By George

Tim Lai argues that George Osborne's deficit reduction plan has been painful, but the right choice given the alternatives. The Conservative party’s prospective Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, faced a series of problems going into the 2010 general election: a deep and protracted global economic slump following the 2008 credit crunch, paralysed money markets, a spiralling budget deficit and rapidly rising national debt.

The credit crunch arose from the United States’ sub-prime mortgage market.  From the mid-1990s, US government policy aimed to promote home ownership amongst middle and low-income groups.  Regulatory lending standards were reduced, enabling riskier loans to be made.  Separately, expansionary monetary policy after the 2001 dot.com crash kept US interest rates low from 2002 to 2004, encouraging borrowers into debt.  As rates ‘normalised’ between 2005 and 2007, mortgage costs rose, house prices softened, over-extended borrowers on highly-leveraged loans became exposed, and mortgage defaults multiplied.

Financial institutions in the globalised secondary mortgage market caught a cold.  Benign capital reserve regulations had allowed them to become over-exposed too, on the back of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations funded by short-term inter-bank borrowing.  These complicated bundles of debt were rated as safe by virtue of their diversity, but they proved catastrophically vulnerable to wholesale decline.  Their value plummeted, leaving investment banks with unmanageable debt obligations and no-where to go.  Unable to judge the survivability of existing or prospective counter-parties, they no longer dared lend to each other, and credit froze from August 2007, plunging the global finance sector into crisis.  Government intervention followed on a massive scale, including in the UK, with a coordinated international response to prevent complete market failure; few institutions were allowed to collapse (Lehman Brothers), but many were taken over by rivals (Bears Stearns), bailed out by tax-payers (RBS, Lloyds-TSB, Northern Rock, AIG) or fully nationalized (Bradford & Bingley).  Central banks also injected huge amounts of liquidity into the markets to restore the flow of credit, and they cut base rates to unprecedented levels – the Bank of England rate fell to a record low of 0.5% in March 2009.

Despite these large-scale responses, the crunch in inter-bank lending quickly spread to the real economy. Lenders retrenched, seized by institutional paralysis, reactionary risk aversion, and the need to repair balance sheets and meet new regulatory obligations to recapitalise.  Faced with this credit squeeze, general uncertainty, stock-market volatility akin to the Great Depression, fragile cash-flow, household debt, negative equity, a coincident spike in commodity and food prices (which peaked in Summer 2008), and a growing risk of bankruptcy or unemployment, businesses and consumers reigned in as well.

Albeit for different reasons, the UK’s housing market had become dangerously inflated too, and became an important factor in the nation’s economic woes.  Interest rates never dipped as low as in the US, but had nonetheless been attractive to borrowers since the mid-1990s at around 6%, half the 1970s / 80s average.  Liberal lending criteria drew many into the net, tacitly encouraged by successive governments addicted to property-related revenues and the invigorating effect of apparently rising household wealth.  Struck by contagion and credit blight, the UK housing sector crashed (prices fell by 12% from April 2008 to December 2009), followed by domestic consumer demand (spending fell by 4% over the same period). The effect was compounded from early 2009 by events in the Euro-zone, where the banking crash spawned a sovereign debt crisis in some nations, whereby over-spending governments struggled to refinance their debt or bail out their banks.  These economies faired even less well than the UK, with knock-on effects upon trade.  On the supply side, surviving companies turned increasingly inward, delaying new investment or hiring, cutting costs and hoarding capital, with adverse consequences for productivity and output; UK GDP fell by 6.3% between Q1/2008 and Q2/2009.

Predictably, government revenues fell in the economic downturn (from 36.3% of GDP in 2006-7 to 34.5% in 2009-10), whilst expenditures rose sharply (from 44.2% to 51.6%).  Hence, in the run up to the 6 May election, the budget deficit sat at 11.2% of GDP, the fourth largest amongst OECD countries – smaller than Greece’s and Ireland’s but larger than Spain’s, Portugal’s and Italy’s (the so-called PIIGS) – and the national debt sat at 71.3% of GDP, the highest level since WW2.

