Currency reform in Ancient Rome

In the Western world, modern civilizations are often thought of in comparison to those of the ancient world. The Roman Empire is typically the first considered, and arguably the most natural reference point owing to its many achievements, complexity and durability. It stands in history, widely considered the high water mark of the ancient world; one against which contemporary political, economic and social questions can be posed. Much of the world is still living with the consequences of Roman policy choices in a very real sense, in matters ranging from the location of cities to commercial and legal practices to customs.

The global economic downturn of 2008, in particular its monetary facet, readily invites comparison between the troubles of the modern world and those of the Roman Empire; just as Western currencies have declined precipitously in value since their commodity backing was removed in stages starting roughly a century ago, Roman currencies were also troubled, and present a cautionary tale.

The Roman coin in use through most of the empire was the denarius, which demonstrated a persistent decline in value, starting from the time of transition from Republic to Empire, and continuing until its decimation during the Crisis of the Third Century AD. Although efforts by Diocletian taken after the monetary collapse are commonly associated with Roman economic reform, there were other efforts by earlier, lesser known emperors that suddenly and unexpectedly improved the silver content and value of the denarius. Firsthand accounts and archeological findings provide sufficient detail to allow examination of these short, if noteworthy, periods of voluntary restorative policies – and their architects.

While popular interest typically fixes on such well known emperors as Julius Caesar, Nero, and Augustus, I seek to direct attention toward four lesser known emperors who undertook the improvement of the denarius.  These initiatives essentially constitute rare, temporary episodes of qualitative tightening, in contrast to the more common – and, in recent history, ubiquitous - policy of quantitative easing. The reformers were Domitian, Pertinax, Macrinus, and Severus Alexander. A necessarily concise summary of each one’s initiatives follows, with a brief review of the circumstances surrounding their administration and decisions.

Domitian (September 81 AD – September 96 AD)

The first noteworthy Roman currency reformer was Domitian, son of Vespasian and brother of Titus. He ascended in 81 AD, inheriting the problems associated with his forbear’s costly projects. Vespasian had undertaken large scale construction projects he thought necessary to repair the damage to many structures during the civil wars that raged throughout the late Republic.  In addition, he paid lofty financial incentives to regime-supporting historical writers and awarded pensions of up to 1,000 gold coins annually to a coterie of court intellectuals. Titus, his son and successor, was known for the initiation of lavish and elaborate games as well as for recompensing individuals struck by unexpected natural disasters, including the eruption of the volcano Vesuvius, the Great Fire of Rome, and those affected by the outbreak of war in Britannia. Together, Titus and Vespasian committed vast resources to the construction of the Coliseum; and, consequently, during the 12 years of their emperorship, the silver content of the denarius was reduced from roughly 94% to 90% purity.

Despite that precedent, “Domitian was apparently very sensitive to the importance of capital and the benefits of stability derived from a credible and dependable money supply.”[1] Thus early in his reign, in a “dramatic and entirely unexpected” move that coincided with the end of hostilities in Britain and Chatti (Germany), he fired the Empire’s financial secretary. Historians speculate that this was either because the secretary considered Domitian’s plans to improve the currency quality “unwise” or because he’d allowed such “slackness to permeate the mint” in the first place.[2] Shortly thereafter, “in 82 – 84 AD Domitian improved the silver standard, and older coins averaging 88 to 92 percent silver were reminted into purer denarii (98 percent fine)”.[3]

However, Domitian’s currency improvement effort was short-lived due to renewed foreign warfare. Between 85 and 89, fighting in Africa, Dacia (Eastern Europe), and Chatti again broke out, such that the “purer coins had scarcely entered the marketplace when [he], in mid-85, pressed for money to pay war bills, again changed the standard, reducing it to 93 percent fine”.[4]

Domitian’s reign eventually devolved into tyranny and massive building projects echoing those of his brother and father, and culminated in a wealth confiscation edict so brutal that “it [became] fatal at th[e] time … to own a spacious house or an attractive property”.[5] In 96 AD, he was assassinated.

