About the Authors
James Hodgkinson is a Research Associate at the Adam Smith Institute.
He has co-authored policy papers for the Institute on both affordable housing and broadcast regulation policy, with his research featured in the Telegraph and the Daily Express. Additionally, James has written for outlets including GB News, The Critic, and Conservative Home, and is a regular panellist on Talk.
Alongside his work at the ASI, James serves as Vice-Chair of his home parish council and Chairman of Kent Association of Local Councils Canterbury Area Committee.
Mitchell Palmer is an Economist at the Adam Smith Institute.
He previously worked as a special adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, whom he advised on fiscal policy and microeconomics. He has also worked in economic consulting in New Zealand and at a think tank in Singapore.
Mitchell holds a first-class degree in History and Economics from the University of Oxford. While at Oxford, he was made a Hayek Fellow of the Mont Pelerin Society. He also studied at Yale-NUS College in Singapore.
Acknowledgements:
The authors wish to thank James Humphrey, Madsen Pirie, and members of the fishing sector for their generous insights in writing this paper. All errors, omissions, and recommendations remain the authors’ own.
The Adam Smith Institute has an open access policy. Copyright remains with the copyright holder, but users may download, save and distribute this work in any format provided: (1) that the Adam Smith Institute is cited; (2) that the web address adamsmith.org is published together with a prominent copy of this notice; (3) the text is used in full without amendment (extracts may be used for criticism or review); (4) the work is not re–sold; (5) the link for any online use is sent to info@adamsmith.org.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect any views held by the publisher or copyright owner. They are published as a contribution to public debate.
Copyright © Adam Smith Research Trust 2026. Some rights reserved. Published in the UK by ASI (Research) Ltd.
Foreword
It is no secret that the British fishing industry has been in decline for decades. From years of the EU’s much maligned Common Fisheries Policy to falling stock numbers, it has become increasingly challenging to make a career in the industry. Brexit presented a pivotal opportunity for British fishermen. Sadly, the Government’s ‘EU-reset deal’ has squandered much of what Brexit could have provided—for at least the next twelve years.
But it is important to not surrender to despondency. While the EU agreement binds our international obligations, there is still significant scope to pursue domestic reform.
Fisheries policy may not be at the top of the national agenda. After all, the industry accounts for a very small part of our economy. Yet, in areas such as the Solway Coast of south-west Scotland, its importance to important yet fragile communities that have grown with our network of ports cannot be overstated.
This paper provides sensible and pragmatic solutions that would give fishermen of all types a genuine stake in the stocks they safeguard. They would provide more flexibility in how quota is used, speed up trading between vessel owners, and truly reward sustainable fisheries management.
These policies have been tried and tested before. When New Zealand implemented something similar, their fish stocks became some of the most sustainable in the world, whilst their fishermen enjoyed safer employment in a more efficient industry. We can have this too.
This paper does not claim to have every answer required to fix British fishing. But it does make a serious and welcome contribution to a debate that has, for too long, been allowed to drift. Our fishermen and the communities from which they are drawn deserve better, and all those who agree should pay close attention to this paper and its challenging and innovative ideas.
John Cooper MP Member of Parliament for Dumfries and Galloway
Executive Summary
Britain’s fishermen work one of the country’s most dangerous and worst-paid trades, yet the stocks they depend on are being steadily depleted. These two realities should not be possible simultaneously.
Britain regained control of her waters after Brexit, but we have failed to fundamentally change how they are managed. The Government has left both EU vessel access and the allocation and governance of fisheries access for British vessels substantially unreformed.
Despite repeated aims to increase the sustainability of British fisheries, half of Britain’s ‘top 10’ fish species, selected primarily on the basis of landings, are either ‘overfished with critically low population sizes, currently being overexploited, or both’. According to one study, just two in ten of these total allowable catches were set in line with scientific advice.1
This failure is now reaching the supermarket shelf. In 2026, Waitrose became the first British supermarket to stop selling a fish species due to sustainability concerns.2
The British fishing fleet comprises 5,232 vessels. 79% of these are under 10 metre craft, although they account for just 8% of the fleet’s total capacity.3
This paper from the Adam Smith Institute proposes a solution which is equitable for fishermen and promotes sustainable management of fish stocks.