Amidst this, the sitting Labour government’s expansionary pre-crisis spending plans had assumed strong economic growth, without which deficit and debt would rise further.  In his April 2008 Budget, Alistair Darling, the Chancellor, was forecasting uninterrupted growth of 1¾–3% between 2008-2010, a rapid fall in inflation to 2% by 2009, a diminishing budget deficit of 2% of GDP by 2010, and national debt of less than 40% of GDP, also by 2010.  Six months later, he acknowledged the extent of the UK’s fiscal challenge, but remained committed to a publicly-funded Keynesian stimulus programme, alongside expansionary monetary policy (cf Quantative Easing), low interest rates and falling commodity prices, to mitigate the effects of the ever-deepening recession confronting him.  He explicitly deferred repairing the public finances to the medium-term.  In his last Pre-Budget Report, in November 2009, he conceded that the economy had, in fact, contracted by 4.75% that year, he predicted above-target inflation, projected an in-year deficit of £178 billion or 12.6% of GDP, of which three quarters was structural, and he estimated that national debt would reach £1.3 trillion or 78% of GDP by 2014.  But he only committed to reigning in government spending from 2011, and to halving the deficit over 4 years, with scant detail on how it would be achieved.

There was little here to worry the Keynesian devotee, for whom renewed growth would naturally close the deficit and pay down the debt.  But disquiet amongst others was multi-faceted: that bureaucratically driven capital expenditure would allocate resources inefficiently, distort markets and displace private sector activity; that a globalised economy would dissipate the effect of any demand-stimuli on British productivity; that the inevitable prospect of fiscal consolidation, including through higher taxes, would dissuade consumers and businesses from being significantly stimulated; that incurring further debt rather than convincingly addressing the public finances would undermine the UK’s credit-worthiness and compound the crisis with higher borrowing costs for the government and a deeply indebted electorate (interest on the national debt stood at 4% of GDP in 2009/10, the fifth largest item of public expenditure); that a cumulative total of £25 billion in stimulus measures – which was all that even Darling felt was affordable in the circumstances – would make little impact (cf the $940 billion spent by the US federal government, the effect of which is also disputed).  In short, whilst Darling’s ends may have been laudable, his Keynesian ways were questionable to many and the means he devoted were commonly held to be woefully inadequate.

Against this background, and in keeping with the Conservatives’ ‘small government’ instincts, Osborne adopted a more aggressive strategy that attacked the deficit immediately and aimed to eliminate it more quickly.  His headline targets were to reduce government spending from 47% of GDP in 2009-2010 to 41% in 2015-2016, cut borrowing from 11% to 2% and begin bringing public debt down.  A notable objective during the process was to preserve the confidence of bond markets and keep borrowing costs low.  Ahead of the election, the Conservative Party’s manifesto had committed to: macro-economic stability founded upon savings and investment; low interest rates; effective prudential supervision of the financial markets and; at its core, a credible plan to eliminate the bulk of the structural budget deficit over the course of a single Parliament.  The substance emerged on 22 June, in the new Chancellor’s emergency budget, where he described an ambitious strategy to cut public expenditure by 6.3% of GDP over four years, with more than three quarters coming from spending cuts and the balance from higher taxation.  He also announced most of the major muscle moves for his strategy:

• An immediate in-year cut of £6 billion had been announced soon after the election as a nod to the markets. He supplemented this (whilst also leaving most of Labour’s pre-existing measures in place) with a public sector pay freeze, an accelerated rise in the state pension age, the elimination of middle class tax credits, a change from Retail to Consumer Price Index for calculating welfare benefits, better scrutiny of the Disability Living Allowance and restrictions on Housing Benefit.  In subsequent budgets, he: cut Child Benefit for high-earners; increased public sector pension contributions; introduced ‘career average’ rather than final earnings as the basis for defined-benefit public sector pensions; placed an overall cap on welfare spending and; committed to running a balanced budget over an economic cycle. • On taxation, he increased VAT from 17.5% to 20%, introduced a bank balance-sheet levy, created a 28% Capital Gains Tax band for higher-rate earners (up from 18%) and signalled reviews on tax indexation and financial dealings as sources of additional revenue.  Later, he also ramped up the Revenue’s anti-tax-avoidance operations. • To support growth, he lifted the threshold for employers’ National Insurance contributions, began a phased reduction in corporation tax from 28% to 24% (later extended and accelerated to reach 20% in 2015-2016), took steps to increase the personal income tax allowance from £6,500 to £10,000 (later raised to £10,500 – a flagship Liberal Democrat measure adopted by the coalition government), resurrected a previous link between the basic pension and earnings, and declared support to various regional infrastructure projects.  This was followed by a suspension of above-inflation rises in petrol duty, the controversial reduction of Labour’s top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%, the introduction of ‘funding for lending’ and Help to Buy schemes aimed at encouraging banks to lend to small businesses and nudge developers into building new housing, and limited relief from green levies for businesses. • Finally, by way of oversight, he had already announced the creation of an independent Office for Budget Responsibility.  In the Autumn of 2010, he also instigated an overhaul of the regulatory framework for the financial sector under the Bank of England, which gained wide-ranging powers for prudential regulation under its new Governor in 2013. This extensive catalogue of measures went a long way to addressing the deficit over time, but a gap remained for government departments to bridge during the Comprehensive Spending Review that followed his emergency budget.  Having reaffirmed the party’s commitment to protect the health and overseas aid budgets, which represented almost 20% of all government spending, other areas faced eye-watering average cuts of 25% – up from 14% if nothing had been ring-fenced).  This was later ameliorated by other savings (notably from Child Benefit), but nonetheless remained at 19%.  In practice, the pain was unevenly spread, from 7.5% for Defence and 11% for Education, through 25% for the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, to over 60% for Communities & Local Government.

