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Book Four
Of Systems of Political Economy.
CHAPTER V
Of Bounties
Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws
I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties without
observing that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law
which establishes the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and
upon that system of regulations which is connected with it, are
altogether unmerited. A particular examination of the nature of
the corn trade, and of the principal British laws which relate to
it. will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion.
The great importance of this subject must justify the length of
the digression.
The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different
branches, which, though they may sometimes be all carried on by
the same person, are in their own nature four separate and
distinct trades. These are, first, the trade of the inland
dealer; secondly, that of the merchant importer for home
consumption; thirdly, that of the merchant exporter of home
produce for foreign consumption; and, fourthly, that of the
merchant carrier, or of the importer of corn in order to export
it again.
I. The interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great
body of the people, how opposite soever they may at first sight
appear, are, even in years of the greatest scarcity, exactly the
same. It is his interest to raise the price of his corn as high
as the real scarcity of the season requires, and it can never be
his interest to raise it higher. By raising the price he
discourages the consumption, and puts everybody more or less, but
particularly the inferior ranks of people, upon thrift and good
management. If, by raising it too high, he discourages the
consumption so much that the supply of the season is likely to go
beyond the consumption of the season, and to last for some time
after the next crop begins to come in, he runs the hazard, not
only of losing a considerable part of his corn by natural causes,
but of being obliged to sell what remains of it for much less
than what he might have had for it several months before. If by
not raising the price high enough he discourages the consumption
so little that the supply of the season is likely to fall short
of the consumption of the season, he not only loses a part of the
profit which he might otherwise have made, but he exposes the
people to suffer before the end of the season, instead of the
hardships of a dearth, the dreadful horrors of a famine. It is
the interest of the people that their daily, weekly, and monthly
consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the
supply of the season. The interest of the inland corn dealer is
the same. By supplying them, as nearly as he can judge, in this
proportion, he is likely to sell all his corn for the highest
price, and with the greatest profit; and his knowledge of the
state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly, and monthly sales,
enable him to judge, with more or less accuracy, how far they
really are supplied in this manner. Without intending the
interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to his
own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty
much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is
sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When he foresees that
provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short
allowance. Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do
this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniences which
his crew can thereby suffer are inconsiderable in comparison of
the danger, misery, and ruin to which they might sometimes be
exposed by a less provident conduct. Though from excess of
avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn merchant should
sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the
scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniences which
the people can suffer from this conduct, which effectually
secures them from a famine in the end of the season, are
inconsiderable in comparison of what they might have been exposed
to by a more liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it. The
corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess
of avarice; not only from the indignation which it generally
excites against him, but, though he should escape the effects of
this indignation, from the quantity of corn which it necessarily
leaves upon his hands in the end of the season, and which, if the
next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell for
a much lower price than he might otherwise have had.
Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants
to possess themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country,
it might, perhaps, be their interest to deal with it as the Dutch
are said to do with the spiceries of the Moluccas, to destroy or
throw away a considerable part of it in order to keep up the
price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the
violence of law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with
regard to corn; and, wherever the law leaves the trade free, it
is of all commodities the least liable to be engrossed or
monopolized by the force of a few large capitals, which buy up
the greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the
capitals of a few private men are capable of purchasing, but,
supposing they were capable of purchasing it, the manner in which
it is produced renders this purchase practicable. As in every
civilised country it is the commodity of which the annual
consumption is the greatest, so a greater quantity of industry is
annually employed in producing corn than in producing any other
commodity. When it first comes from the ground, too, it is
necessarily divided among a greater number of owners than any
other commodity; and these owners can never be collected into one
place like a number of independent manufacturers, but are
necessarily scattered through all the different corners of the
country. These first owners either immediately supply the
consumers in their own neighbourhood, or they supply other inland
dealers who supply those consumers. The inland dealers in corn,
therefore, including both the farmer and the baker, are
necessarily more numerous than the dealers in any other
commodity, and their dispersed situation renders it altogether
impossible for them to enter into any general combination. If in
a year of scarcity, therefore, any of them should find that he
had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the current price,
he could hope to dispose of before the end of the season, he
would never think of keeping up this price to his own loss, and
to the sole benefit of his rivals and competitors, but would
immediately lower it, in order to get rid of his corn before the
new crop began to come in. The same motives, the same interests,
which would thus regulate the conduct of any one dealer, would
regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in general to
sell their corn at the price which, according to the best of
their judgment, was most suitable to the scarcity or plenty of
the season.
