Civil servants and lawyers

The idea that civil servants and lawyers (particularly judges and legal advisors) wield disproportionate power is often voiced in debates about democratic accountability, the rule of law, and the ‘deep state.’ If the goal is to bring them to heel, it is important to proceed with care, ensuring that reforms enhance democratic accountability without undermining essential checks and balances.

 Civil servants are unelected but often shape or block policies through institutional inertia, risk-aversion, or ideological bias exercised behind the scenes.

One potential reform would be to increase Ministerial power over appointments, letting ministers choose more senior civil servants. This would a somewhat akin to the political appointments that are made in the US. This would usher in greater political accountability, and alignment with the elected government’s agenda.

 We could introduce fixed-term contracts and performance-based reviews, shifting from lifelong careers to performance-based tenures. This would encourage responsiveness and accountability.

 We might enhance Parliamentary oversight by giving select committees more authority to scrutinize civil service performance. Ministers could be given more formal authority over senior civil service appointments.

 Bringing the legal sector, including the judiciary, to account would involve rebalancing legal power and democratic control. The point is that judges and lawyers can obstruct government policy through judicial reviews or human rights claims, undermining the will of Parliament. We would have to reform or replace the Human Rights Act to assert parliamentary sovereignty. And we would have to withdraw from the European Human Right Commission to prevent UK elected legislators being overruled by appeals to a foreign court.

Some activists famously use ‘lawfare’ to thwart the will of the people by legal challenges. To curb this we would need to limit the scope of judicial review by defining more narrowly the grounds on which government decisions can be challenged.

Parliamentary sovereignty could be strengthened by legislative clarity to ensure that Parliament clearly sets out its intent in laws to reduce judicial interpretation latitude.

We could reform public appointments by making appointments to quangos, regulators, and key legal or policy roles more transparent and open to scrutiny.

Reducing the perceived overreach of civil servants and legal professionals is possible, but must be done in ways that preserve their competence and independence, and uphold the rule of law. It can be done and should be done, but it must be done carefully.

Madsen Pirie