Osborne’s plan for fiscal consolidation was severe, and risky.  Many feared it would kill off a weak recovery, plunge the economy back into recession and prolong the nation’s woes.  Foremost amongst his critics was the Labour opposition.  But his approach did gain the endorsement of the money markets, sovereign rating agencies and international institutions (including, initially, the International Monetary Fund), all key audiences.  Subsequently, with a depreciating pound, stubborn inflation, rising unemployment, weak private sector investment, feeble productivity growth and, in 2011, the prospect of double-dip recession, he fought off strong pressure to reign back on his programme – and retrospective analysis later determined that a double-dip recession did not, in fact, occur.  By the same token, he resisted further fiscal tightening in early 2013, when Moody’s removed the UK’s AAA credit rating, and when it became clear he would miss his key targets, such that the deficit will is not now expected to clear until 2018-2019, borrowing is forecast to remain above 2% of GDP until 2017-2018, and the national debt is unlikely to fall until 2016-2017.

But even as the UK’s credit-worthiness was downgraded, economic indicators began to improve, led by rising employment and followed by falling inflation, stronger growth and recovering house prices.  By May 2013, the deficit had, at least, stabilised.  A year later: unemployment is below 7% and record numbers have jobs; inflation is 1.6%, well below the Bank of England’s 2% target; incomes are rising faster than prices; the economy is expected to grow by 2.7% in 2014 (faster than any other major economy) and has all-but reached its pre-crisis level; and the budget deficit is down by a third and falling.  In short, notwithstanding the delay in meeting his main targets, the ends to which Osborne committed himself in 2010 are largely realised or firmly in prospect.  But does that make his strategy the right one?

Amongst the foremost strengths of Osborne’s approach, he maintained the confidence of the money markets and protected borrowing rates.  It is improbable that the UK would ever have been unable to sell its bonds, as those nations bailed out by the troika of the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF were unable to do during the Eurozone crisis, but a loss of confidence would almost certainly have raised the cost of government and personal borrowing, swallowing up the Exchequer’s scarce resources and compounding the financial difficulties of individual debtors and struggling businesses (the UK’s 10 year bond yield fell from 4.28% in February 2010 to a record low of 1.38% in July 2012, and stood at around 2.67% in late April 2014; by contrast, Spain’s peaked at 7.6% in July 2012 and was 4.29% in April 2014; Greece’s peaked at 48.6% in March 2012 and stood at 8.6% in April 2014).  The creation of an independent OBR and the consolidation of responsibility for financial stability and prudential regulation under the BoE played to the same ‘confidence’ narrative by strengthening fiscal transparency and economic governance.  The theorist (including the OECD and IMF) would also look favourably upon Osborne’s spending cuts as a more effective way to close the budget deficit than a higher taxes, and upon his increase in consumption tax as less distorting and constraining on growth than taxes on income, production or investment.  But both spending cuts and higher VAT are regressive and, politically, they demanded to be offset.  Raising the personal income tax allowance (and manipulating the higher rate threshold to limit the benefit to higher earners) did this, whilst also incentivising employment over welfare dependency.  So, too, eliminating middle-class allowances and introducing higher-rate capital gains tax.  Meanwhile, cutting corporation tax, employers’ National Insurance contributions and moderating rises in fuel duty will have supported private sector growth, albeit this effect was notably sluggish.  In summary, Osborne’s package of measures seems balanced and well calibrated to deliver effect without breaking voters’ endurance.  Whilst risky, it was also politically astute, underlining the Tories’ reputation for economic competence and forcing Labour toward fiscal conservatism in an attempt to shed their reputation for profligacy.