Pertinax (January 193 AD – March 193 AD)

For nearly a century after Domitian’s fall, the debasement of the denarius continued apace, and by 148 AD devaluations became ritually associated not only with the start of wars and public projects but with inaugural events and holidays as well.[6]

At the beginning of Domitian’s reign, money supply was 60% of what it had been in 40 [AD], and about 70% of this level at the end of his reign, a range maintained throughout the reigns of the Antonines, until, under Commodus, money supply reached 700-800% above [that] initial level.[7]

Commodus, whose twelve year regime saw among other things the re-introduction of Plebian Games – a pricey, nearly month-long festival of religion, art and sports - and an incredible expenditure of state funds in a massive, megalomaniacal campaign of self-indulgent iconography, was succeeded by Pertinax – a man of “propriety [and] economy” – whose 86-day rule starkly depicts the considerable risk that currency reformers undertook - and perhaps still do.

[O]n the day of his accession, he resigned over to his wife and son his whole private fortune, that they might have no pretense to solicit favors at the expense of the state. He refused to flatter the former with the title of Augusta, or to corrupt the inexperienced youth … by the rank of Caesar … g[iving] him no assured prospect of the throne[.][8]

In addition,

[h]e forbad his name to be inscribed on any part of the imperial domains, insisting that they belonged not to him, but to the public. He melted the silver statues which had been raised to Commodus … s[elling] all his concubines, horses, arms, and other instruments of pleasure. With the money thus raised, he abolished all the taxes which Commodus had imposed.[9]

On the heels of that, Pertinax “carried out an extraordinary … coinage reform that returned the denarius to the standard of Vespasian.”[10] It revalued the denarius from 74 to 87% silver by weight on new coins, several mintings of which were emblazoned with the motto “MENTI LAVDANDAE” (“noteworthy good sense”), and most significantly featured not his or another emperor’s visage but Ops, the Roman personification of wealth. In addition to this, Pertinax simultaneously embarked upon a fiscal rehabilitation program, the centerpiece of which were large budget cuts targeting the Roman military; he began by cancelling the customary bonus paid to soldiers by newly-seated emperors.

In a remarkably short of time, Pertinax gained “the love and esteem of his people.”[11] But his cuts to the military were deep and far reaching, and his urge to settle disputes with enemies rather than fight them out enraged the soldiery. “A hasty zeal to reform the corrupted state … proved fatal” for him. [12]. On the 86th day of his rule, his personal guard betrayed him and mutinied, gathering at the imperial domicile. Though other guards urged him to safety, “instead of flying, he boldly addressed them” – and fell beneath their swords.[13] Rome’s “Age of Inflation” had thus begun.

Macrinus (April 217AD – June 218AD)

Gibbons describes Caracalla, who ruled for 19 years, as “the common enemy of mankind” for the incredible number of massacres and persecutions, as well as economic destruction, which occurred during his tenure.[14] He devalued the denarii from 1.81 grams of silver to 1.66 and introduced a new coin, the antoninianus: ostensibly a “double denarius” but actually weighing 2.6 grams of silver instead of the implied 3.3 grams. Additionally, he increased tax revenue by making all freemen in the Empire citizens and commissioned the construction of a number of massive, exorbitant bathhouses. And, most unsurprisingly, he raised the pay of the military, granted them new and expanded benefits, and launched a war against the Parthian Empire.

Macrinus, a member of Caracalla’s staff, became emperor after his assassination – to which, by some accounts, he was a co-conspirator. From the start, he made clear his concern with “prioritiz[ing] public faith over the generation of a sufficient amount of cash” for the Roman state.[15] During his short reign, he made the conscious choice to raise the purity rate of silver from Caracalla’s debased 1.66 grams of silver to above the level extant when Caracalla was installed - 1.82 grams - and demonstrated an inclination toward diplomacy versus combat. When the Persians challenged the Roman army, Macrinus “tried to make peace with the Persian king” and “s[ent] back [their] prisoners of war voluntarily.”[16] Consequently, he incurred the resentment of soldiers and further enraged them by introducing a pay system which paid them according to their rank and time-in-service.

In summary,

[t]he increased silver content was clearly beneficial for the state, as it would instill more confidence among its recipients and presumably still inflation … [but] the major problem, of course, was Macrinus’ attempt at military reform … [T]he army would not stand for a curtailment of privileges, even among new recruits. So while Macrinus’ plan was … fiscal responsibility in the state, the strength of the army was too great to allow for it … [and] paved the way for Macrinus’ downfall.[17]

Dissent soon erupted within the ranks and military forces, in a coup, elevated 15-year-old Elagabalus as the new emperor; a battle ensued between Elagabalus supporters and Macrinus loyalists. Macrinus’ forces were routed, and he was captured and executed.

