, nightclub raids and CCTV have contributed to a fall in fights, muggings, robberies and shootings. Cities in Germany are considering he idea of recruiting young people aged 14-18 as local 'sheriffs' with police IDs and authority to stop bus and train vandalism. A pilot scheme in Bochum has already cut crime on public transport by 40 per cent. All in all, it is fair to say that the New York approach may be controversial, and is easy to get wrong: but when done well, it certainly works to the benefit of all law-abiding local residents For further information:
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Copyright 2002: Adam Smith Institute
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