Whoever examines with attention the history of the dearths
and famines which have afflicted any part of Europe, during
either the course of the present or that of the two preceding
centuries, of several of which we have pretty exact accounts,
will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen from any
combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other
cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes perhaps, and in
some particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the
greatest number of cases by the fault of the seasons; and that a
famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of
government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the
inconveniences of a dearth.
In an extensive corn country, between all the different
parts of which there is a free commerce and communication, the
scarcity occasioned by the most unfavourable seasons can never be
so great as to produce a famine; and the scantiest crop, if
managed with frugality and economy, will maintain through the
year the same number of people that are commonly fed on a more
affluent manner by one of moderate plenty. The seasons most
unfavourable to the crop are those of excessive drought or
excessive rain. But as corn grows equally upon high and low
lands, upon grounds that are disposed to be too wet, and upon
those that are disposed to be too dry, either the drought or the
rain which is hurtful to one part of the country is favourable to
another; and though both in the wet and in the dry season the
crop is a good deal less than in one more properly tempered, yet
in both what is lost in one part of the country is in some
measure compensated by what is gained in the other. In rice
countries, where the crop not only requires a very moist soil,
but where in a certain period of its growing it must be laid
under water, the effects of a drought are much more dismal. Even
in such countries, however, the drought is, perhaps, scarce ever
so universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the
government would allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few
years ago, might probably have occasioned a very great dearth.
Some improper regulations, some injudicious restraints imposed by
the servants of the East India Company upon the rice trade,
contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.
When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniences
of a dearth, orders all the dealers to sell their corn at what it
supposes a reasonable price, it either hinders them from bringing
it to market, which may sometimes produce a famine even in the
beginning of the season; or if they bring it thither, it enables
the people, and thereby encourages them to consume it so fast as
must necessarily produce a famine before the end of the season.
The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is
the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine, so
it is the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth; for
the inconveniences of a real scarcity cannot be remedied, they
can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full protection
of the law, and no trade requires it so much, because no trade is
so much exposed to popular odium.
In years of scarcity the inferior ranks of people impute
their distress to the avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes
the object of their hatred and indignation. Instead of making
profit upon such occasions, therefore, he is often in danger of
being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines plundered and
destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity, however,
when prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his
principal profit. He is generally in contract with some farmers
to furnish him for a certain number of years with a certain
quantity of corn at a certain price. This contract price is
settled according to what is supposed to be the moderate and
reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price, which before
the late years of scarcity was commonly about eight-and-twenty
shillings for the quarter of wheat, and for that of other grain
in proportion. In years of scarcity, therefore, the corn merchant
buys a great part of his corn for the ordinary price, and sells
it for a much higher. That this extraordinary profit, however, is
no more than sufficient to put his trade upon a fair level with
other trades, and to compensate the many losses which he sustains
upon other occasions, both from the perishable nature of the
commodity itself, and from the frequent and unforeseen
fluctuations of its price, seems evident enough, from this single
circumstance, that great fortunes are as seldom made in this as
in any other trade. The popular odium, however, which attends it
in years of scarcity, the only years in which it can be very
profitable, renders people of character and fortune averse to
enter into it. It is abandoned to an inferior set of dealers; and
millers, bakers, mealmen, and meal factors, together with a
number of wretched hucksters, are almost the only middle people
that, in the home market, come between the grower and the
consumer.
The ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing
this popular odium against a trade so beneficial to the public,
seems, on the contrary, to have authorized and encouraged it.
By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI, c. 14, it was enacted that
whoever should buy any corn or grain with intent to sell it
again, should be reputed an unlawful engrosser, and should, for
the first fault, suffer two months' imprisonment, and forfeit the
value of the corn; for the second, suffer six months'
imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and for the third, be
set in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king's
pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. The ancient
policy of most other parts of Europe was no better than that of
England.
Our ancestors seem to have imagined that the people would
buy their corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant,
who, they were afraid, would require, over and above the price
which he paid to the farmer, an exorbitant profit to himself.
