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Regulation and the financial crisis Print E-mail
Written by Tom Clougherty   
Thursday, 27 November 2008 06:02

In a new ASI briefing paper – The Financial Crisis: Is Regulation Cure or Cause? – Tim Ambler examines demands for financial stability and security though increased regulation. The question the paper poses is whether existing regulation mitigated the 2008 financial crisis, had no impact, or exacerbated it. Answering this question is the key to deciding how we respond to the crisis.

A few main points:

  • The crisis may have begun in the US, where regulation introduced during the Carter and Clinton presidencies was a major contributing factor, but whatever the international aspects of the crisis there are clearly a number of home-grown elements that made the UK particularly susceptible to it.
  • The financial crisis was triggered by the bursting of a credit-fuelled bubble. Regulation and regulators did not cause this fatal bubble, but they did indirectly help it to grow by fostering the illusion of financial security. At no point did the UK's main regulatory institutions warn of the dangers ahead.
  • The over-regulation of traditional financial services shifted enterprise towards complex financial packages that were unknown to, unseen by, and not understood by the FSA or UK Treasury. In many instances, even bank directors did not know what they were investing in.
  • The regulation enforced by the FSA is predominantly legalistic and rules-based, and amounts to the micro-management of the way firms are structured and run their businesses. Compliance with rules was mistaken for the validation of business models and management practices – clearly a mistake. Regulation should focus more on principles and outcomes, not processes. We need better oversight, not more regulation.
  • The most important factor in the crisis was that the UK's financial regulators lacked a clear and simple remit. This led them to overlook the early signs of the crisis and hampered their response to it. The Treasury must take responsibility for the failings of the tri-partite system, since they were the architects of it.
  • The paper singles out the Bank of England for particular criticism, arguing that it was so pre-occupied with its first objective – monetary stability – that it failed to give due attention to its second one – the stability of the financial system. And even the Bank's focus on interest rates and inflation was rendered ineffective by the exclusion of property prices from their remit.
  • The main conclusion of the paper is that improving regulation will not provide more than modest help in future. The important thing is that the Bank of England, the FSA and the credit agencies do the jobs they are supposed to do more effectively. The paper suggests a number of structural modifications that should be made to allow this to happen.

Click here to download a PDF of the briefing paper.

Comments (6)Add Comment
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written by HJ, November 27, 2008
You're absolutely right, of course - couldn't agree more.

However, there is one thing you've overlooked. The VAT cut is temporary and it will go back up in a year, simply because they can't afford to make it a permanent cut due to the deficit and their profligate spending plans. Had Brown/Darling chosen to double personal allowances or cut employers NI, people (i.e. voters) would have really noticed the impact when they returned to their old levels after a year.

Doubling tax allowances and reducing or eliminating employers NI contributions are the right things to do permanently - but Brown/Darling are only after a short term fix.
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written by Anonymous, November 27, 2008
It should be noted RPI includes mortgage interest patment where as RPIX excludes mortgage interest payments (while including property prices), when comes to inflation targeting using RPI could inflate Mortgage interest payment creating a vicious circle of high interest rates unlike RPIX, the difference is quite academic but important from monetary point of view.

The brefing paper has a factual error before CPI was used, the Bank of England used the RPIX as inflation measure with a target of 2.5%.

For more details about RPIX visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RPIX
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written by Flug, November 27, 2008
Especially point 2 is a crucial one. The bubble had to be anticipated and actions be taken much earlier. All the steps the governments plan to take now will just not abolish the cause but only harm the consequences. Another point is that several Central Reserve Banks just did follow either a too active policy or took the right actions at the wrong time. I am very curious what's gonna happen now, as I abhor the whole money system with its compound interest, that is the key reason for the financial crisis in my eyes.
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written by Blog Administrator, November 27, 2008
Anonymous – Thanks for pointing that out. I've updated the PDF.
Great
written by Jeff, December 01, 2008
Nice article.
Thanks for sharing it.
Also thanks for the pdf.
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written by Miles Saltiel, December 04, 2008
There is much good sense in Tim Ambler's paper on regulation and who would want to argue with the critical comments on UK regulation by my former-colleague, Richard Jeffries? The paper does, however, miss a couple of tricks.

First it fails to set out a framework for the objectives of a market-friendly regime of financial regulation, e.g., controlling leverage, maximising transparency (where the papers creates something of a straw man; see below), compliance, and avoiding contagion with firewalls and moral hazard by making targeted examples.

Second, he fails to make the most of some of his points. Thus, he lays into the FSA without pointing out that its central failing is the style of its regime: rules-based on the US model, rather than principles-based, which would have made irrelevant the "off-books" character of recent financial structures. He also dismisses transparency as backward-looking, without considering how exchange-based trading and disclosure of transactions in complex instruments would have precluded the distinguishing feature of the current crisis: the flight from interbank lending. And although he notes failings of auditing, he doesn't drill down to the complex monopoly embracing investment banks, rating agencies and auditors. (Parenthetically, the remarks on "mark to market" are a tad eccentric for a free-market paper.)

Finally, the paper's policy prescriptions are insufficiently ambitious. The UK has a vital interest in healthy capital markets and it would serve our interests to make market-savvy proposals in the European and international forums addressing the matter in the new year.

For an expansion on these comments- as circulated by George Osborne's office to the shadow treasury team - please see http://www.fourth-phoenix.com/Market-savvy.pdf

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