School choice: first evidence to prove long-term benefits

A report released this month by Victor Lavy of CESifo is the first evidence of its kind to prove the long-term social and economic benefits of school choice. Up until now, research conducted has explored life outcomes resulting from varying teachers' quality, schools' quality, classroom sizes and other school programs. Yet to be unravelled was the impact of school choice later on in life and how the effects of different types of post-secondary schooling, varying by quality, persist beyond attainment and standardised test scores. Adult employment, earnings and dependency on welfare are all examined in primary school students offered free school choice in the junction of transition to secondary school to determine which educational interventions best achieve the desirable long-term outcomes.  Remarkably, students who had choice at primary school are 4.7 percentage points more likely to enroll in post secondary schooling, and to complete almost an additional quarter year of college schooling in comparison to controlled students. Further to this success was an estimated 5-7 percentage points increase in average annual earnings among treated students at ages 28-30. This is explained by the improvement in academic outcomes resulting from the school choice program and post-secondary schooling attainment which are highly correlated to labour market earnings. Most surprising in the findings was that school choice led to reductions in health or mental disability rates at age 30 and to a decline in eligibility and recipiency of 3 disability welfare allowances.

Lessons learned from this study - which was conducted in Israel - can be easily applied to other educational settings due to different countries having very comparable and similar high-stakes exit exams. The school choice program also has similar features to related programs in the US, in Europe and in other OECD countries. As a result, variants of this school choice program have the potential to be implemented in developed countries across the world.

A great advantage of this study is that it is also the first of its kind to present evidence that can easily be acted upon directly via policy. Whereas most related studies have looked at long-term outcomes of measures not easily manipulated by policy like teachers' and schools' quality.

All the evidence now suggests that allowing children and their parents to choose freely at age 13 which secondary school they will attend, not only improves sharply their high school outcomes six years later, but also influences their path to post-secondary schooling, enhances their earnings over a decade and a half later and reduces their dependency on the public welfare system. These results are important because the school choice experiment targeted a disadvantaged population in some of the more deprived parts of Tel Aviv. This is now the most potent contribution of late to the critical question surrounding what educational interventions are conducive to the best possible life outcomes. Now the empirical evidence provided by the paper creates a fuller picture of the individual and social returns from these interventions, and will equip educators and governments with the information required to make the most informed decisions as to which educational programs constitute the most beneficial use of limited school resources.

With increasingly prominent advocates of free school choice and more evidence exhibiting its merits, we can hope to see it embodied in policy in the near future. Standing in the way, unfortunately,  are politicians and educationalists with an unfaltering dedication to the taxpayer-funded state-monopoly of learning. Opponents of school choice are not home with freedom. For if you had the freedom to choose how to be educated, you would not choose their way.

Logical Fallacies: 4. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QdWptDS_HXc  

The latest in Madsen Pirie's ongoing series on logical fallacies, in this video he explains 'cum hoc ergo propter hoc'.

You can pre-order the new edition of Dr. Madsen Pirie's How to Win Every Argument here

The best laid plans of mice and men gang aft agley

There's an interesting reason why politics, the creation of laws and regulations, just isn't very good as a way of doing things. That being that the world's a complicated place. And so it is with this idea that every child should be safe from the terrors of pornography on the internet. The powers that be demanded that all such possible access be filtered out unless responsible adults deliberately asked for access to be possible. And lo! the regulations were made and:

“But it’s very simplistic: URLs with Sussex or Essex in them, for example, are blocked."

Rather less amusingly the websites of many charities and educational sites are also blocked. If all "porn" is blocked then so will be places that discuss how to escape the porn industry, what to do about an addiction to porn and, a memory so glorious that perhaps we should build a statue to it, the website of the MP who campaigned for there to be an internet porn filter.

The point being that this world of ours is a complicated place. Enough of us now understand Hayek's point about economic planning, that we can't for the only thing that we have that is capable of calculating the economy is the economy itself. It's not possible to run a model and then direct it: what happens is emergent from the very method of calculation. What is less well understood is that this applies to all these other areas of life as well. It's not possible for us to just gaily insist "porn filters for all!" and for that to be actually implemented.

Therefore, logically, we should stop trying to micromanage life in this manner and go off and do something more useful with our energies. And given that doing pretty much anything would be a more useful use of our energies that leaves us all with a great deal of choice over what to do.

This picture is illegal in California

Or rather, the action being performed in that picture is illegal in California. It's not that the lettuce is not organic or anything. It's that it is evidence of someone working during their lunch break:

I mentioned earlier that we had struggled to comply with California meal break law. The problem was that my workers needed extra money, and so begged me to be able to work through lunch so they could earn a half-hour more pay each day. They said they would sign a paper saying they had agreed to this. Little did I know that this was a strategy devised by a local attorney who understood meal break litigation better than I. What he knew, but I didn't, was that based on new case law, a company had to get the employee's signature every day, not just once, to avoid the meal break penalties. The attorney advised them they could get the money for working lunch AND they could sue later for more money (which he would get a cut of). Which is exactly what they did, waiting until November to sue so they could get some extra money to pay for Christmas bills. This is why -- believe it or not -- it is now a firing offense at our company to work through lunch in California.