They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate his trade altogether.
They even endeavoured to hinder as much as possible any middle
man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the
consumer; and this was the meaning of the many restraints which
they imposed upon the trade of those whom they called kidders or
carriers of corn, a trade which nobody was allowed to exercise
without a licence ascertaining his qualifications as a man of
probity and fair dealing. The authority of three justices of the
peace was, by the statute of Edward VI, necessary in order to
grant this licence. But even this restraint was afterwards
thought insufficient, and by a statute of Elizabeth the privilege
of granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions.
The ancient policy of Europe endeavoured in this manner to
regulate agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims
quite different from those which it established with regard to
manufactures, the great trade of the towns. By leaving the farmer
no other customers but either the consumers or their immediate
factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured to
force him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a
corn merchant or corn retailer. On the contrary, it in many cases
prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a
shopkeeper, or from selling his own goods by retail. It meant by
the one law to promote the general interest of the country, or to
render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being well understood
how this was to be done. By the other it meant to promote that of
a particular order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much
undersold by the manufacturer, it was supposed, that their trade
would be ruined if he was allowed to retail at all.
The manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to
keep a shop, and to sell his own goods by retail, could not have
undersold the common shopkeeper. Whatever part of his capital he
might have placed in his shop, he must have withdrawn it from his
manufacture. In order to carry on his business on a level with
that of other people, as he must have had the profit of a
manufacturer on the one part, so he must have had that of a
shopkeeper upon the other. Let us suppose, for example, that in
the particular town where he lived, ten per cent was the ordinary
profit both of manufacturing and shopkeeping stock; he must in
this case have charged upon every piece of his own goods which he
sold in his shop, a profit of twenty per cent. When he carried
them from his workhouse to his shop, he must have valued them at
the price for which he could have sold them to a dealer or
shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he valued
them lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing
capital. When again he sold them from his shop, unless he got the
same price at which a shopkeeper would have sold them, he lost a
part of the profit of his shopkeeping capital. Though he might
appear, therefore, to make a double profit upon the same piece of
goods, yet as these goods made successively a part of two
distinct capitals, he made but a single profit upon the whole
capital employed about them; and if he made less than his profit,
he was a loser, or did not employ his whole capital with the same
advantage as the greater part of his neighbours.
What the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was
in some measure enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two
different employments; to keep one part of it in his granaries
and stack yard, for supplying the occasional demands of the
market; and to employ the other in the cultivation of his land.
But as he could not afford to employ the latter for less than the
ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little afford
to employ the former for less than the ordinary profits of
mercantile stock. Whether the stock which really carried on the
business of the corn merchant belonged to the person who was
called a farmer, or to the person who was called a corn merchant,
an equal profit was in both cases requisite in order to indemnify
its owner for employing it in this manner; in order to put his
business upon a level with other trades, and in order to hinder
him from having an interest to change it as soon as possible for
some other. The farmer, therefore, who was thus forced to
exercise the trade of a corn merchant, could not afford to sell
his corn cheaper than any other corn merchant would have been
obliged to do in the case of a free competition.
The dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single
branch of business has an advantage of the same kind with the
workman who can employ his whole labour in one single operation.
As the latter acquires a dexterity which enables him, with the
same two hands, to perform a much greater quantity of work; so
the former acquires so easy and ready a method of transacting his
business, of buying and disposing of his goods, that with the
same capital he can transact a much greater quantity of business.
As the one can commonly afford his work a good deal cheaper, so
the other can commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper than if
his stock and attention were both employed about a greater
variety of objects. The greater part of manufacturers could not
afford to retail their own goods so cheap as a vigilant and
active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was to buy them at
wholesale and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers
could still less afford to retail their own corn, to supply the
inhabitants of a town, at perhaps four or five miles distance
from the greater part of them, so cheap as a vigilant and active
corn merchant, whose sole business it was to purchase corn by
wholesale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail it
again.
