After the Rose Garden 6 - Foreign policy
This week’s post takes foreign policy as first serving the people of the UK, then our friends, then the rest of the world. Once this was known as “realism”. This week saw Trump’s first foreign trip. Choosing the Middle East reminds us how little weight he attaches to Europe; and that although there is enough meat in our trade deal last week to nettle China, it is a fragile foundation for foreign policy.
Our post-WW2 approach served us well enough: immersion in international institutions coupled with reliance on US security, initially without unqualified devotion to every Pentagon adventure (eg, Vietnam), but with increasing commitment and decreasing technological and logistical independence since 9-11. Now, the provocations of Vance and Hegseth have made it impossible to carry on - indeed that was their intent. The thrust of this note is to explore the Pandora’s box which they opened.
No matter the urgency we attach to security, the disagreeable truth is that our immediate options are limited. We are locked into American supply, while our relations with our neighbours remain complicated by Brexit which shackles both sides, if not longer historical memories. In addition, all concerned are constrained by American control of chokepoints, both geographical, eg, the Straits of Hormuz and Molucca; and institutional, eg, high tech, payment systems, and smart capital.
What then are our alternatives? We need not descend into overwrought visions of American antagonism to wish to increase our independence. This will take years, if not decades, calling for delicacy all round to maintain the political and economic dealings which we most need or value, while developing alternatives. Once the Royal Navy despaired of finding enough oaks to mast its ships; during the world wars, the nation feared for its very food. How now, to defray our imports with high tech and services? We need a joint military-industrial taskforce to examine our supply chains and chokepoints, proposing arrangements to secure them.
So to the next question: with whom else should we throw in? Certainly our neighbours, with whom we trade energetically and whose territory, once the source of security threats, now acts as a buffer against Russia. For an adult lifetime, European forces have operated under American leadership, with scant alternative homegrown structure. Our immediate priority is to flush out appetites: first sight shows divergent views between those closest to, or with bad experiences of, Russia, eg, the Balts, Germany, Poland and the Scandies; selected mavericks like Hungary and Slovakia; and France’s perennial exceptionalism. It flatters our own exceptionalism to believe that we can play much part in dissolving this. We kick off with Starmer working his way back into Europe’s good books at his reset summit next Monday. Let’s wish him good luck.
Is there scope to sweeten the pill with our most immediate neighbours by acting as a bridge to others more remote, but of similar mind, in particular the rich English-speaking democracies? There is no doubt that Australia and (even more) Canada are feeling bereft. Suddenly, it’s a good look for the UK to play honest broker between Europe and the Anglosphere. But let’s not resort to sentimentality. No-one else will. Once again, the most fruitful framework is a joint examination of vulnerabilities, leading to proposals of how best to correct them.
The East Asian trading democracies, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, will value support against China which relieves them of total reliance on the US pivot to the Pacific. They throw in economic muscle, technology and critical geography. More candidates for the vulnerability exercise. It’s also worth remembering that Japan’s first overseas military alliance was in 1902 with the UK, directed against Russia. What goes around…
Finally, West Asia, including the problematic (and imperfectly aligned) powerhouses of Israel, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. All are dependent on the US. Even so, we cannot overlook them. Israel has intelligence, military and technical nous which it would be foolish to ignore; we rely on the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia for energy. Our first departure should be negotiating naval bases in the region and finding ships to deploy.
These “coalitions of the willing” are based upon policy of a piece with the UK’s 300 years of global engagement, after WW2 extending to wholehearted subscription to international bodies. There is another course: Israel, Singapore, Switzerland and Taiwan offer templates as successful citadels - the foreign policy equivalent of Singapore on Thames. Then again, in a world of global supply chains, a true citadel may be impossible - even the US is scrambling for chips and rare earths. Nonetheless, the examination of vulnerabilities we propose should explore the option of maximising narrow self-sufficiency. And make no mistake, nothing is likely to replicate the eighty years of general peace since WW2. Pandora’s box is open.
Next post – defence
Miles Saltiel