Severus Alexander (March 222AD – March 235AD)

The new Emperor Elagabalus presided until his 18th birthday, profoundly debasing the denarius and squandering monstrous sums from the public treasury. “No fouler…monster” wrote the poet Ausonius, “ever filled the imperial throne of Rome”.[18] After his assassination, his cousin Severus Alexander rose to power. And

[b]y the time that Alexander ascended the throne the question of the coinage, long acute, had become critical. Looking backwards one may see two centuries of fraud that the debasement of money had gradually but surely proceeded; in the future something little short of national bankruptcy awaited the Roman world unless measures were forthwith adopted to ward off [that] evil day.[19]

Yet in a different strategy from Domitian’s, Alexander initially reduced the silver content of the denarius from 1.41 grams to 1.30 grams, and some years later not only raised it back to the old standard, but far beyond that to 1.50 grams; a quality it had not seen in decades. He

restored the tarnished reputation of imperial money by improving the denarius and striking the first substantial numbers of brass sestertii and copper assees in a generation … they were well-engraved, struck on flans of traditional size and weight, and, as money, the equal of their more elegant ancestors.[20]

He reduced taxes and attempted through various means to end the “singular system of annihilating capital and ruining agriculture and industry [which] was so deeply rooted in the Roman administration”.[21] At the same time, though, he subsidized literature, art and science and socialized education.

When invaders from Gaul threatened the Empire, Severus Alexander attempted to buy them off rather than engage in a pitched, costly battle. This, once again, angered the legionnaires, who elevated General Maximinus as the new emperor. The military rebelled and, like Pertinax and Macrinus before him, Alexander Severus was executed.

Over the next three years, Maximinus doubled soldiers’ pay and waged nearly continual warfare. Taxes were raised, with tax-collectors empowered to commit acts of violence against delinquent or reluctant payers, as well as to summarily confiscate property for citizens in arrears.

Over the next five decades,

[e]mperors … debased the silver currency and raised taxes during what they perceived to be a temporary crisis, expecting windfalls of specie from victory, but war had changed from profitable conquest to a grim defense … The Roman world was treated to the spectacle of imperial mints annually churning out hundreds of millions of silver-clad antoninaniani by recycling coins but a few years old [which] removed older coins from circulation and destroyed public confidence in imperial moneys.[22]

Characteristic of all monetary collapses, as the denarius rapidly withered into a billon trinket Roman citizens developed odd, if essential, skills – the most noteworthy of which were extracting the thin silver coating from otherwise worthless coins and fluency in the social language of monetary failure: barter.

Epilogue

Comparing modern challenges and policy responses to those of remote times is an attractive but precarious enterprise: every generation, let alone culture and era, breathes a unique psychological oxygen. Nevertheless, in this case the exercise yields several potentially valuable insights.

First, what can we say about the reformers? Why did select figures, in an era admitting no formal economic theories and within which the interaction of supply and demand was attributed to superstitious causes or conspiracies, occasionally shore up their currency?

It is notable that all of the reform-minded emperors possessed germane backgrounds and experience: where the majority of Roman emperors had pre-ascension careers in politics or the military, Domitian grew up in a family known for banking; and despite the inglorious end of his incumbency (when maintaining power came to trump sense and experience) his initial

concern with finance, with a stable currency, and an awareness of reciprocity in business and trade dealings as demonstrated in instruments such as his Vine Edict, reflect his continuation of a tradition of financial sensibility, more in keeping with a business house, than with the traditions of [elites] valued by Senators and expected of Emperors.[23]

Most fascinatingly,

[w]hile still a Caesar, Domitian had published a work on coinage … which Pliny the Elder … had cited as a source.[24]

Macrinus was the first non-senatorial emperor, and had years of both financial training and experience; he served as the administrator of the massive Flaminian Road project. Later in his pre-political career, he was personally selected to manage the personal wealth of the imperial family under the emperors Caracalla and Geta. Pertinax had spent years in business as well as teaching, and his time as a merchant led him to the belief that “[e]conomy and industry … [were] the pure and genuine sources of wealth”[25]

Alexander Severus became emperor at 13. It is difficult to hypothesize as to what may have led him to enhance the denarii – and so strongly – but one may speculate that his closest advisors, his mother and grandmother, drew from years of experience in Roman booms and busts.