The law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising
the trade of a shopkeeper endeavoured to force this division in
the employment of stock to go on faster than it might otherwise
have done. The law which obliged the farmer to exercise the trade
of a corn merchant endeavoured to hinder it from going on so
fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, and
therefore unjust; and they were both, too, as impolitic as they
were unjust. It is the interest of every society that things of
this kind should never either be forced or obstructed. The man
who employs either his labour or his stock in a greater variety
of ways than his situation renders necessary can never hurt his
neighbour by underselling him. He may hurt himself, and he
generally does so. Jack of all trades will never be rich, says
the proverb. But the law ought always to trust people with the
care of their own interest, as in their local situations they
must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator
can do. The law, however, which obliged the farmer to exercise
the trade of a corn merchant was by far the most pernicious of
the two.
It obstructed not only that division in the employment of
stock which is so advantageous to every society, but it
obstructed likewise the improvement and cultivation of the land.
By obliging the farmer to carry on two trades instead of one, it
forced him to divide his capital into two parts, of which one
only could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at
liberty to sell his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he
could thresh it out, his whole capital might have returned
immediately to the land, and have been employed in buying more
cattle, and hiring more servants, in order to improve and
cultivate it better. But by being obliged to sell his corn by
retail, he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his
granaries and stack yard through the year, and could not,
therefore, cultivate so well as with the same capital he might
otherwise have done. This law, therefore, necessarily obstructed
the improvement of the land, and, instead of tending to render
corn cheaper, must have tended to render it scarcer, and
therefore dearer, than it would otherwise have been.
After the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant
is in reality the trade which, if properly protected and
encouraged, would contribute the most to the raising of corn. It
would support the trade of the farmer in the same manner as the
trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the manufacturer.
The wholesale dealer, by affording a ready market to the
manufacturer, by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can
make their price to him before he has made them, enables him to
keep his whole capital, and sometimes even more than his whole
capital, constantly employed in manufacturing, and consequently
to manufacture a much greater quantity of goods than if he was
obliged to dispose of them himself to the immediate consumers, or
even to the retailers. As the capital of the wholesale merchant,
too, is generally sufficient to replace that of many
manufacturers, this intercourse between him and them interests
the owner of a large capital to support the owners of a great
number of small ones, and to assist them in those losses and
misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them.
An intercourse of the same kind universally established
between the farmers and the corn merchants would be attended with
effects equally beneficial to the farmers. They would be enabled
to keep their whole capitals, and even more than their whole
capitals, constantly employed in cultivation. In case of any of
those accidents, to which no trade is more liable than theirs,
they would find in their ordinary customer, the wealthy corn
merchant, a person who had both an interest to support them, and
the ability to do it, and they would not, as at present, be
entirely dependent upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the
mercy of his steward. Were it possible, as perhaps it is not, to
establish this intercourse universally, and all at once, were it
possible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the
kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation of land,
withdrawing it from every other employment into which any part of
it may be at present diverted, and were it possible, in order to
support and assist upon occasion the operations of this great
stock, to provide all at once another stock almost equally great,
it is not perhaps very easy to imagine how great, how extensive,
and how sudden would be the improvement which this change of
circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the
country.
The statute of Edward VI, therefore, by prohibiting as much
as possible any middle man from coming between the grower and the
consumer, endeavoured to annihilate a trade, of which the free
exercise is not only the best palliative of the inconveniences of
a dearth but the best preventative of that calamity: after the
trade of the farmer, no trade contributing so much to the growing
of corn as that of the corn merchant.
The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several
subsequent statutes, which successively permitted the engrossing
of corn when the price of wheat should not exceed twenty,
twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty shillings the quarter. At
last, by the 15th of Charles II, c. 7, the engrossing or buying
of corn in order to sell it again, as long as the price of wheat
did not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter, and that of
other grain in proportion, was declared lawful to all persons not
being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market
within three months. All the freedom which the trade of the
inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed was bestowed upon it by
this statute. The statute of the 12th of the present king, which
repeals almost all the other ancient laws against engrossers and
forestallers, does not repeal the restrictions of this particular
statute, which therefore still continue in force.
This statute, however, authorizes in some measure two very
absurd popular prejudices.
First, it supposes that when the price of wheat has risen so
high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, and that of other
grains in proportion, corn is likely to be so engrossed as to
hurt the people. But from what has been already said, it seems
evident enough that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the
inland dealers as to hurt the people: and forty-eight shillings
the quarter, besides, though it may be considered as a very high
price, yet in years of scarcity it is a price which frequently
takes place immediately after harvest, when scarce any part of
the new crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible even for
ignorance to suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as
to hurt the people.
