COVID-19 highlighted the flaws in UK pandemic preparedness. Yet the Government is still yet to take action to mitigate future risks.

The risk of biological threats is increasing due to several factors, including population growth, technological advancements, and increased global tensions. Advancements in synthetic biology have made biological materials more affordable and accessible to malign actors seeking to create bioweapons.

A biological threat can emerge from many reasons including a deliberate attack - seen in 2001 during the Salisbury attacks - an accidental release from a life sciences lab, or a zoonotic spillover, all of which have increased in likelihood.

As evidenced by COVID-19, nations such as our own are ill-prepared for major biological threats. In contrast to other deadly pathogens, COVID-19 was relatively mild and a deliberate biological attack could be far more dangerous and much more overwhelming for any state.

To reduce the chance of a future biological threat, a more effective biosecurity approach is needed. This requires strong prevention, detection and response capabilities that together can significantly enhance the UK’s residence against biological threats.

Below, I propose a set of policy suggestions that I believe would strengthen our biosecurity and are therefore split into three sections; prevention, detection and response.

Prevention

Prevention is the most critical component within a biosecurity approach. Stopping biological threats before they emerge is preferable to mitigating them after the fact.

Essential prevention strategies include:

Regulating the purchase of synthetic biology technologies

Including requirements for actors purchasing DNA synthesis and gene editing technologies to undergo full screening to ensure these materials are not being misused to synthesise dangerous pathogens.
Invest money into creating computer software that can be installed into all DNA synthesis or gene editing devices that can immediately detect when materials are being misused.

Enacting international agreements and export controls on materials and technologies that could be used to create bioweapons.
Regulate gain-of-function research:

Gain of function research involves manipulating pathogens to increase their lethality in aim of understanding the potential threat to the population better. Due to the high risk of laboratory spillages, this type of research is often deemed controversial and has the ability to harm society greatly.
To control gain-of-function research, an independent government agency should be established that regulates and ensures that only essential and proven beneficial research is being conducted.

Detection

The detection of potential pathogens can most efficiently be done through establishing strong early warning and monitoring systems. Currently detection strategies in the UK are limited; a monitoring system that is pathogen-agnostic (not looking for one specific pathogen but looking for all nucleic acids that could potentially generate into sometime dangerous) needs to be established.

An expansion in the Ministry of Defence’s budget for Research and Development to be spent on creating a biosurveillance system. This system would be on a national scale and would take data from a variety of sources, including looking at waste water in areas prone to a biological attack (urban areas, areas near BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs), testing the blood of patients in blood banks, screening passengers in airports. Testing could also expand to factory farm animals to detect potential pathogens in animals that could easily be spread to humans.
Establish an online system that collates all the data from each source and turns them into information that can be easily interpreted by decision makers.
Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and work towards creating an international collaboration scheme that establishes regular communication, data sharing and global surveillance between countries. Data needs to be shared on a global scale so that if a country detects a pathogen early, other countries can shut down connections with them to properly isolate them - this leads to a quicker response and containment of a potential virus.

Response

Once a potentially dangerous pathogen has been detected, a quick and effective response is needed to contain and control its spread. Covid-19 demonstrated the UK’s inability to do this efficiently, leading to countless more deaths than what would have been given the following suggestions were in place.

Increased investment into building highly effective, easy to use, cheap and abundant PPE which can be readily enforced if a new pathogen is detected. Once established, PPE should be stockpiled and given to healthcare/essential workers during a pandemic. Current PPE standards are low, they are not designed for extreme biothreats, expensive and short in supply.
Invest money into portable, easy to use ventilators and create a drone delivery scheme that would allow medication, ventilation, vaccine and PPE delivery for those living in remote locations.
Use the Operation Warp Speed model to develop vaccinations and PPE rapidly. OWS was a successful public-private partnership that led to a rapid response to COVID-19, resulting in the creation of Moderna, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines.

The IFP identified four components of the OWN model: clear goal setting, market shaping mechanisms, whole-of-government strategy and streamlined regulations. These components can be applied to develop a biosecurity plan.
A unique feature of OWS was an independent board with decision making authority, allowing for faster decision making without bureaucratic red tape which if similarly used against a biothreat, could allow for the quick creation of vaccines and PPE.