The curse of civil servisitis
Not all civil servants are affected by it, but civil servisitis is endemic at higher levels, and can easily infect the unwary.
Part of its cause is that UK civil servants are unelected and permanent, while politicians come and go. Senior officials, often called ‘mandarins,’ can serve across multiple governments, and ministers may rely heavily on them for expertise and implementation. This can create a perception that real continuity of power lies with officials, not elected MPs. Those who stay in place accumulate institutional knowledge and influence that can outweigh political leadership.
Bureaucrats have control over information and policy detail. They draft legislation, prepare briefings and advise minsters on options. Because ministers depend on this input, critics argue that officials can shape what options are presented, emphasize or downplay certain risks, and influence outcomes indirectly. Those who control the information, can steer decisions, even without formal authority.
Some politicians, especially reform-minded or anti-establishment figures, claim that the civil service can delay implementation, interpret policies narrowly or broadly, and raise procedural or legal obstacles. This is sometimes referred to as ‘bureaucratic inertia’ or, more controversially, as a ‘deep state’ dynamic. The argument is that, even if ministers decide something, officials can affect whether, and how, it actually happens.
Many senior civil servants are drawn from similar educational and social backgrounds, and work within a shared institutional culture. This can lead to accusations that they hold technocratic or establishment views and are disconnected from parts of the electorate. The argument is that a culturally homogeneous elite may develop dismissive attitudes toward voters or popular opinions.
Tensions between ministers and civil servants sometimes become public. This visibly happened during the Brexit process. Disputes involving advisers such as Dominic Cummings and criticism from politicians such as Boris Johnson raised the claim that officials were resistant to political direction and overly cautious and obstructive. Such episodes reinforced the notion that civil servants wield hidden power.
An accountability gap arises because, unlike MPs, civil servants are not elected, rarely face direct public scrutiny, and operate largely behind the scenes. The fact that they exercise influence without democratic accountability can foster arrogance or detachment.
The term ‘Blob’ is used by critics to describe an alleged alliance of civil servants, officials, charities, and academics who resist or obstruct government policy. Popularized by Michael Gove, it characterizes this group as a uniform, slow-moving establishment that favours left-leaning policies and works against radical or centre-right reforms, particularly regarding Brexit. It is often accused of using bureaucracy, legal threats, and slow processes to stall government initiatives. The term has been used to describe education unions, the Treasury, and officials who resisted Brexit implementation. The term implies that the permanent, unelected bureaucracy is working against elected ministers to maintain the status quo.
The US solves this process to some extent by having political appointees staffing governmental agencies. The posts are filled by people who will work with a new administration instead of against it. This would undoubtedly be a radical step if the UK decided to copy it, but some have suggested that it might be applied to the senior levels of the bureaucracy. It would certainly make civil servisitis less prevalent.