One also notes that each of the reformers came after particularly egregious debasers: Domitian after Vespasian and Titus; Pertinax after Commodus; Macrinus after Caracalla; and Severus Alexander after Elagabalus. It seems as if each deduced the connection between his predecessor’s profligate monetary (and, indeed, fiscal) policies and the consequent economic crisis, choosing to reverse the afflux.

Summarizing Macrinus’ efforts, but no doubt broadly applicable, is this synopsis:

The exact motivation … for coinage reform [efforts in the Roman Empire] is in general a little hazy … attempts at reforming the coinage standards could reflect the distrust that the … population had for the imperial currency … [a]nother possibility is that [the reformers] wanted to fit into a monetary tradition that was considered responsible … [or] felt a desire to distance themsel[ves] from the policies of [their] predecessor[s] … [as many] were a simple overturning of [prior emperors] destructive economic measures.[26]

In consummation, were these episodes in qualitative tightening successful? Obviously, brief respites in the systematic debasement of the denarius delayed the eventual, yet perhaps inevitable, monetary emergency. More analytically, though, one hint lies in the architectural analysis of lost, donated, and hoarded coins, in that

coins lost casually on sites are equivalent to small change lost today [in that] more were lost as their numbers mounted and purchasing value plunged due to debasements … [C]asual losses and hoards, then, can document shifts in patterns of circulation both within and beyond imperial frontiers.[27]

The number and constitution of coin hoards reveal the public propensity to forestall consumption (“saving”, in familiar parlance) or represent financial reserves hidden out of fear of future devaluations; in any event, they imply which coins were highly valued. Patterns of similar coins lost or donated, oppositely, suggest which in circulation were valued appreciably less. While both Pertinax and Macrinus ruled briefly, and their programs were quickly reversed by their successors, under both Domitian and Severus Alexander (who ruled for 15 and 13 years, respectively) the number of discovered, archeologically-dated coin hoards skyrocketed over those dated to their immediate predecessors: from 3 to 10 and 7 to 18; again, respectively. Similarly, coins of reduced quality are found with higher frequency at ritual offering sites (e.g., temples) and where losses were common (e.g., river crossing sites) than those of contemporary circulating issues with higher purity.[28]

But the most forbidding commonality is the thread of continuity running through the fates of the monetary reformers:

Emperors who improved the purity of the denarius, [notably] Pertinax in 193 [and] Macrinus in 217 … found themselves outbid for the loyalties of the army, and … went down in ignominious defeat.[29]

And so we return to the present day. Owing to the deep entrenchment of government in daily life and, consequently, the politically incendiary nature of entitlements, attempts to underpin the value of any currency with a commodity is likely to be met with considerable resistance from the diffuse and deep-seated institutions and social groups benefitting from fiat currency systems. And yet, for the first time in well over a century, the issue of what actually backs state-issued money has resurfaced as a political issue. Precious metals are seeing their greatest popular resurgence in decades, as, in tandem, interest in and usage of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies - precisely because of their irreproducibility and the consequent quantitative limitations - expands rapidly. This, perhaps, hints at a burgeoning shift in public awareness and sentiment, which may eventually translate to political pressure for a return to sound money, but real progress will likely be an uphill battle - with bouts of ‘sticker shock’ along the way. As historian William Warren Carlise wrote,

[a]ll through history we find that it is the reform, the return to sound money rather than the depreciation itself that first rouses popular discontent. It is only when the mass of the people learns that depreciations must be followed sooner or later by such remedies that they begin to entertain a salutary dread with regard to them.[30]

Perhaps the best conclusion that can be drawn from examining these instances is that in response to the familiar rhetorical query – “Are we going the way of the Romans?” – one can reply, truthfully: “No; they occasionally reformed their currency.”

Endnotes

[1] http://domitian-economicemperor.blogspot.com/2011/01/domitian-emperor-in-broader-economic.html

[2] Brian W. Jones, The Emperor Domitian (London: Routledge, 1992), 76.

[3] Kenneth W. Harl, Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 B.C. to A.D. 700 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1996), 14.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Jones, 77.

[6] Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 141.

[7] http://domitian-economicemperor.blogspot.com/2011/01/domitian-emperor-in-broader-economic.html

[8] Edward Gibbon, Esq. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. I (London: W. Strahan, 1776), 101

[9] John Platts, A New Universal Biography … of Eminent Persons (London: Sherwood, Gilbert and Piper, 1826), 122.