Secondly, it supposes that there is a certain price at which
corn is likely to be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to
be sold again soon after in the same market, so as to hurt the
people. But if a merchant ever buys up corn, either going to a
particular market or in a particular market, in order to sell it
again soon after in the same market, it must be because he judges
that the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole
season as upon that particular occasion, and that the price,
therefore, must soon rise. If he judges wrong in this, and if the
price does not rise, he not only loses the whole profit of the
stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of the stock
itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the
storing and keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much
more essentially than he can hurt even the particular people whom
he may hinder from supplying themselves upon that particular
market day, because they may afterwards supply themselves just as
cheap upon any other market day. If he judges right, instead of
hurting the great body of the people, he renders them a most
important service. By making them feel the inconveniencies of a
dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, he prevents
their feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would
do, if the cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster
than suited the real scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is
real, the best thing that can be done for the people is to divide
the inconveniencies of it as equally as possible through all the
different months, and weeks, and days of the year. The interest
of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as he
can: and as no other person can have either the same interest, or
the same knowledge, or the same abilities to do it so exactly as
he, this most important operation of commerce ought to be trusted
entirely to him; or, in other words, the corn trade, so far at
least as concerns the supply of the home market, ought to be left
perfectly free.
The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be
compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The
unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime were not more
innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them than those who have
been accused of the former. The law which put an end to all
prosecutions against witchcraft, which put it out of any man's
power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that
imaginary crime, seems effectually to have put an end to those
fears and suspicions by taking away the great cause which
encouraged and supported them. The law which should restore
entire freedom to the inland trade of corn would probably prove
as effectual to put an end to the popular fears of engrossing and
forestalling.
The 15th of Charles II, c. 7, however, with all its
imperfections, has perhaps contributed more both to the plentiful
supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than
any other law in the statute book. It is from this law that the
inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and protection
which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home
market, and the interest of tillage, are much more effectually
promoted by the inland than either by the importation or
exportation trade.
The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain
imported into Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain
consumed, it has been computed by the author of the tracts upon
the corn trade, does not exceed that of one to five hundred and
seventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the importance
of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as
five hundred and seventy to one.
The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from
Great Britain does not, according to the same author, exceed the
one-and-thirtieth part of the annual produce. For the
encouragement of tillage, therefore, by providing a market for
the home produce, the importance of the inland trade must be to
that of the exportation.
I have no great faith in political arithmetic, computations.
I mention them only in order to show of how much less
consequence, in the opinion of the most judicious and experienced
persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade. The
great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceding the
establishment of the bounty may perhaps, with reason, be ascribed
in some measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II,
which had been enacted about five-and-twenty years before, and
which had therefore full time to produce its effect.
A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have
to say concerning the other three branches of the corn trade.
II. The trade of the merchant importer of foreign corn for
home consumption evidently contributes to the immediate supply of
the home market, and must so far be immediately beneficial to the
great body of the people. It tends, indeed, to lower somewhat the
average money price of corn, but not to diminish its real value,
or the quantity of labour which it is capable of maintaining. If
importation was at all times free, our farmers and country
gentlemen would, probably, one year with another, get less money
for their corn than they do at present, when importation is at
most times in effect prohibited; but the money which they got
would be of more value, would buy more goods of all other kinds,
and would employ more labour. Their real wealth, their real
revenue, therefore, would be the same as at present, though it
might be expressed by a smaller quantity of silver; and they
would neither be disabled nor discouraged from cultivating corn
as much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in
the real value of silver, in consequence of lowering the money
price of corn, lowers somewhat the money price of all other
commodities, it gives the industry of the country, where it takes
place, some advantage in all foreign markets, and thereby tends
to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of the
home market for corn must be in proportion to the general
industry of the country where it grows, or to the number of those
who produce something else, and therefore have something else, or
what comes to the same thing, the price of something else, to
give in exchange for corn. But in every country the home market,
as it is the nearest and most convenient, so is it likewise the
greatest and most important market for corn. That rise in the
real value of silver, therefore, which is the effect of lowering
the average money price of corn, tends to enlarge the greatest
and most important market for corn, and thereby to encourage,
instead of discouraging, its growth.