Eventually a system becomes so encrusted by such nonsense that nothing useful can ever be done and all that can be is to chase the paper around in ever decreasing circles. That is arguably what happened to the Ottoman Empire, various incarnations of the various Indian and Chinese empires and so on and on. It's one of the reasons that we here shout so loudly about regulation and the necessity of a bonfire of much of it.

We do not say that there should not be regulation, not at all. But we do say that we need to carefully consider who is doing the regulating. There are times and circumstances when it does need to be the bureaucrat or the politician. But far more often tasks that they take upon themselves will be better regulated through what we might call simple market processes. Markets are, after all, just the interaction of voluntary behaviour and surely we can trust two adults to agree between themselves about whether someone might usefully check a spreadsheet, or not, while munching on a salad?

It's the absence of markets that causes poverty

There's an excellent discussion of a recent finding in development economics over here.

If markets are missing completely, or so unreliable as to effectively be missing, then household separation fails. The extreme case is easiest to think of. If a household is completely autarkic, and can trade with no one else, then it can only consume what it produces. The two decisions are inseparable. If they want a new TV, then they’d better have a source of rare earth elements in their back yard and a passion for soldering.

The importance of knowing if household separation holds or not is that it tells us something fundamentally important about why a developing area is poor.

What's being looked at is that horrible, $1 a day, poverty that far too many of our fellow humans are stuck in. The big question being, well, are they stuck there because of the way that markets operate? Perhaps "the market" means they can't get enough fertiliser for example. Or is it that markets simply do not exist and thus they cannot reap the benefits of the division and specialisation of labour and the subsequent trade in the increased production?

The answer appears to be the absence of markets rather than any failure in them. Which leads to an interesting thought about what should be the right way to aid them.

Instead of sending money with which to buy them stuff we should be trying to work out how to create markets. And the most important part of that is in fact information. Not from us to them, but within such communities. And that ties in neatly with something that is becoming apparent from another part of the literature. It may well be that the mobile telephone is the greatest poverty reducing technology of our times. Simply because it does do exactly that, allow the spread of the information that enables markets to do their wealth creation thing. As this excellent paper makes clear.

It's not quite as simple as "make sure there's a phone network everywhere and the poor will get rich" but we're increasingly coming to the view that that's a damn good start to solving the problem.

UPenn Global Go-To Think Tank Rankings 2014 – how we did

This year's Global Go-To Think Tank Rankings, which are compiled annually by the University of Pennsylvania, have been released, and the ASI did pretty well. Our global rankings were:

• 69th in Top Think Tanks Worldwide (Non-US)
• 16th in think tanks in Western Europe
• 3rd in Top Domestic Economic Policy Think Tanks
• 5th in Top International Economic Policy Think Tanks
• 17th in the Best Use of Social Networks
• 40th in Think Tanks with the Best External Relations
• 24th in Think Tanks with the Most Significant Impact on Public Policy
• 12th in Think Tanks with Outstanding Policy Orientated Public Programmes

The full rankings are here, and congratulations to our friends at other think tanks who also did well, particularly the Cato Institute which came 8th in the total US think tank rankings. We rose in most rankings, and by our own internal measures of impact, media coverage, research quality, events attendance and fundraising, 2014/15 is shaping up to be a very good year indeed.

Reading the report reminded me of the challenge that think tanks (and non-profits in general) all have. As Jeffrey Friedman has observed, when you run a for-profit firm, you have a single measure of success – profit. If you do X and profits go up, keep doing X. If you do X and profits go down, stop doing X. In a complex world having just one thing that matters cuts through quite a lot of confusion.

But, obviously, non-profits don't have that measure or any single thing we can focus on. For us, it's a constant struggle. Focus on fundraising too much as a think tank and you end up being good at talking to donors but not good at using their money to make the world better. The tail wags the dog. Focus on media coverage and you become a rent-a-quote. And so on.

The thing you really care about is changing the world. But if that's done by, say, changing the minds of young people, it takes decades to measure success. If it's done by focusing on policies implemented, you're tempted to go for the easy, insignificant win over the difficult long-term change. There's no single thing you can look at, so it's tough to cut through the complexity. Rankings like this don't do that entirely, but every little helps.

With property rights, there are plenty more fish in the sea

We at the Adam Smith Institute need little further evidence that property rights are the best way to an efficient allocation of resources. Even so, more literature on how property rights can work in different industries and regulatory environments is always welcome. A new National Bureau of Economic Research paper looks at how the strength of property rights can affect regulators' willingness to allow the exploitation of natural resources. They focus on the most common system of regulation, which sees a limited number of firms given the right to extract to the level of a cap set by a regulator. They attribute this, at least partly, to a benign form of regulatory capture.

Commonly, it is seen as an unwelcome anticompetitive force, leading to the overexploitation of resources by monopolistic producers in industries with clearly defined property rights. However, because of the temporary, weak, and ill-defined nature of rights in the natural resources sector, the authors suggest that this analysis is not applicable. Instead, they find that

when property rights to the resource are strong, the regulator’s choice (which is the product of resource harvesters’ influence) coincides with the public interest. However, when property rights to the resource are weak, the regulator’s choice leads to overexploitation. This suggests that the resulting extraction level is closer to the socially-optimal extraction level when rights to the resource are strong.