In this paper, we show that:
The current system of weak property rights encourages overexploitation and short-termist behaviour.
Quota allocations lack permanency, suppressing investment and reducing the value of fishing rights.
A fragmented system of quota pools and administrative controls creates inefficiency and delays.
Small-scale fishermen are disproportionately excluded from access to profitable quota.
To address these failings, we propose that the Government:
Replace existing quotas with permanent, tradeable property rights in fisheries.
Allocate fishermen a fixed percentage share of total allowable catch (TAC) in perpetuity.
Renegotiate EU shares of Britain’s TAC to fixed quantities, to ensure only British fishermen benefit from the ‘sustainability dividend’.
Establish a single national electronic quota market, removing administrative barriers to trading.
Introduce ownership caps to prevent excessive concentration and preserve competition.
Introduction
When the United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) on 31 January 2020, she regained control of her Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of approximately 770,000 square kilometres, encompassing a large portion of the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.4 Following Brexit, the Fisheries Act 2020 established a new framework for Britain’s domestic fisheries. However, it retained the core architecture of the CFP: quota allocations remain, and fishermen operate without absolute security of tenure.5
As part of the EU withdrawal process, this country signed the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement. This facilitated an initial five-and-a-half-year adjustment period, during which EU quotas in British waters were to be returned to Britain and vice versa. It was supposed to lead to fully sovereign annual access negotiations from June 2026.6 This prospect ended during the Lancaster House summit of May 2025, when Britain agreed to extend full reciprocal access to its waters until June 2038.7 The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations described this move as the surrender of Britain’s ‘best tool’ for the regeneration of its coastal communities.8
While fundamental revision of this agreement is, at least until 2038, out of the question, the Lancaster House Agreement does not dictate Britain’s domestic approach to fish stocks. The deal concerns which fleets may fish in British waters and in what volumes; it does not determine how Britain allocates its domestic share of fishing rights.9
We address this question and propose a bold solution. In place of the current ‘mismatch’ of quota pools and producer organisations, as well as an array of species which can still be fished without quota limit, we propose the extension of private property rights in full across British fisheries. Annual total allowable catches (TACs) would still be set by the government, in line with scientific advice. However, based on historic catch figures, individual fishermen would be allocated permanent rights to catch a share of the TAC of a given species of fish in perpetuity. These rights could be freely traded, sold, or leased within a domestic market without encumbrance.
The State of British Fisheries Today
The principal commercial fish species in British waters
British waters contain a range of economically valuable fish stocks. Broadly, these can be placed into three categories: pelagic fish (those inhabiting the water column), demersal fish (those living at or near the seabed), and shellfish (molluscs or crustaceans).10
Pelagic species
Pelagic species represent the most landed species group by volume – 482,000 tonnes were landed in 2024, comprising 65% of the total landings by British vessels in 2024. Of all fish species, Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) is the most caught across the United Kingdom, with over 233,000 tonnes landed in 2024, accounting for 31% of the total catch.11 It is primarily fished to the west of the British Isles, and in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea.12 Herring (Clupea harengus) is the second most important pelagic species, with British boats landing approximately 110,000 tonnes at home and abroad. Britain’s blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) fishery has grown rapidly in recent years, more than doubling in catch volume since 2020, and now equals the catch volume of the herring fishery. The increase in blue whiting catches can be attributed to agreements negotiated since Britain became an independent coastal state.13 Approximately 90% of herring caught by the British fleet originates from the seas adjacent to Scotland and Northern Ireland.14 Conversely, 75% of whiting is caught by English vessels, compared to just 25% caught by Scottish vessels.15
Demersal species