By the 22nd of Charles II, c. 13, the importation of wheat,
whenever the price in the home market did not exceed fifty-three
shillings and fourpence the quarter, was subjected to a duty of
sixteen shillings the quarter, and to a duty of eight shillings
whenever the price did not exceed four pounds. The former of
these two prices has, for more than a century past, taken place
only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far
as I know, not taken place at all. Yet, till wheat had risen
above this latter price, it was by this statute subjected to a
very high duty; and, tin it had risen above the former, to a duty
which amounted to a prohibition. The importation of other sorts
of grain was restrained at rates, and by duties, in proportion to
the value of the grain, almost equally high.* Subsequent laws
still further increased those duties.
* Before the 13th of the present king, the following were the duties
payable upon the importation of the different sorts of grain:-
Grain Duties Duties Duties
Beans to 28s. per qr. 19s. 10d. after till 40s. 16s. 8d. then 12d.
Barley to 28s. 19s. 10d. 32s. 16s. 12d.
Malt is prohibited by the annual Malt-tax Bill.
Oats to 16s. 5s. 10d. after 9 1/2d.
Pease to 40s. 16s. 10d. after 9 3/4d.
Rye to 36s. 19s. 10d. till 40s. 16s. 8d. then 12d.
Wheat to 44s. 21s. 10d. till 53s. 4d. 17s. then 8s.
till 4 l. and after that about 1s. 4d.
Buckwheat to 32s. per qr. to pay 16s.
These different duties were imposed, partly by the 92nd of Charles
II, in place of the Old Subsidy, partly by the New Subsidy, by the One-third
and Two-thirds Subsidy, and by the Subsidy, 1747.
The distress which, in years of scarcity, the strict
execution of those laws might have brought upon the people, would
probably have been very great. But, upon such occasions, its
execution was generally suspended by temporary statutes, which
permitted, for a limited time, the importation of foreign corn.
The necessity of these temporary statutes sufficiently
demonstrates the impropriety of this general one.
These restraints upon importation, though prior to the
establishment of the bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by
the same principles, which afterwards enacted that regulation.
How hurtful soever in themselves, these or some other restraints
upon importation became necessary in consequence of that
regulation. If, when wheat was either below forty-eight shillings
the quarter, or not much above it, foreign corn could have been
imported either duty free, or upon paying only a small duty, it
might have been exported again, with the benefit of the bounty,
to the great loss of the public revenue, and to the entire
perversion of the institution, of which the object was to extend
the market for the home growth, not that for the growth of
foreign countries.
III. The trade of the merchant exporter of corn for foreign
consumption certainly does not contribute directly to the
plentiful supply of the home market. It does so, however,
indirectly. From whatever source this supply may be usually
drawn, whether from home growth or from foreign importation,
unless more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported
into the country, than what is usually consumed in it, the supply
of the home market can never be very plentiful. But unless the
surplus can in all ordinary cases be exported, the growers will
be careful never to grow more, and the importers never to import
more, than what the bare consumption of the home market requires.
That market will very seldom be overstocked; but it will
generally be understocked, the people whose business it is to
supply it being generally afraid lest their goods should be left
upon their hands. The prohibition of exportation limits the
improvement and cultivation of the country to what the supply of
its own inhabitants requires. The freedom of exportation enables
it to extend cultivation for the supply of foreign nations.
By the 12th of Charles II, c. 4, the exportation of corn was
permitted whenever the price of wheat did not exceed forty
shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion. By
the 15th of the same prince, this liberty was extended till the
price of wheat exceeded forty-eight shillings the quarter; and by
the 22nd, to all higher prices. A poundage, indeed, was to be
paid to the king upon such exportation. But all grain was rated
so low in the book of rates that this poundage amounted only upon
wheat to a shilling, upon oats to fourpence, and upon all other
grain to sixpence the quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary,
the act which established the bounty, this small duty was
virtually taken off whenever the price of wheat did not exceed,
forty-eight shillings the quarter; and by the 11th and l2th of
William III, c. 20, it was expressly taken off at all higher
prices.
