Monarchs, politicians and the national interest
At a time when the UK faces serious crises—record migration pressures, spiralling national debt, stagnant growth, and strained public services—the role of an experienced monarch as a discreet constitutional advisor could and should be given weight.
For example, Charles III might usefully emulate his grandfather, George VI, by offering considered suggestions on the incoming Prime Minister’s cabinet choices.
George VI was no pushover. When Winston Churchill appointed the controversial press baron Lord Beaverbrook to the wartime Cabinet, the King voiced dismay over The Beaver’s suitability. And he helpfully suggested to Clement Attlee that Ernest Bevin—the tough trade union leader—would make a better Foreign Secretary for the turbulent postwar years than the more left-leaning pacifist Herbert Morrison. Attlee took the advice, and Bevin proved highly successful in navigating the early Cold War, the reconstruction of Germany, and the founding of NATO.
That king’s father, George V, also moved to promote national interest over party politics. In the First World War, he clashed with ministers over appointments and promotions. Later, he chose Stanley Baldwin over the less popular Lord Curzon as prime minister, catching the mood of the time that leaders should come from the Commons, not the Lords. Soon after, he counselled Baldwin to address more sympathetically the concerns raised in the General Strike. And in the 1931 financial crisis, he persuaded Ramsay MacDonald to form a cross-party National Government rather than resign.
The exception, in fact, was Elizabeth II, who was very young when she came to the throne, and never seemed willing to question the choices of her (more experienced) prime ministers, such as Churchill, Eden and Macmillan. Nor did she seemingly resist profound constitutional changes being made by slim majorities in referendums or parliaments.
But that should not become the constitutional norm. Experienced monarchs—and Charles has been close in to state affairs all his life—can look through internal party politics to the national interest beyond. They have an important constitutional role in questioning prime ministers’ appointments and decisions. Of course, they cannot interfere or give instructions of any kind, and certainly cannot override such choices (except, maybe, in cases of severe constitutional crisis). Yet by offering a detached wisdom over party in-fighting, horse-trading and convenience, they might certainly promote appointments and decisions that more closely serve the interests of the whole nation. In these troubled times, such advice should be given—and listened to.
Eamonn Butler