[10] Mattern, 140 – 141.

[11] Gibbon, 102.

[12] Gibbon, 103.

[13] Platts, 122.

[14] Gibbon, 139.

[15] Andrew Scott, “Change and Discontinuity within the Severus Dynasty: The Case of Macrinus”, a dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Classics, May 2008, 133.

[16] Henry Jewell Bassett, Macrinus and Diadumenian (Menasha: George Banta Publishing Co., 1920), 33.

[17] Scott, 135.

[18] Martijn Icks, The Crimes of Elagabalus: The Life and Legacy of Rome’s Decadent Boy Emperor (London: I. B. Taurus & Co, 2011), 115.

[19] R. V. Nind Hopkins, The Life of Alexander Severus (Cambridge: University Press, 1907), 182.

[20] Harl, 128.

[21] Hopkins, 154.

[22] Harl, 132.

[23] http://domitian-economicemperor.blogspot.com/2011/01/domitian-emperor-in-broader-economic.html

[24] Ibid.

[25] Gibbon, 102 – 103.

[26] Scott, 129 -133.

[27] Harl, 17 – 20.

[28] Richard Duncan-Jones, Money and Government in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107.

[29] Harl, 126 – 127.

[30] William Warrand Carlile, The Evolution of Modern Money (London: Macmillan and Co.), 100.

What would we consider a successful railway system?

Under many measures, the railways have performed remarkably since privatisation. It is not surprising that the British public would nevertheless like to renationalise them, given how ignorant we know they are, but it's at least slightly surprising that large sections of the intelligentsia seem to agree.

Last year I wrote a very short piece on the issue, pointing out the basic facts: the UK has had two eras of private railways, both extremely successful, and a long period of extremely unsuccessful state control. Franchising probably isn't the ideal way of running the rail system privately, but it seems like even a relatively bad private system outperforms the state.

 

Short history: approximately free market in rail until 1913, built mainly with private capital. Government control/direction during the war. Government decides the railways aren't making enough profit in 1923 and reorganises them into bigger regional monopolies. These aren't very successful (in a very difficult macro environment) so it nationalises them—along with everything else—in the late 1940s.

By the 1960s the government runs railways into the ground to the point it essentially needs to destroy or mothball half the network. Government re-privatises the railways in 1995—at this point passenger journeys have reached half the level they were at in 1913. Within 15 years they've made back the ground lost in the previous eighty.

But maybe it's not privatisation that led to this growth. Let's consider some alternative hypotheses:

Was it a big rise in the cost of driving?

Was it the big rise in GDP over the period that did it?

Was it just something that was happening around the developed world?

Was it purely down to extra cash injections from the state?

Has it come at the expense of safety?

Has it come at the expense of customer satisfaction?

Has it come at the expense of freight?

Is it all driven by London?

Democracy's not all it's cracked up to be you know

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As Churchill pointed out democracy does have something going for it, that it's better than all other methods anyone's ever tried. But that doesn't mean that it's perfect, not by a long shot. And interestingly we've that nice Owen Jones making the point for us:

The Aids crisis was building; more than half the population believed homosexuality was “always wrong”, peaking at 64% in 1987 when just 11% opted for “not wrong at all”; and later that decade the homophobic legislation, section 28, was introduced.

Meaning that under the pure rules of democracy that Section 28 legislation was entirely justified. Indeed, it should have been introduced as it was obviously the majority view of the people. All of which is a problem with democracy: for there are quite obviously times when that will of the majority conflicts with the civil liberties of various minorities. Meaning that we have to decide which we are going to regard as more important, those civil liberties or that will of the majority.

Those times that we have to decide coming in a variety of flavours. We could most certainly gain a majority for the idea that we should string the paedos up without much of a trial. There's actually a substantial campaign to insist that legal protections for accused rapists should be weakened, even to the point (not in the UK thankfully, not yet, but in the Antipodes) that the presumption of innocence should be dropped. Here at home we have a campaign to insist that prostitution among consenting adults must be made illegal: quite clearly a violation of that right to ownership of ones' own body and the income therefrom. And there's been campaigns against the rights of property ownership for most of the past century. A subset of which today is the idea that the shareholders in a company may not decide how much they wish to pay the managers in their own employ (in the name of "equaliteeee" of course).

And the campaign against the arbitration part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is exactly a complaint that that treaty would insist that governments must obey the law of the land over and above whatever democracy demands as changes.

