Vishal is the winner of the Adam Smith Institute’s ‘Young Writer on Liberty’ competition. The subject of the competition was ‘3 Policy Choices to make the UK a Freer Country’, and below is one of Vishal’s three submissions.
Although only 12% of Afghanistan’s land is arable, 70% of the population rely on agriculture for their subsistence and the country is the world’s largest producer of illicit opium (~90% of total global output). There has been discussion of granting farmers licenses to cultivate opium but we should also consider it as a potential method of covert, economic counter-insurgency. This would reduce the need for troops on the ground, alleviate poverty and deal with the NHS’ shortage of opioid drugs (this shortage has meant that people are literally dying of pain).
Many corporations (such as GlaxoSmithKline, Mallinckrodt, Abbott Laboratories and Johnson & Johnson) already legally import from India, Turkey and New Zealand. Why not add Afghanistan to the list and kill several birds with one stone?
Prior to the 2001 invasion, the Taliban declared opium ‘haram’ (sinful) and they sharply reduced opium output in Afghanistan during this crackdown. However, in a hypocritical move intended to help fund its insurgency, they have been earning money from opium farmers, smugglers, etc. – being the ‘middleman’ generates some serious revenue for the Taliban.
Legalisation would eliminate the need for middlemen by allowing farmers to directly supply to pharmaceutical companies instead. Farmers receive a fraction (<25%) of the profits. The rest goes to kingpins and warlords. One can easily see why the opium farmers would subsequently have a disincentive to fund any operations by the Taliban against those who are responsible for their livelihood and newfound wealth. How many producers could seriously be interested in killing off their customers?
Many young men have benefitted from the opium trade (becoming the ‘new rich’). So, supposing that the Taliban were to try to wrest control of cultivation or extort from the cultivating communities, they would be causing discontent amongst the same people whom they physically require to fight.
The Taliban pay up to $200/month for men to fight for them (versus the $70/month offered to join the national police force) – legalisation would give those youth some alternative, lucrative sources of employment. Fewer able, young Afghans willing to fight means that we wouldn’t require as many troops to be stationed there and that the Taliban’s grip over certain provinces would naturally loosen.
These self-reinforcing socioeconomic mechanisms, amongst others, would naturally undermine the Taliban both socially and financially.
Legalisation can be a means of economic counter-terrorism that enables double-sided welfare gains and getting troops out sooner rather than later.