At the outset of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, he warned the west against intervention, lest it meet “consequences greater than any you have faced in history”. Since then, Russia has shown no compunction in shelling the cities it attacks, possibly recklessly, possibly missing military targets; most likely targeting indiscriminately to demoralise defenders. Russia is also accused of shelling the humanitarian corridors it promotes so energetically; of firing on protesters in the occupied city of Kherson; and of deporting civilians to Russia. Whatever the details, ten million Ukrainians - just under one quarter - have been displaced.
When Herman Kahn wrote On Escalation in 1965, he noted the parallel of the fifties game of “chicken”, in which American teenagers drove their souped-up bangers at each other, to see who would swerve first. He noted that one winning strategy is ostentatiously to throw away the steering wheel, to convey that swerving is off the cards. Is this what Putin is doing? If so, how should NATO respond? Any answer is complicated by NATO’s own game of chicken: “strategic ambiguity”, intended to leave first the Soviet Union and now Russia uncertain about where the West’s red lines lie and what happens if they are crossed.
It is arguable that the present pass calls rather for a programme of deliberate and proportionate responses, well telegraphed to the other side. There are two elements to such a programme. One is to establish the threshold for action - those famous red lines. These may be territorial, attacks on the territory of a NATO member; or they may be escalation on the battlefield, that is using the chemical, biological or nuclear “weapons of mass destruction”. Complications arise out of stealth - there is evidence that in October 2014, the Russians attacked NATO facilities in the Czech Republic with deniable special forces; ambiguity - both sides have low-yield tactical nuclear weapons; and bad politics - the West funked it when Russia and Syria used chemical weapons in 2013. This may be a reason for some of that “strategic ambiguity”.
Then we turn to military responses. The West is well-informed and well-armed, so has ample options. The proportionate course is to limit retaliation to the military units violating the threshold and their associated logistics and command systems. For example, a drone strike on NATO territory may be held to justify destroying the launch-pads themselves, together with their associated radar and HQ set-ups. This is complicated, if (to take this example further) drones are launched from aircraft, warships or remote locations. Further complications arise out of the use of weapons of mass destruction, where the West is well enough armed to have the choice of not responding in kind.
These are serious matters, to be treated accordingly. How else to walk the narrow tightrope of deterring our antagonist by keeping retaliation on the agenda, without going straight to Kahn’s terrifying climax, “insensate or spasm nuclear exchanges”?