His approach has not been without its weaknesses, however.  Most notably, the commitment to ring-fence health spending has severely exacerbated cuts elsewhere and distorted service provision across the board.  It has also sheltered 20% of total government spending from the most rigorous examination.  This may have been a political concession the Tories had to make to gain office in 2010, but it was constraining and unlikely to be repeated in 2015.  Another commonly levelled criticism has been that universal pensioner benefits were left untouched.  In view of dramatically improved health and life expectancy, and the less wearing nature of most modern occupations, many have also argued that Osborne should have gone further with raising the state pension age.  But senior citizens are a growing constituency and the group most likely to vote.  They cannot easily be ignored and, indeed, the Tories even reiterated their expensive commitment to protect the value of state pensions via the ‘triple lock’, which assures indexation by the greatest of inflation, wages or 2.5%.  Elsewhere, Labour’s capital investment cuts, amounting to 1.5% of GDP, were left in place.  Granted, new and important capital spending was subsequently announced (much of it using private sector money) but, amongst all else, it could sensibly have been disbursed earlier, helping to create economically conducive conditions for the recovery.  In short, the government’s strategy has had its economic shortcomings, some of them quite serious, but most have been driven by political expedience or necessity; ever will it be thus.

The circumstances facing the government have also presented opportunities, some of which have been embraced more readily than others.  For example, the chance to refashion and shrink government has been clear, but seems largely to have been taken ad hoc, without any central or overarching examination of what the state is for.  The OBR forecasts that public sector employment will have shrunk by up to 1.1 million by 2018, spending has become more targeted and public services have been opened up to other providers; but this does not amount to a fundamental philosophical transformation.  A root-and-branch overhaul of the UK’s complicated and behaviour-distorting tax code is overdue – for example, to remove the increasingly artificial distinction between income tax and National Insurance, to enhance rewards for investment and production, and to eliminate the most harmful forms of economic rent.  Less punishing or stigmatising bankruptcy laws, akin to those of the United States, might encourage enterprise.  And an examination of the energy sector could more faithfully price carbon emissions, evaluate the cost and maturity of emerging green technologies and agree sensible bridging strategies around nuclear generation and shale oil and gas.

But nor should the threats be underestimated that Osborne faced to his strategy.  It seems likely that excess productive capacity, scarce credit, general uncertainty, risk aversion, and turmoil in the Euro-zone export market did, indeed, serve to dampen private sector investment and to delay the substitution of public sector spending that Osborne’s plan required.  Faced with multiple challenges, banks also remained stubbornly reluctant to lend to business.  Most indicators came to point strongly in the right direction, but his timetable had already been compromised by this earlier sluggishness.  Inflation could have knocked things off track too; although fuelled by temporary phenomena, the cumulative and persistent effect could have forced an unwelcome rise in interest rates.  Instead, deflation became the greater threat.  Disappointing private-sector investment and a persistently fragile Euro-zone left exports weak, perpetuating a potentially destabilising trade deficit.  A resurgent housing market raised the fear of a new bubble, and saving remained unattractive.

In summary, whilst imperfect, Osborne’s deficit reduction plan withstands scrutiny.  At a time when others were reluctant to face (or publicly admit to) the economic challenge in prospect fro the nation, he described it as he saw it and was clear on his objectives from the outset, with respect to government spending, borrowing and debt; he laid out his timetable; and he deployed a strategy to deliver, balancing savings against revenues and using effective measures that, in many instances, had reinforcing secondary effects.  But it is always difficult to prove cause and effect in real-world economics, where innumerable inter-dependent factors are at work, which cannot be evaluated in isolation.  Hence, the extent to which Osborne’s actions were the cause of the positive economic outcomes that followed will always be debatable.  But on the balance of rather extensive circumstantial evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that his strategy was successful.

Nor is it easy to contemplate alternatives in the absence of any meaningful counterfactual.  Some present President Obama’s stimulus package in the US as the sort of Keynesian response advocated by Labour.  But the effect of this federal spending was substantially diminished by the sharp cuts forced upon the states, most of which are required by law to maintain a balanced operating budget.  The US, with the world’s reserve currency, also enjoys very different borrowing terms in the bond markets to the UK.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, the much more severe austerity visited upon the PIIGS by the troika, in order to restore their fiscal credibility, is widely viewed to have prolonged recession and aggravated unemployment well beyond anything the UK endured (Greece, Spain and Italy remain in recession in May 2014, with Greek and Spanish unemployment still exceeding 25%).  In short, George Osborne’s flawed offering may have been about as good as it could reasonably have been.

What joy, it's Mariana Mazzucato again

We've pointed to Mariana Mazzucato's umm, interesting views on government aid to research before here. She seems not to have grasped the most basic concept underlying the very existence of such aid in the first place. But here she is wading in on what should be done about the Pfizer takeover offer for AstraZeneca:

Pfizer wants to buy AstroZeneca, a British firm, to cuts its high overheads and especially to pay the lower UK tax rate (20%) – the cheap way the UK attracts "capital"– rather than the 40% US tax rate

Given that the US rate is 35% we might assume that Ms. Mazzucato's command of the facts is somewhat lacking.