Demersal species are the second most landed species group, comprising 18.5% of the total landing volume in 2024. Haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) is the most caught demersal species, with 40,000 tonnes of fish landed by British vessels.16 The majority of Britain’s haddock is landed by Scottish vessels, reflecting the importance of the North Sea and west of Scotland haddock fisheries.17 Other economically important demersal species include cod (Gadus morhua). Much of this fish is caught by the largest trawlers that can put to sea for many months at a time, often outside British waters, in the EEZs of other nations, including off the coast of Svalbard (Norway). Over the long term, catches of demersal species have been in consistent decline. In 2024, landings of demersal fish were around 17% of the quantity landed in 1938.18
Shellfish
Shellfish represent the smallest proportion of all landed species categories by British vessels (16.8%). Despite this, it remains the second-largest category in terms of value. The three main species of shellfish caught commercially in Britain are (in order of total volume caught) king scallops (Pecten maximus), nephrops, and lobsters (Homarus gammarus). Together, these three species comprise 50% of the total volume of shellfish caught by British vessels. Britain’s shellfish sector exhibits distinct regional specialisation, with the North Sea supporting vast nephrops populations, contrasting with the coastal fringes of the South West, which sustain the nation’s crab and lobster potting fleets. Since 1938, landings of shellfish have increased by 276%. This is in part due to improved boat technology (allowing access to previously inaccessible fishing grounds), but also because (with the exception of nephrops), shellfish fisheries remain free of quotas. Instead, stocks are managed by other measures, including technical restrictions, effort limits, and fishery management plans (FMPs).19
The size and nature of Britain’s fishing fleet
In 2024, there were 5,232 vessels in the British fishing fleet. Of the total fleet, 47% of the craft are English, 7% are Welsh, 37% are Scottish, and 5% are Northern Irish. The rest originate from the Channel Islands or other British territories.20
However, determining the size of the fleets of the constituent nations by vessel capacity produces a different, and arguably more useful, conclusion. Capacity here means the tonnage of fish a vessel could land per year, based on its specification and disregarding quota-based restrictions. The Scottish fleet accounts for 62% of the total British fleet capacity, while English vessels account for just 28%.21 English vessels are smaller and likely less efficient than their Scottish counterparts.
While especially true for England, this phenomenon occurs throughout the fleet. Vessels under 10 metres (often commercially operated inshore vessels) make up 79% of the fleet but only contribute 8% to the fleet’s total capacity. Larger vessels of more than 15 metres (larger inshore boats and deep-water craft) make up 10% of the British fleet but contribute 86% of the fleet’s capacity.22
Industry groups
In the broadest terms, fishermen are either members of industry groups called producer organisations (POs), meaning that they can transfer quota between one another, or they are not.
The vast majority of British vessels operate in the ‘non-sector’ (87%), but vessels within producer organisations accounted for 91% of all British landings by weight.23
Vessels over 10 metres in the non-sector catch very few pelagic or demersal species, instead focusing on shellfish, where quota regulations are less extensive.24 In 2023, these vessels caught 48% of all shellfish, 3% of demersal, and 1% of pelagic species landed by the British fleet.25 Vessels under 10 metres also produce small volumes of demersal and pelagic species, due to a lack of available quota, and again focus on shellfish production. However, despite amounting to 79% of the total fleet size, they only amount to 8% of its total capacity.26
Sustainability of British fish stocks
British fisheries have been in a state of decline for over a century. Since records began in 1889, the catch rate for haddock has declined by 99%, cod by 86.6%, and halibut by 99.8%.27 During Britain’s EU membership, the sustainability of fisheries remained a concern. During the Brexit negotiation process, ‘conservation and sustainability’ were to be placed ‘at the heart of [a post-Brexit] approach to our [British] territorial waters’.28 However, these concerns have persisted since Brexit. A 2025 report indicates that ‘half of the “top 10” stocks on which the British fishing industry relies (in terms of volume of landings by the British fleet) are either overfished with critically low population sizes, currently being overexploited, or both’. Additionally, only two of the ‘top 10’ stocks mentioned had their TAC set in line with scientific guidance.29 Across Britain, retailers are becoming more concerned about the sustainability of their fish supplies (even when covered by quota). In February 2026, Waitrose became the first British supermarket to suspend the sale of mackerel over sustainability concerns.30 Political pressure to maintain the current catch levels is, at least in part, responsible for the problem of overfishing. In 2024, the Government’s own advisers noted that only 46% of TACs were set in accordance with scientific advice.31 If ownership of fisheries rested solely with those who catch the fish, these political pressures would likely be reduced, as fishermen would recognise the importance of ensuring the long-term sustainability and viability of their own stock.32