Jones has provided us there with a useful example of when those civil liberties are more important than whatever it is that the mob thinks. We should remind him of this point when he next, or his ilk, suggests taking away our economic liberties. Just because the Demos can be whipped into howling for it does not make a policy one we should enact.

Two cheers for Mark Carney

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Applauding regulators, and especially the financial variety, is rare but maybe the tide is finally changing.  It was a delight to see Ofgem attacked this month by its previous chiefs for reducing competition and thereby contributing to higher prices, i.e. the opposite of what utility regulators are supposed to do. Likewise it was a delight to read in The Times (“Regulators join bandwagon heading away from Bank”, 18th August) that the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has lost 160 staff.  That is only 10% of the total and the cynical may believe that they were always lost.  Even so, it is a step in the right direction and the Governor’s “One Bank” plan deserves some of the credit.

The Bank’s present 3,600 staff compares with 2,900 in February 1997, i.e. before Gordon Brown removed banking regulatory and supervisory responsibility.  This compares like with like. In 1974, Bank of England staff numbered 5,500 excluding print workers.  The long term staffing levels are declining but, with the transfer of regulation to Brussels, Mark Carney should still be looking to halve the current number to about 1,800.  For comparison, the Bank of Canada has, according to its latest (2012) Annual Report, 1,239 staff.

The odd thing about The Times report is its sepulchral gloom.  We should be rejoicing that personnel are leaving the PRA and that they are joining trading banks to direct their compliance.  Surely less interference from bureaucrats and more self discipline by banks is just what we want?

Why only two cheers for the Governor?  Things seem to be going in the right direction at last but they have a long way to go.

There's no reforming the EU without understanding it

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Once again the Daily Telegraph (“Brussels plots fresh City of London power grab”, 8th August) and like-minded media have become irrationally frenzied by EU moves that are wrong but nevertheless entirely rational.  London has been reminded that the three UK financial regulators will have to give up their regulatory powers to Brussels and become merely supervisors. As this Institute pointed out in our letter to The Times in June 2009, the UK governmentagreed that the previous March.  It was President Sarkozy’s price for attending the London G10 Summit in April.   The necessary legal framework was agreed by Parliament before that summer’s recess. The government and the City were silent at the time and in the five years since.  It is no use yelping now.  Brussels is only implementing what we agreed.

The worry now is that the City and the government ignorance of Brussels and its processes make EU reform all the less likely.  One needs to understand and then work the system to succeed.  The UK negotiators’ failure is demonstrated by the 55 occasions on which we have sought to block some new Brussels initiative or other and been over-ruled each time.  The French and the Germans know how to garner support for what they want done; the British government clearly hasn’t a clue.

If the past five years, during which the EU financial regulation issue has been ignored by City and government, show anything, it is that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and HM Treasury have been asleep at the wheel.  The FCO lacks backbone and is notoriously pro-EU. We need a new team.

Obviously some of the existing team do have some understanding of the EU.  Perhaps we need an exam, supervised by Michael Gove, to sift out the good ones and then complete the new team with our finest negotiators first to understand what has to be done and then to prepare the way.  It will make little difference to the UK’s position in the EU if our involvement, for the few years preparation will take, is little more than keeping bums on seats.

The Coalition has at least done some of the preparation in asking and thinking about what reforms Britain would like but that is no more than a Santa Claus wish list without a plan to achieve any reform.

A final thought along these lines is to put the new team under John Major’s charge.  He is the last British Prime Minister successfully to have negotiated any substantial matter with the EU.

The reason we're all such fat lardbuckets

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A number of reasons are put forward as to why the nation has, in its entirety, become a population of fat lardbuckets. Big Food pushes ever more unhealthy comestibles upon us, advertising to children is for some reasons still allowed, there's no tax on sugar, or fat, we've even got those who insist that inequality causes obesity. Of course, all these reasons come with their own solutions: we should ban advertising to children, or of "unhealthy" food, or reduce inequality or something. As Chris Snowden shows in his latest little report (The Fat Lie)all of those reasoned proffered are simply wrong:

If we look at the average body mass of English adults since 1993, we see a steady increase from 72.4 kg to 77.4 kg (Figure 7). This seven per cent increase contrasts sharply with the data from DEFRA which shows a decline in domestic calorie consumption of nine per cent in the same period (Figure 8). If we confine ourselves to the period 2002-12, for which we have solid data for food consumed inside and outside the home, we see the same ‘paradox’: an increase in average body weight of two kilograms coinciding with a decline in calorie consumption of 4.1 per cent and a decline in sugar consumption of 7.4 per cent.