And what is happening to big pharma's research and development? In the name of "open innovation" – the admission that most of their knowledge comes from small biotech and large public labs – big pharma have been closing down their own R&D (reducing total numbers of researchers), as well as moving the remaining ones to be close to those labs. Big pharma is no longer in the innovation business, using its own resources to fund the high-risk ideas, most of which will fail. It has become more risk-averse and prefers to focus on the D of R&D and please shareholders. Mergers and acquisition strategies reduce expensive overheads and costs (of which research infrastructure is the highest).

And there is another, umm, mis-statement of the facts. It's the D in R&D that is the expensive and risky part of drug development. You'll not have much change out of $300 million (at the least!) for running a series of Phase II and Phase III trials of a new drug. And yes, drugs do indeed fail to get approved even after such tests, let alone during them. That's actually the function that big pharma performs in the current system: having the financial beef to be able to pay for this very expensive and high failure rate stage. She's simply got things the wrong way around here.

But we can and should go further for she's entirely garbling the whole point of having government contribute to the provision of public goods:

Government could also retain a golden share of the intellectual property rights (patents) which public research produces, and/or make sure that the prices of the new drugs reflect how the taxpayer paid for the most high-risk research.

Sigh. The entire point, the only point, to having government subsidise basic research is because basic research is a public good. That is, the results (ie, we know that heroin cures pain, Hurrah!) are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means that they are also extremely difficult to make any money out of. So, we assume that this difficulty with making a profit will lead to less innovation and research than we might like there to be. Great, so, government steps in to correct this possible market failure.

But you can't then go around demanding that government gets a cut of the profits when the only reason government is there in the first place is because it's dang hard to make profits out of this research. If it's easy to make profits then government doesn't need to fund it: the only reason for the government funding is that profits are hard to capture.

We can also think of this another way. The reason we have government is so that we can gain these public goods that we can only have through government. So to complain that government is producing public goods without any reward is near lunatic: that's just government doing what government is there to do. It's like complaining that your umbrella keeps the rain off you. Yes, what else do you want it to do for you, cook your tea or something?

Mervyn King on Thomas Piketty

In the Sunday Telegraph former Bank of England Governor, Mervyn King, reviews Thomas Piketty's book, "Capital in the Twenty-First Century," and carefully shows where and why it is wrong.

He points out that technology and globalization "have raised the demand for special talent and lowered it for unskilled labour."  The Wimbledon prize money is 33 times what it was (in real terms) forty years ago, whereas manufacturing wages have merely doubled over the same period.

Returns go to the winners of the tournament, whether in tennis, finance, law, computing, advertising or other occupations. The “winner takes all” mentality has invaded many walks of life, although the identity of the winner changes over time.

King takes on Piketty's central claim that the rate of return on capital (r) exceeds the rate of economic growth (g), and his assumption that this will lead to ever greater concentration of wealth.  King questions the idea that "the owners of capital reinvest all their profits and the spendthrift workers consume all their wages."  Where, he asks, are the families that have pensions and own houses?  And what about the sovereign wealth funds that are important forms of collective ownership?

A key issue King identifies in Piketty is his failure to take into account risk in investment. "Adjusting for risk," he says, "average rates of return have historically been much closer to growth rates."  Indeed, King notes that the current risk-adjusted rate of interest is below the growth rate.  Where Piketty claims that the period 1910-1970 was exceptional because of major shocks, King suggests that the risk premium "which constitutes a large part of the rate of return on capital," reflects the possibility that major shocks could happen again.

King tells us that the share owned by the top one percent has fluctuated up and down, but is lower today than it was 200 years ago, and "a similar story can be told for Britain and Sweden. In Europe, the concentration of wealth among the elite remains far below what it was in the 19th century."

Although Piketty concentrates on capitalism's alleged failings, King says one should not ignore the achievements of a market economy in creating growth and reducing poverty.  Quite so.  No-one has found a better way to raise living standards for billions of people.  The wealth of a market economy has funded education, healthcare, sanitation, the arts and scientific research as well as raising material prosperity.  Piketty's attack on it is but the latest in a series emanating from the Left, and King has done us all a service by undermining it.

Twelve problems with Piketty's capital

Piketty’s thesis is that the rate of return on capital exceeds the general rate of growth (r > g). So, barring wars, capital owners accumulate a larger and larger share of the world’s wealth. 1. This theory does not fit the facts. In the modern economy, it is not the rich who are getting richer, but the poor. The failure of communism and the spread of trade has lifted perhaps 2 billion people off dollar-a-day- poverty.

