The line item veto

A line-item veto would allow the President of the United States to veto specific provisions, usually spending items, within a bill, particularly appropriation bills, without rejecting the entire legislation. The two issues to consider are whether it could be done and whether it should be done. 

The main advantage of a line item veto for a U.S. President is that it would curb wasteful spending. So-called ‘pork barrel’ projects are those added by Congress to unrelated bills to secure funding for their own district. A line item veto would enable the President to eliminate specific earmarks or unnecessary spending added by Congress to win local support, without having to veto essential legislation. For example, he or she could remove a funding provision for a local museum tacked onto a national defence bill. 

It would certainly enhance fiscal discipline and help to reduce the federal deficit by cutting unnecessary or excessive expenditures line by line. It could also act as a check on congressional overreach in budget matters.

It would increase Executive efficiency by providing the President with a more nuanced tool to shape fiscal policy. They would be able to avoid the ‘all-or-nothing’ dilemma where the President must accept or reject an entire bill even if only a small part is problematic.

The Executive branch would gain greater leverage in budget negotiations, potentially leading to more balanced and disciplined legislative outcomes.

But could it be done? A constitutional amendment would give it the most durable path. The Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 in Clinton v. City of New York (1998), ruling it unconstitutional under the Presentment Clause.

To legally authorize a true line-item veto, a constitutional amendment would be required, needing two-thirds approval in both the House and Senate, and ratification by three-quarters of the state legislatures.

This would be an unlikely route, but there are modified legislative approaches that could be done within current limits. Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President can propose to rescind certain spending items, but Congress must approve the rescission within 45 days.

This gives the President limited power, but requires congressional endorsement. There could be ‘Enhanced Rescission Authority’ under which Congress could pass a law allowing the President to propose targeted spending cuts, which would then require expedited up-or-down votes in Congress with no amendments and no filibuster. This skirts full veto power but gives the President more influence.

There could be separate enactment of appropriations, under which Congress could voluntarily present appropriations in a more granular, modular fashion, enabling more targeted vetoes under existing powers. But this relies entirely on congressional cooperation.

It could be argued that a line item veto would unbalance the separation of powers. Critics might argue that it would give too much legislative power to the executive, upsetting the balance of powers.

It could conceivably be used to punish political opponents by having the President cut their district’s funding selectively. The ability to do so and the threat to do so might enable a President to pressurize them and to curb their independence.

The conclusion is that while a line-item veto could promote fiscal responsibility and reduce waste, implementing it requires a constitutional amendment to avoid legal challenges. Short of that, enhanced rescission powers offer a more feasible, though limited, alternative within the current constitutional framework.

Should it be done? Yes. Could it be done? Only to a limited extent.

Madsen Pirie

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