Britons are eating fewer calories than we all used to. What is causing the increase in weight is that we're all also doing less physical labour than we used to. The imbalance between calories consumption and expenditure is growing but not the total amount of calorie consumption. We've thus got under-expenditure of calories, not over-consumption of them.

Note that if we are all consuming fewer calories this does then mean that if Big Food has been trying to get us to eat more they've failed and failed dismally.

It's also worth noting one more thing, that inequality argument. This should really be turned on its head: it is greater equality that is to blame here. There's always been a certain calorie richness, calorie density, to the British working class diet as compared to its middle class (or even upper) equivalent. This made perfect sense back in the days of heavy manual labour. We now have much greater equality in the workplace, there's very few of us making a living from the exercise of our muscles rather than what's between our ears. And that greater equality has had a larger effect on those still eating that culturally calorie dense diet than it has on those whose diet adapted to less physical labour earlier.

It is still possible to point out that it's the poorer among us who are the lardbuckets. But this isn't the result of ineq1uality at all, it's the result of greater equality in the workplace, in all of us now expending fewer calories in pursuit of our daily bread.

Actually, people aren't willing to pay more tax for the NHS

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There's a report out announcing that loads of people would be entirely happy to pay more tax if that extra cash was allocated to the NHS. Two important things #to say about this. The first being that it's untrue and the second being that if it is then that's just great:

Almost half of voters say they would be happy to pay more income tax as long as the money went directly to the NHS, which is facing a £30bn gap in its finances by 2020.

Polling firm ComRes found that 49% of people would be prepared to pay more tax to help fund the health service, one in three (33%) people said they would not be ready to do so, and 18% did not know either way.

However, if only the views of those who expressed an opinion are considered, as many as 60% of people are willing to pay more tax to help the NHS providing its wide range of services; 40% are not.

The reason it's not true is our old friend revealed preferences. We should never try to divine what people really want from what they say: we should instead look at what they do. And we do have a method of being able to pay extra tax: simply send the cheque to "The Accountant, 2 Horse Guards Road, London SW1" and they're absolutely delighted to apply it to whatever area of public spending you wish to inform them you favour. Admittedly it's a few years since I looked into this but in that year an entire 5 people had actually done so and four of them were dead, leaving bequests.

So revealed preferences tells us that exactly one live person was actually willing to pay higher taxes for any reason at all, not just for the NHS.

But let's assume for a moment that this is in fact true. That the reason, perhaps, that more people don't pay is because they don't know where Mr. Accountant resides? All we have to do is tell everyone where he does and that's the problem solved, isn't it? A few people to open the flood of envelopes that will no doubt overwhelm the office and we're done. Everyone who wants to pay more tax for the NHS may do so and no one who does not needs to.

If only all public policy questions were as simple to solve as this one.

An infrastructure push does not lead to a boost to GDP

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We've heard much these past few years about how now id just the time to have an infrastructure surge. It's said often enough that a recession is just when we should be building all those roads, railways, council houses and the rest. Obama even tried to find those $800 billion worth of shovel ready projects just raring to do. With no great success it should be said. Sadly, this just doesn't seem to work. From the IMF:

This paper has examined whether major public investment drives in the past have served to promote or accelerate national economic growth. It is not about whether in theory public investment drives could accelerate growth, but rather whether in practice, with real governments deciding how to spend the funds and implementing investments, they have in fact accelerated growth.

The answer appears to be “probably very little”. This conclusion pertains to the drives – the big increases in public capital spending – not necessarily to routine levels of public investment. And furthermore the evidence here is not about whether public capital can promote growth by averting the emergence of bottlenecks. Major public investment campaigns continue to be advocated in several countries as a major trigger for economic growth, and on this issue, whether they have in fact triggered growth, the evidence for a positive effect of public capital on GDP or GDP growth is weak. … It is difficult to find a clear-cut example that fits the oft-repeated narrative of a public investment boom followed by acceleration in GDP growth. If anything the cases of clear-cut booms illustrate the opposite – major drives in the past have been followed by slumps rather than booms.