2. Capital is not like a tree that drops fruit into the owner’s lap. Capital has to be created, accumulated, applied, managed and safeguarded if it is to produce any income at all. Capital owners can and do fail at any one of those points.

3. Capital is certainly destroyed by war from time to time. But it is destroyed every day by folly, misfortune, miscalculation or being outperformed by competitors. The difficult thing is keeping wealth. Losing it is easy.

4. Capital carries risk, not a word that features much in Piketty. Utility-type capital with more predictable returns produces higher returns, entrepreneurs making risky investments demand higher returns. There is no one ‘r’.

5. Even a small amount of risk undermines Piketty’s belief that capital owners will get richer for ever. Stuff happens: it is hard to predict what returns will be next year, never mind in ten years or a hundred.

6. The risk-adjusted rate of return on capital is modest, and falling, as it has been doing for decades. Adjusted for risk, Piketty’s thesis does not fit the facts.

7. Capital is only one factor of production. You need labour and brains too. If capital took a larger and larger share, wages would soon be bid up. The 19th Century saw huge capital accumulation – but huge rises in living standards too.

8. The most important form of capital in our service economy is human capital. That’s not confined to a few rich people, but owned by all of us. Investing in it delivers a far bigger payback than the returns on financial or physical capital.

9. The success and rapid rise of poor immigrant groups, from Ellis Island to modern Europe, shows that you do not need to own financial or physical capital to generate income and accumulate wealth fast.

10. Capital-owning societies are actually more equal. Pre-tax, not greatly; but post-tax, with their health, education and welfare programmes, they are very much more equal. And it’s better to be poor in a rich capitalist country.

11. Piketty’s savage global redistribution would destroy capital, and sacrifice its productive power for society. Massive capital taxes create instability (Cyprus) or ruin (Zaire). High taxes also cut people’s investment in their own human capital.

12. If you want to make the world more equal, try open immigration. The world’s poorest live where capital is sparse and unprotected by the rule of law. Let them become participants in the productive, capitalist, wealth-creating process.

But George, it matters what people do, not what they feel guilty about

Sadly, George Monbiot has gone off on one again. Decrying the fact that we neoliberals in the Anglo Saxon capitalist style world don't feel guilty enough about despoiling Gaia. The poor in other places, being as they are not Anglo Saxon and also sanctified by their being poor, care a lot more.

We are sinners as a result.

The problem with this is that what matters rather more than how guilty any of us might feel is what we actually do.

For years we've been told that people cannot afford to care about the natural world until they become rich; that only economic growth can save the biosphere, that civilisation marches towards enlightenment about our impacts on the living planet. The results suggest the opposite. As you can see from the following graph, the people consulted in poorer countries feel, on average, much guiltier about their impacts on the natural world than people in rich countries, even though those impacts tend to be smaller. Of the nations surveyed, the people of Germany, the US, Australia and Britain feel the least consumer guilt; the people of India, China, Mexico and Brazil the most. The more we consume, the less we feel. And maybe that doesn't just apply to guilt. Perhaps that's the point of our otherwise-pointless hyperconsumption: it smothers feeling. It might also be the effect of the constant bombardment of advertising and marketing. They seek to replace our attachments to people and place with attachments to objects: attachments which the next round of advertising then breaks in the hope of attaching us to a different set of objects. The richer we are and the more we consume, the more self-centred and careless of the lives of others we appear to become. Even if you somehow put aside the direct, physical impacts of rising consumption, it's hard to understand how anyone could imagine that economic growth is a formula for protecting the planet.

The problems with all of this are myriad. For a start, the impact of the poor upon the environment is much greater than that of we rich. The Amazon isn't being cut down to grow beef for McDonald's, it's being burnt down by poor peasants so they can grow runty corn for a year or two until the soil is exhausted. And the proof that we richer people do care more about the environment is all around us. Britain is cleaner than it has been for 500 years as a result of our increased wealth.

We might change out minds a little bit about this if we are to talk of climate change: for it is true that emissions from people living in the rich world are higher than of those living in the poor. But do also note what is happening: we rich world people are putting in place the expensive plans required to lower those emissions. Feed in tariffs, cap and trade, carbon taxes: whether you want to "take climate change seriously" or not is entirely up to you. But there's absolutely no doubt that it is us in the places that apparently don't care about it that are actually doing things about it.

Which brings us to the much more important basic point. The 20th century rather tells us that what people think about things, their guilt at the state of the world, is less important than their actions. Many communists and socialists really did believe that communism and socialism would be better for human beings than the terrors of capitalism and free markets. But their motives pale beside their actual works, slaughtering a hundred million and more in assuaging their guilt.

