Controlling the blob

In the US, the incoming President directly appoints the heads of departments. This gives the elected administration a considerable degree of control over the unelected civil service. This is not the case in the UK, where ministers and ex-ministers have reported opposition from intransigent civil servants with their own agenda and priorities. The TV series ‘Yes Minister’ and ‘Yes Prime Minister’ were hugely successful, partly because they dwelt upon a relationship that reflected (and over-exaggerated) the interaction between elected ministers and their civil servants.

The UK might consider adopting a little of the US model by having permanent secretaries appointed by the elected administration instead of emerging through the civil service ranks The direct appointment of outsiders as permanent secretaries could exert greater political control over the civil service in several ways.

 It would help policy alignment, in that outsiders appointed directly by ministers are likely to share the government’s political values and policy priorities. This alignment would make them more inclined to implement ministers’ agendas faithfully, reducing the risk of civil servants pursuing their own institutional preferences.

There would be increased ministerial influence because direct appointments would allow ministers to choose senior officials they trust and who are personally loyal to them. This would strengthen the minister’s authority over the department and ensures that administrative leadership is more responsive to political direction.

It would certainly reduce bureaucratic resistance. Career civil servants, with long tenures and internal loyalties, might resist or delay controversial reforms. Bringing in outsiders could help overcome entrenched bureaucratic inertia, as these appointees owe their positions to the minister, not the department.

It would bring greater accountability for policy delivery. Since outsiders would be selected for their commitment to delivering the government’s programme, ministers could hold them more directly accountable for implementation, tightening the link between political decisions and administrative outcomes.

Bringing fresh perspectives and a reform momentum would fresh and renew civil service practices and procedures. External appointees could introduce new management practices, ideas, and urgency from outside the traditional bureaucratic culture. This could make the civil service more adaptable and politically attuned to government objectives.

The ability to appoint top officials signals that ultimate control over the machinery of government would rest with elected politicians, reinforcing democratic legitimacy and reducing the perception of civil service independence as a counterweight to ministers.

The effect of direct appointment of outsiders as permanent secretaries would make the civil service more politically responsive, loyal, and accountable to the elected government, enhancing ministerial control over both policy formation and execution.

Madsen Pirie