A bounty for intercepting illegal Cross-Channel boats
Measures to reduce the number of illegal immigrants coming across the Channel in small boats have so far failed to make a significant impact. It may be that a multi-faceted approach could stand a better chance of succeeding.
There could be a joint UK-French coastal task force with joint patrols. Technology and intelligence-sharing rewards could increase pre-launch disruption, and there could be increased logistical and training support for those attempting interception.
In addition to these measures, we might look at the proposal to offer a bounty to French coastguard ships for each small boat returned to France. The bounty would be in addition to existing measures, and part of it would be shared by the coastguard sailors. It provides a straightforward incentive to enhance enforcement and to be more proactive in intercepting boats early. Sharing the bounty with individual sailors could create a stronger on-the-ground incentive for action.
It could increase operational efficiency. Rewarding successful interceptions could prioritize preventing departures over mid-Channel rescues, which are riskier and costlier. This would undoubtedly result in saving lives, some of which are otherwise being lost in mid-voyage. Shifting from blanket funding to performance-based pay could ensure funds are used more effectively.
It would feature in domestic political messaging. By demonstrating action, politicians could claim to be taking tougher and more results-driven measures to stop crossings.
It would require the negotiated consent and participation by the French, and would involve increased UK-French cooperation. If structured carefully, the offer could be seen as an enhancement, rather than a replacement, of existing funding, potentially smoothing over French concerns about resourcing.
It would have to be designed against moral hazard because otherwise the rewards might incentivize over-reporting, manipulation, or unsafe behavior to qualify for payments.
Offering bounties to French coastguards could bring operational gains to solve the immediate crisis. A more sustainable long-term solution might focus on joint intelligence-led disruption, better legal pathways for asylum in the UK to reduce demand for crossings, and greater regional cooperation. What the bounties do is to give the French more skin in the game. This applies to their government and to their coastguards. They would incentivize the French by making it in their interest to bring the Channel under control and out of the hands of the criminal gangs of people smugglers.
If measures that succeed are not implemented soon, it may only be a matter of time before vigilantes take to the seas, or a future populist government issues letters of marque to licensed privateers to solve the problem by whatever means are necessary. Such events would sit less well with international law, or with the UK’s international standing.
Madsen Pirie