Actions George, not motives.

Repeat after us: the Treasury is not the economy and the economy is not the Treasury

We've another instance of that desperately sad confusion over the economy and the government, the difference between the Treasury and the nation. There are most assuredly people who go around paying and earning in cash and not, very naughtily, paying the requisite taxation on such sums. This will cost the Treasury tax revenue, this is entirely true. But it does not cost the nation or the economy anything:

For homeowners eager to save money on repairs, it’s a tempting proposition – you pay a tradesman cash-in-hand, he knocks a bit off the bill, and no questions are asked. With the builder or plumber failing to declare their earnings and pay any tax, such secret payments are said to cost the economy £2billion a year. Now a survey suggests the black economy is booming, with more than four in five homeowners admitting they have paid a workman cash-in-hand.

This simply is not a cost to the economy as a whole. For that money is still circulating, the economic activity is still happening, therefore it cannot be a cost to the economy. We might take it a little further too. We know very well that the levying of a tax reduces economic activity purely by being levied. The marginal deadweight cost at current levels of taxation is put at around one third or so. The corollary of that is that some one third of currently untaxed activity would simply not happen if it were taxed. The grey economy (intrinsically legal but untaxed) is thus in part an addition to the size of the economy we would have if all transactions were taxed.

But more important than that we have to insist on killing the pernicious idea that the economy is the Treasury, or that the Treasury is the economy. Economic activity that doesn't pay the tithe to the Treasury is still economic activity and thus is not a cost to the economy as a whole.

HMRC and the rule of law

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Plans to allow Britain's tax authorities, HMRC, to take money directly from the accounts of tax delinquents have been criticised by a Committee of MPs on the grounds that HMRC 'sometimes makes mistakes'.

A sharper criticism would be that the plan is a fundamental assault on the rule of law.

Next year is the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, but the basic civil protections it gave citizens against arbitrary power are being systematically eroded. Governments have become elected dictatorships.

Magna Carta laid down that there could be no taxation without the 'common consent' of the people. It also insisted that no official can take anything from a person – nor fine them, nor imprison them, nor 'in any way destroy' them – without due process of law. Right now, the tax authorities would have to apply to the courts before they could take cash or other assets from a citizen.

But the new HMRC plans flout both these Magna Carta principles. HMRC can already decide that someone owes tax that they have deliberately 'avoided' – even if they have complied with every tax law. This is arbitrary power that we cannot safely entrust to any official. Reinforcing that power with further powers of confiscation – in the absence of any magistrate or court decision – is even more dangerous.

The MPs are right that even fair-minded officials make mistakes. Worse, the new plan passes the burden of proof – and the costs of proving it – from the authorities to the citizen. That again is contrary to the fundamental principle that people are innocent until proven guilty.

HMRC says that the new powers would be used only in extremis. But then they say that they expect perhaps 17,000 people will be affected each year. Many of them will, of course, be people who are completely innocent and the subject of official mistakes. Some will see their businesses ruined, and their employees losing their jobs, because of officials arbitrarily raiding their accounts. Others, worryingly will be people who the authorities decide to bully and make an 'example' of just because they are well known.

Recent history – like people being arrested under terrorism legislation for heckling the Home Secretary or walking down a cycle path – shows that when you give officials sweeping powers, they will be used. And when you exempt them from the rule of law, those powers will be abused.

Simon Jenkins is absolutely correct, the problem with the NHS is the national part

Glory be, something sensible said in The Guardian at last. Admittedly, it is being said by Simon Jenkins who does sometimes get things gloriously correct. His point is that the NHS simply cannot be run as one single monolithic bloc, it's just too large for that:

Yet one subject that is unmentionable – and therefore untouchable – is the size of the NHS itself. A public service that, for a generation, has successfully nationalised its virtues finds it has now nationalised blame for its vices. Where glory once shone down on the Commons dispatch box, now there is only scandal. It must make sense that, when every conceivable reform – devolution, centralisation, purchaser-provider split, internal markets, fundholders, commissioners – has been tried and seen to fail, someone should challenge the very concept of a central service. It might be worth looking at how others do it, and not smugly concluding that the public likes the NHS the way it is. The health service is not useless or uncaring or that bad at making people better. It is just too big. Aneurin Bevan was wrong to nationalise it back in 1948 – and his great foe, Herbert Morrison, was right in wanting a new service based on charitable and municipal hospitals, as remains the case almost everywhere in the world.

The NHS is some 11% of our entire economy. We might think that only running 11% of the economy as a Stalinist style top down and planned organisation isn't so bad. But this is an organisation the same size as the total economies of Finland, Greece or Portugal. And other than Seumas Milne there's no one at all left who thinks that rigid state planning of any organisation that size is likely to work or be efficient.