The trade of the merchant exporter was, in this manner, not
only encouraged by a bounty, but rendered much more free than
that of the inland dealer. By the last of these statutes, corn
could be engrossed at any price for exportation, but it could not
be engrossed for inland sale except when the price did not exceed
forty-eight shillings the quarter. The interest of the inland
dealer, however, it has already been shown, can never be opposite
to that of the great body of the people. That of the merchant
exporter may, and in fact sometimes is. If, while his own country
labours under a dearth, a neighbouring country should be
afflicted with a famine, it might be his interest to carry corn
to the latter country in such quantities as might very much
aggravate the calamities of the dearth. The plentiful supply of
the home market was not the direct object of those statutes; but,
under the pretence of encouraging agriculture, to raise the money
price of corn as high as possible, and thereby to occasion, as
much as possible, a constant dearth in the home market. By the
discouragement of importation, the supply of that market, even in
times of great scarcity, was confined to the home growth; and by
the encouragement of exportation, when the price was so high as
forty-eight shillings the quarter, that market was not, even in
times of considerable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of
that growth. The temporary laws, prohibiting for a limited time
the exportation of corn, and taking off for a limited time the
duties upon its importation, expedients to which Great Britain
has been obliged so frequently to have recourse, sufficiently
demonstrate the impropriety of her general system. Had that
system been good, she would not so frequently have been reduced
to the necessity of departing from it.
Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free
exportation and free importation, the different states into which
a great continent was divided would so far resemble the different
provinces of a great empire. As among the different provinces of
a great empire the freedom of the inland trade appears, both from
reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a dearth,
but the most effectual preventative of a famine; so would the
freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the
different states into which a great continent was divided. The
larger the continent, the easier the communication through all
the different parts of it, both by land and by water, the less
would any one particular part of it ever be exposed to either of
these calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more
likely to be relieved by the plenty of some other. But very few
countries have entirely adopted this liberal system. The freedom
of the corn trade is almost everywhere more or less restrained,
and, in many countries, is confined by such absurd regulations as
frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth into
the dreadful calamity of a famine. The demand of such countries
for corn may frequently become so great and so urgent that a
small state in their neighbourhood, which happened at the same
time to be labouring under some degree of dearth, could not
venture to supply them without exposing itself to the like
dreadful calamity. The very bad policy of one country may thus
render it in some measure dangerous and imprudent to establish
what would otherwise be the best policy in another. The unlimited
freedom of exportation, however, would be much less dangerous in
great states, in which the growth being much greater, the supply
could seldom be much affected by any quantity of corn that was
likely to be exported. In a Swiss canton, or in some of the
little states of Italy, it may perhaps sometimes be necessary to
restrain the exportation of corn. In such great countries as
France or England it scarce ever can. To hinder, besides, the
farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market is
evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of
public utility, to a sort of reasons of state; an act of
legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can
be pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity. The price
at which the exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is ever to
be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.
The laws concerning corn may everywhere be compared to the
laws concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much
interested in what relates either of their subsistence in this
life, or to their happiness in a life to come, that government
must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the
public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of.
It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a
reasonable system established with regard to either of those two
capital objects.
IV. The trade of the merchant carrier, or of the importer of
foreign corn in order to export it again, contributes to the
plentiful supply of the home market. It is not indeed the direct
purpose of his trade to sell his corn there. But he will
generally be willing to do so, and even for a good deal less
money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves
in this manner the expense of loading and unloading, of freight
and insurance. The inhabitants of the country which, by means of
the carrying trade, becomes the magazine and storehouse for the
supply of other countries can very seldom be in want themselves.
Though the carrying trade might thus contribute to reduce the
average money price of corn in the home market, it would not
thereby lower its real value. It would only raise somewhat the
real value of silver.
The carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great
Britain, upon all ordinary occasions, by the high duties upon the
importation of foreign corn, of the greater part of which there
was no drawback; and upon extraordinary occasions, when a
scarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by temporary
statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of
laws, therefore, the carrying trade was in effect prohibited upon
all occasions.
That system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the
establishment of the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the
praise which has been bestowed upon it. The improvement and
prosperity of Great Britain, which has been so often ascribed to
those laws, may very easily be accounted for by other causes.
