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Book One
Of the Causes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour,
And of the Order according to which its Produce is Naturally
Distributed among the Different Ranks of the People.
CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER
I shall conclude this very long chapter with observing that
every improvement in the circumstances of the society tends
either directly or indirectly to raise the real rent of land, to
increase the real wealth of the landlord, his power of purchasing
the labour, or the produce of the labour of other people.
The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise
it directly. The landlord's share of the produce necessarily
increases with the increase of the produce.
That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude
produce of land, which is first the effect of extended
improvement and cultivation, and afterwards the cause of their
being still further extended, the rise in the price of cattle,
for example, tends too to raise the rent of land directly, and in
a still greater proportion. The real value of the landlord's
share, his real command of the labour of other people, not only
rises with the real value of the produce, but the proportion of
his share to the whole produce rises with it. That produce, after
the rise in its real price, requires no more labour to collect it
than before. A smaller proportion of it will, therefore, be
sufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit, the stock which
employs that labour. A greater proportion of it must,
consequently, belong to the landlord.
All those improvements in the productive powers of labour,
which tend directly to reduce the real price of manufactures,
tend indirectly to raise the real rent of land. The landlord
exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over and above
his own consumption, or what comes to the same thing, the price
of that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces
the real price of the latter, raises that of the former. An equal
quantity of the former becomes thereby equivalent to a greater
quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to purchase a
greater quantity of the conveniences, ornaments, or luxuries,
which he has occasion for.
Every increase in the real wealth of the society, every
increase in the quantity of useful labour employed within it,
tends indirectly to raise the real rent of land. A certain
proportion of this labour naturally goes to the land. A greater
number of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation, the
produce increases with the increase of the stock which is thus
employed in raising it, and the rent increases with the produce.
The contrary circumstances, the neglect of cultivation and
improvement, the fall in the real price of any part of the rude
produce of land, the rise in the real price of manufactures from
the decay of manufacturing art and industry, the declension of
the real wealth of the society, all tend, on the other hand, to
lower the real rent of land, to reduce the real wealth of the
landlord, to diminish his power of purchasing either the labour,
or the produce of the labour of other people.
The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every
country, or what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that
annual produce, naturally divides itself, it has already been
observed, into three parts; the rent of land, the wages of
labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a revenue to
three different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to
those who live by wages, and to those who live by profit. These
are the three great, original, and constituent orders of every
civilised society, from whose revenue that of every other order
is ultimately derived.
The interest of the first of those three great orders, it
appears from what has been just now said, is strictly and
inseparably connected with the general interest of the society.
Whatever either promotes or obstructs the one, necessarily
promotes or obstructs the other. When the public deliberates
concerning any regulation of commerce or police, the proprietors
of land never can mislead it, with a view to promote the interest
of their own particular order; at least, if they have any
tolerable knowledge of that interest. They are, indeed, too often
defective in this tolerable knowledge. They are the only one of
the three orders whose revenue costs them neither labour nor
care, but comes to them, as it were, of its own accord, and
independent of any plan or project of their own. That indolence,
which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their
situation, renders them too often, not only ignorant, but
incapable of that application of mind which is necessary in order
to foresee and understand the consequences of any public
regulation.
The interest of the second order, that of those who live by
wages, is as strictly connected with the interest of the society
as that of the first. The wages of the labourer, it has already
been shown, are never so high as when the demand for labour is
continually rising, or when the quantity employed is every year
increasing considerably. When this real wealth of the society
becomes stationary, his wages are soon reduced to what is barely
enough to enable him to bring up a family, or to continue the
race of labourers. When the society declines, they fall even
below this. The order of proprietors may, perhaps, gain more by
the prosperity of the society than that of labourers: but there
is no order that suffers so cruelly from its decline. But though
the interest of the labourer is strictly connected with that of
the society, he is incapable either of comprehending that
interest or of understanding its connection with his own. His
condition leaves him no time to receive the necessary
information, and his education and habits are commonly such as to
render him unfit to judge even though he was fully informed. In
the public deliberations, therefore, his voice is little heard
and less regarded, except upon some particular occasions, when
his clamour is animated, set on and supported by his employers,
not for his, but their own particular purposes.
His employers constitute the third order, that of those who
live by profit. It is the stock that is employed for the sake of
profit which puts into motion the greater part of the useful
labour of every society. The plans and projects of the employers
of stock regulate and direct all the most important operations of
labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and
projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages,
rise with the prosperity and fall with the declension of the
society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich and high in
poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which
are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order,
therefore, has not the same connection with the general interest
of the society as that of the other two. Merchants and master
manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people who
commonly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth
draw to themselves the greatest share of the public
consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in
plans and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of
understanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As
their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the
interest of their own particular branch of business, than about
that of the society, their judgment, even when given with the
greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion) is
much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those
two objects than with regard to the latter. Their superiority
over the country gentleman is not so much in their knowledge of
the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of
their own interest than he has of his. It is by this superior
knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed
upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own
interest and that of the public, from a very simple but honest
conviction that their interest, and not his, was the interest of
the public. The interest of the dealers, however, in any
particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in some
respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the
public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is
always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may
frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but
to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can
serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above
what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an
absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. The proposal
of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this
order ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and
ought never to be adopted till after having been long and
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with
the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public,
who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the
public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both
deceived and oppressed it.
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