So, to localism and small scale management it is then. Jenkins mentions Denmark as a reasonable example, where it is the commune (as small as 10,000 people but usually substantially larger) that both raises the tax money for health care and also allocates its spending. Sweden does much the same but at the county level. And when the basis of the system is that fine grained then it's obvious that not all treatments can be provided by all outlets. There's therefore a considerable market in who provides what to whom.

And yes, that is the other side of pushing decision making and planning down to that level. We still want a coordination method for the whole. But we've just agreed that it cannot be central government nor planning. The answer is, thus, the other method of coordination that we know of: markets. For that is what markets are a method of, coordination, cooperation. The competition part of them is a terribly minor part: that's the bit where people work out who they are going to cooperate with.

A decentralised NHS would be, as Jenkins says, a better one. And we'd therefore need to use market mechanisms to provide the coordination across the different providers. It can still all be tax funded if that's how we decide we'd like to do it. But whether we do that or not it is still true that currently we've Stalnist central planning in an organisation that ios the economic size of entire countries. And the interesting lesson of the second half of the 20th century was that central planning on that scale just doesn't work.

UK inequality just isn't what we keep being told it is

We're repeatedly told two things: that inequality in the UK is very high and also that inequality is a terrible thing, damaging to us all. However, there's a nice little study from Eurostat which shows that all isn't quite as it seems. The Independent reports:

The grim truth about pay and living standards in some the regions of the UK has also been highlighted by official EU figures showing that parts of Britain are effectively poorer that countries from former communist countries in Eastern Europe. People in Cornwall and the Welsh Valleys are worse off than residents of Estonia and Lithuania, according to Eurostat figures comparing wealth across the EU using a measure known as “purchasing power standards” - which takes into account GDP per person and cost of living. In addition, Durham and the Tees Valley, in the north east of England, are poorer than those in the wealthiest regions of Bulgaria and Romania, the two most deprived countries in the EU. By contrast, the Eurostat figures show that London is the richest place in Europe.

The impression we get from the usual reports of inequality is that we've plutocrats living in their gilded palaces while diverse Dives scramble for scraps at their gates. It is this that creates the social tensions that lead to that inequality being so bad for all of us as The Spirit Level and the like insists.

But as we can see from these figures that's not really what drives inequality across the UK. Rather, London is a part of the Great Global Economy and the rest of Britain is a pretty middle of the road European one. We have regional, or geographic, inequality rather than that vertical pyramid people so love to worry about. Thus it's rather difficult to see the transmission method by which the inequality leads to all those horrors that we're supposed to associate with it.

That earning £15,000 a year while the people next door flaunt their £100,000 a year might indeed engender jealousy, envy, even stress. But that million of people hundreds of miles away have a better lifestyle than you and all those around you do, well, it's very difficult to see how this can have much of an effect.

If it did have an effect then we would expect those in Kent to suffer from the lifestyles in Paris, those in Bratislava to be consumed with resentment at how well off Vienna is. And no one really does argue either of those things: so why the diference between London and Cornwall is paid any mind is very difficult to see.

Even if we do want to argue that there's an effect the solution is still obvious: work to make all of Britain part of that Great Global Economy, not to try and strangle London to make all equally poor.

Polly Toynbee really needs to pay more attention to her examples

Polly Toynbee wants to convince us all that privatisation was a very bad idea, that those businesses sold off would have been much better left in hte bosom of he State. We do need to point out, however, that she would be well advised to pick her examples in a rather better fashion. For example:

The state sold off its assets at knock-down prices, with an average increase in profits of 419% in nine companies from privatisation to 2010, compared with an FTSE100 average of 206% in the same period.

Lessee: companies in the bosom of the State make low profits. Companies freed from said embrace make much better profits. How is this a criticism of freeing companies from that clutch? It is, rather, evidence that when run along political lines, as anything owned by the State will inevitably be, an organisation will be run in an inefficient manner. For Polly to choose as an example of why privatisation is bad exactly the evidence that it works as advertised on the tin is possibly careless of her.

And again:

The pay of privatised staff has stagnated while 170,000 jobs were lost.

So the nationalised companies were grossly overstaffed and the workers paid too much in wages. Privatisation corrected both these errors. Again, this is something most odd to use as an argument against privatisation.

The dogma driving these privatisations wilfully ignores past experience.

Dogma:

Dogma is a principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true. It serves as part of the primary basis of an ideology, nationalism or belief system, and it cannot be changed or discarded without affecting the very system's paradigm, or the ideology itself.

Exactly who is guilty of that here Polly?