That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every man
that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone
sufficient to make any country flourish, notwithstanding these
and twenty other absurd regulations of commerce; and this
security was perfected by the revolution much about the same time
that the bounty was established. The natural effort of every
individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert
itself with freedom and security is so powerful a principle that
it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of
surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the
folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations; though
the effect of these obstructions is always more or less either to
encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security. In Great
Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from
being perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other
part of Europe.
Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement
of Great Britain has been posterior to that system of laws which
is connected with the bounty, we must not upon that account
impute it to those laws. It has been posterior likewise to the
national debt. But the national debt has most assuredly not been
the cause of it.
Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty
has exactly the same tendency of tendency with the police of
Spain and Portugal, to lower somewhat the value of the precious
metals in the country where it takes place, yet Great Britain is
certainly one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and
Portugal are perhaps among the most beggarly. This difference of
situation, however, may easily be accounted for from two
different causes. First, the tax of Spain, the prohibition in
Portugal of exporting gold and silver, and the vigilant police
which watches over the execution of those laws, must, in two very
poor countries, which between them import annually upwards of six
millions sterling, operate not only more directly but much more
forcibly in reducing the value of those metals there than the
corn laws can do in Great Britain. And, secondly, this bad policy
is not in those countries counterbalanced by the general liberty
and security of the people. Industry is there neither free nor
secure, and the civil and ecclesiastical governments of both
Spain and Portugal are such as would alone be sufficient to
perpetuate their present state of poverty, even though their
regulations of commerce were as wise as the greater part of them
are absurd and foolish.
The 13th of the present king, c. 43, seems to have
established a new system with regard to the corn laws in many
respects better than the ancient one, but in one or two respects
perhaps not quite so good.
By this statute the high duties upon importations for home
consumption are taken off so soon as the price of middling wheat
rises to forty-eight shillings the quarter; that of middling rye,
pease or beans, to thirty-two shillings; that of barley to
twenty-four shillings; and that of oats to sixteen shillings; and
instead of them a small duty is imposed of only sixpence upon the
quarter of wheat, and upon that of other grain in proportion.
With regard to all these different sorts of grain, but
particularly with regard to wheat, the home market is thus opened
to foreign supplies at prices considerably lower than before.
By the same statute the old bounty of five shillings upon
the exportation of wheat ceases so soon as the price rises to
forty-four shillings the quarter, instead of forty-eight, the
price at which it ceased before; that of two shillings and
sixpence upon the exportation of barley ceases so soon as the
price rises to twenty-two shillings, instead of twenty-four, the
price at which it ceased before; that of two shillings and
sixpence upon the exportation of oatmeal ceases so soon as the
price rises to fourteen shillings, instead of fifteen, the price
at which it ceased before. The bounty upon rye is reduced from
three shillings and sixpence to three shillings, and it ceases so
soon as the price rises to twenty-eight shillings instead of
thirty-two, the price at which it ceased before. If bounties are
as improper as I have endeavoured to prove them to be, the sooner
they cease, and the lower they are, so much the better.
The same statute permits, at the lowest prices, the
importation of corn, in order to be exported again duty free,
provided it is in the meantime lodged in a warehouse under the
joint locks of the king and the importer. This liberty, indeed,
extends to no more than twenty-five of the different ports of
Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones, and there
may not, perhaps, be warehouses proper for this purpose in the
greater part of the others.
So far this law seems evidently an improvement upon the
ancient system.
But by the same law a bounty of two shillings the quarter is
given for the exportation of oats whenever the price does not
exceed fourteen shillings. No bounty had ever been given before
for the exportation of this grain, no more than for that of pease
or beans.
By the same law, too, the exportation of wheat is prohibited
so soon as the price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter;
that of rye so soon as it rises to twenty-eight shillings; that
of barley so soon as it rises to twenty-two shillings; and that
of oats so soon as they rise to fourteen shillings. Those several
prices seem all of them a good deal too low, and there seems to
be an impropriety, besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether
at those precise prices at which that bounty, which was given in
order to force it, is withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly
either to have been withdrawn at a much lower price, or
exportation ought to have been allowed at a much higher.
So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the
ancient system. With all its imperfections, however, we may
perhaps say of it what was said of the laws of Solon, that,
though not the best in itself, it is the best which the
interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of. It
may perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better.
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