Adam Smith Institute

Jason Turner is an interesting person. He was in charge of welfare reform in New York under mayor Rudi Guiliani, and before that he designed Wisconsin's history changing welfare reforms. He has a chapter in the new report Paying for Success from Policy Exchange,  and was speaking to a few of us at the Institute of Economic Affairs. The fact that I was there as well indicates the degree of cross-think-tank interest there is in the Wisconsin experience.

Wisconsin, Turner told us, cut its welfare rolls dramatically – and reduced poverty and increased employment at the same time. That's because they started from a set of clear principles about what welfare should be for, rather than trying to fiddle with the existing system. The key principle, which struck a chord with taxpayers, legislators, and the working poor, was that everyone who is able to work should be expected to work, and get paid for it, either in the private or the public sector. It's what Turner called the 'time commitment' – sitting idle while drawing benefits is not an option. That appeals, he said, to everyone's sense of fairness – particularly that of the working poor, who do not enjoy the luxury of being able to sit at home while getting paid for it.

The other innovation in Wisconsin was to get private agencies, charities and companies, to handle the task of supporting and training welfare recipients and helping them get back into work. These independent intermediaries did very well out of the plan – but then they were saving taxpayers huge amounts of money. That, of course, led to some criticism, and Turner believes there are important lessons from how that criticism was handled. Well-motivated private agencies can work wonders – the important thing is to keep them working wonders, and not rush to prune back your contracts at the first hint of disquiet.

Another key point learnt from Wisconsin is to keep your targets and your benefits simple. The target in Wisconsin was to reduce the number of people dependent on welfare – a simple target. And complicated benefits were scrapped in favour of simple, flat-rate ones – like a wage. Otherwise, as Frank Field MP sorely noted, you tend to get people worsening their circumstances in order to qualify for the particular benefits. Not what you want at all.

Sweden is often depicted as a Social Democratic paradise. However, her welfare state has achieved less and cost more than most believed. The point is that wealth distribution and flat income have not significantly changed after Sweden expanded her welfare programmes during the 1950s and 1960s, when workers enjoyed lower taxes and worked more hours. Yet what has changed dramatically is the effect of social engineering on immigration, basically creating welfare dependency and preventing integration.

Integration worked well in the first decades after the war with immigrant employment rates 20 percent above the Swedish average. By contrast it is now 30 percent below that average with only half of non-EU immigrants holding jobs. The combination of a highly regulated labour market and lavish welfare payments is keeping immigrants out of jobs. The comparison with the US with much less welfare arrangements is striking:

Given the high barriers to entry, many immigrants in Europe no longer start accumulating essential language and labour market skills. This is in stark contrast with the situation across the Atlantic. For example, in 2000, Iranians in the U.S. had a family income that was 42 percent above the U.S. average. The income of Iranian immigrants in Sweden, however, was 39 percent below the country’s average.

Wednesday's Times carried the news that Ilja Gort, a Dutch wine producer, had managed to insure his nose and sense of smell for £4 million with Lloyd's of London. The article revealed that Ken Dodd's teeth are insured for the same amount, while Bruce Springsteen's voice is valued at £3.5 million, and Heidi Klum's legs go for the bargain price of £1.15 million.

The serious point here is that there are very few risks that we cannot insure ourselves against, which rather undermines the argument that only the state (and not the market) can provide 'welfare'. In reality we could take out health insurance, long-term care and incapacity insurance, unemployment insurance, and so on. We could save into private pension accounts, and we could put money aside to cover minor healthcare expenses. And for majority of us, doing this would be less costly than the taxes we currently pay to fund the state alternatives. Needless to say, with government removed from the equation, we would get a better return on our investment too.

Of course, that isn't to say that there would be no role at all for the state in such an ideal, free-market system. Most of us would surely be happy to see government tax revenues fund the truly disadvantaged so that they too could take advantage of this 'welfare market'. But that's a radically different vision of government from the one that prevails at the moment.