In theory it should work, in practice it doesn't, which is a bit of a conundrum. The practical answer to which puzzle is that government is probably even worse at doing things than we generally think. Thus we'd probably be better off limiting it to that very small set of things that both must be done and that only government can do. Something which is a very small overlap indeed.

A new ASI report finds a foreign player crackdown would do nothing to help England's football team

A new report released today by the Adam Smith Institute blasts the FA's proposals to crack down on foreign players, finding:

  • No link between native play time in the Premier League and performance of English national team
  • No link between amount of minutes played by Englishmen ten years ago and performance today
  • A strong link between foreign players and Premier League quality

The FA's plan to crack down on foreign players in the Premier League would damage the league's quality and success in European club competitions, without any benefit to the English national team's performance, according to a new study from the Adam Smith Institute, an economic think tank.

In the first research of its kind, there was no link found between the time English players get on the pitch and the performance of the national team.

The report, "Sweet FA - Why foreign player crackdowns hurt English football", found this to be true for performance measured in FIFA points, world ranking, or placing at major championships—i.e. the World Cup and European Championship. This also goes for the other major leagues in Europe—Spain's La Liga, Germany's Bundesliga, and Italy's Serie A.

The report also rejected as baseless the claim that a reduced amount of playing time for English players five or ten years prior affected English international performance.

But the report did find evidence of a strong link between a league's UEFA coefficient and the prevalence of foreign players—leagues with more non-natives are stronger, and stronger leagues have more non-natives.

This suggests that Greg Dyke's scheme to tighten up work permit rules for foreign (or just non-EU) players would harm the English Premier League—the world's most popular and successful league—without any concomitant benefit to the English national team.

Paper author Ben Southwood, Head of Policy at the Adam Smith Institute, said:

"It is widely believed that England's perceived underperformance at recent international competitions owes something to the reduced fraction of minutes English players are playing in the Premier League—but up until now no one's really studied the question with any kind of rigour.

"My numbers are not final but they suggest there is no real link between the amount of football English players play in the Premier League (or across the top four European Leagues) and English international performance.

"If the reduced quantity of experience is a problem, then it is being balanced out by the massively improved quality—or something else".

For further comments or to arrange an interview, contact Kate Andrews, Communications Manager, at kate@old.adamsmith.org / 07584 778207.

The Adam Smith Institute is an independent libertarian think tank based in London. It advocates classically liberal public policies to create a richer, freer world.

We'll take good policy from anyone who wants to offer it

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As we regularly point out here, at the ASI we're not party political. But we do propose policies that we think would be good to political parties. As such it's nice when someone, anyone (we're not proud!) decides that implementing a policy we've been recommending would be a good idea. So it is with the announcement that the LibDems are going to have a £12,500 a year personal tax allowance in their manifesto:

The Liberal Democrats have pledged to raise the income tax personal allowance to at least £12,500, in manifesto plans announced on Thursday.

The party has also signalled it would seek to increase the amount people can earn before paying National Insurance.

Danny Alexander, the chief secretary to the Treasury, said the allowance would rise by the end of the next parliament. The move would cut income tax for 30 million workers and save the typical basic rate taxpayer £400 a year, the party claimed. It would also benefit more than six million pensioners.

The ASI has for years argued that the personal allowance should be much higher. But we started to point out, a few years ago when the Living Wage movement first started out, that it's simply ridiculous that people earning the minimum wage face income tax. The entire point of the minimum wage is that this is a minimum politically or socially acceptable amount that people should earn (whether you believe there should be a minimum wage is another matter). That at the margin government then nicks 40% of it in various taxes is just not on. so we've been saying that, even if people don't like our flat tax plan (£15k personal allowance and a flat rate income tax above that) can we all at least agree that the personal tax allowance should be that full time, full year, minimum wage?

The reason that Danny Alexander is saying £12,500 a year as the allowance is because that's what that minimum wage was a couple of years ago when he was first asked about the suggestion.

We would go further though (we always go further) and insist that it should rise to the current minimum wage, whatever that is in any year. And also that the NI contribution limits (yes, for both employers' and employees') need to rise to that same level. For we do still have that simple problem. If the minimum wage is the irreducible minimum that it is just and righteous that someone receives for their labour then it's just not on that government dip its sticky fingers into it.

And it's also worth pointing out that doing this will immediately make the minimum wage above the Living Wage. For we don't actually have a low wage problem in the UK: we have tax poverty.