The authors distinguish between 'weak' and 'strong' property rights using the probability that such rights will be revoked – the more likely, the weaker the rights. They propose that, when rights are strong, firms influence regulators (either formally by voting in regulatory councils, or by informal means) to choose a lower extraction rate than they would in a situation with less secure property rights, because they are less concerned about those rights being revoked in the future. In addition, regulators discount utility from future harvests less when there is less risk of rights being revoked, causing them to favour less current extraction.

The paper tests this thesis empirically against novel panel data from 178 of the largest commercial fisheries, and finds that regulators are "significantly more conservative" in their management of resources when property rights are most secure. In those cases where poorly managed fisheries switch to a 'Catch Share' system, with more secure property rights, there is a significant fall in exploitation, supporting their thesis (the fall prior to the switch is attributed to a gradual policy change in the face of overexploitation):

If in practice the Coasean idea that the assignation and enforcement of property rights – through their effects on the decisions of regulators – lead to more efficient outcomes, this has important implications for policy. It gives us an even greater incentive (as if we need it) to promote the institution of secure property rights, especially in those resource-rich low-income countries which could be subject to a swift depletion of natural resources due not only to tragedies of the commons, but also to the insecurity of extractive firms property rights.

Nationalising the railways might be popular but perhaps not for the reason people think

Owen Jones tells us that Labour should, to beat the Greens, announce some really popular policy like re-nationalising the railways. And this might well be popular but perhaps not for the reason that people are assuming:

But there are three clear commitments Labour could offer to win over Green defectors. First, renationalise the railways. It would cut through like few other policies, and probably prompt some voters to break out in spontaneous applause. Polling demonstrates a publicly owned railway has near-universal appeal, winning over well-heeled Tory commuters and Ukip voters alike. But it also has a totemic quality about it: a clear demonstration that Labour has taken a decisive stance against the untrammelled market in the era of market failure.

The real complaint, we feel, about the railways is not over who owns and or runs them. It's over the price of them.

It's common enough to see people complaining that UK ticket prices are among the highest in Europe. And they are, as a result of a deliberate political decision. More of the revenue to keep them running comes from ticket prices and less from direct subsidy than in most other countries. And that's the correct decision too. There's Britons who don't use a train from one decade to another: difficult to see why they should be taxed to provide cheaper transport for others.

And that's why nationalisation won't make much difference. Because doing so isn't going to reverse that decision that, by and large, people who use trains are the people who should pay to keep trains running. The only way ticket prices will come down is if the taxpayer gets dunned for it. And why should we?

Logical Fallacies: 3. Definitional Retreat

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvTS9Jw2JDM  

The third in Madsen Pirie's 'Logical Fallacies', this video is on the 'definitional retreat'.

You can pre-order the new edition of Dr. Madsen Pirie's How to Win Every Argument here

Uber: helping drivers, helping customers

The first comprehensive analysis of Uber 'partners' (i.e. drivers) has come out, written by Dr. Jonathan Hall, head of policy research at Uber, and Prof. Alan Krueger, of Princeton, and formerly Barack Obama's top economist. The results in short: Uber provides flexible employment at higher per-hour wages than traditional taxi driving, while building up reputational capital that traditional taxi systems cannot offer. It does not undermine traditional employment more general, or enhance inequality, but we all know how cheap the fares can be, and how useful the service is (this previously led me to believe that its stratospheric valuation might be justified).

This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of Uber’s driver-partners, based on both survey data and anonymized, aggregated administrative data. Uber has grown at an exponential rate over the last few years, and drivers who partner with Uber appear to be attracted to the platform in large part because of the flexibility it offers, the level of compensation, and the fact that earnings per hour do not vary much with hours worked, which facilitates part-time and variable hours. Uber’s driver-partners are more similar in terms of their age and education to the general workforce than to taxi drivers and chauffeurs.

Uber may serve as a bridge for many seeking other employment opportunities, and it may attract well-qualified individuals because, with Uber’s star rating system, driver-partners’ reputations are explicitly shared with potential customers. Most of Uber’s driver-partners had full- or part-time employment prior to joining Uber, and many continued in those positions after starting to drive with the Uber platform, which makes the flexibility to set their own hours all the more valuable. Uber’s driver-partners also often cited the desire to smooth fluctuations in their income as a reason for partnering with Uber.

As we see above, Uber drivers really like their jobs, and that's probably why so many of them are still there a year later. I actually feel quite sympathetic towards existing taxi drivers both in the UK and US. They were forced by existing rules to invest heavily in getting their privileged spot in the market place, and Uber is effectively circumventing this process altogether.

This suggests we should compensate taxi drivers so that in the future people are not so worried that tech changes will force transformational rule changes that will ruin them. But this progress promises improvements on practically every margin of taxi driving; I can imagine a future where no traditional taxi driving exists—indeed with self-driving cars I can imagine a future where only an Uber-style rental-taxi system exists. So, compensation aside, it must go on.