In addition to stocks of quota-controlled demersal and pelagic species, stocks of shellfish are experiencing population pressure. In Scottish waters, nephrops (the one shellfish species under quota control) catches have been reduced on both the east and west coasts, and the overall stock population is healthy. However, East of Scotland scallop stocks are declining whilst stocks to the west are stable or increasing. Most crab and lobster stocks are now fully exploited or overexploited.33 This trend is mirrored across wider British waters: reports suggest that both edible crab populations and king scallops are overfished or at risk of becoming so.34
This paper contends that if these resources were placed under the full ownership of those who abstract them, they would be incentivised to pursue sustainable management, to ensure the ongoing viability of their asset.35
Pay and conditions for British fishermen
The fishing industry remains one of the most dangerous in Britain. However, it is also one of the lowest-paid.36 Economic pressures on the fishing industry have increased in recent years. In 2022, rising fuel bills contributed to a 12% decrease in profits.37 Salaries are low across the whole industry but especially in the under-10-metre sector. These vessels are especially vulnerable to periods of unfavourable weather, and are also limited in the methods they can employ to catch fish. Fishermen on under-10-metre craft are likely to be share fishermen, meaning their income fluctuates according to how much fish is caught. On these vessels, between 2008 and 2022, days at sea fell by 44%, and unemployment rose by 47%.38 This is in spite of various government subsidies, including fuel-cost reduction programmes, post-Brexit support, and a fleet modernisation fund.39
Why the Current System of Quota Management Has Failed
The tragedy of the commons
The core problem with open-access fisheries – that each market actor has a rational incentive to fish as intensively as possible before others do, producing collective over-exploitation – was first identified by Gordon (1954). He deemed this phenomenon inevitable, based on each individual’s desire to abstract resources (in this case, fish) at scale before the finite supply is exhausted.40 Hardin (1968) then coined the term ‘the tragedy of the commons’. To alleviate the impact of overfishing, he proposed the extension of private property rights to natural resources, including fisheries.41 Annual catch limits partially addressed this, but created a race to catch as many fish as possible before the limit is reached – incentivising investment in larger and more powerful vessels.42
The result of a system imposing strict quotas while maintaining open access was overcapacity. Once the quota was exhausted, those boats could no longer catch additional fish, and sat largely idle.43 The implementation of boat-specific quotas only partially mitigated this. A review of the 2011 Common Fisheries Policy commissioned by Pew estimated that the EU fishing fleet was approximately twice the size needed to harvest the available quota sustainably.44 Thus, it is clear that quotas, even when attached to specific boats, are not enough to promote efficiency within fisheries.
While the theoretical foundation for this paper is based on Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’, it is not possible to dismiss the contribution of Ostrom. Her work presented Hardin’s binary (privatise or regulate) as a false choice. Through studies of small-scale coastal communities, Ostrom demonstrated that common-pool fisheries could be regulated through collective governance arrangements.45
This paper does not seek to dismiss Ostrom’s findings. However, there are features of the British fisheries that make community-based governance an inadequate solution here. Firstly, British fisheries are not the small-scale coastal commons that Ostrom studied. They are industrialised, multi-species, and multi-jurisdictional fisheries operating across hundreds of thousands of square kilometres. Secondly, the current system contains quasi-collectivist elements (namely pooled quota within producer organisations), yet concerns around overfishing remain central to fisheries management policy today. Finally, our proposed Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system does not preclude cooperative behaviour. Instead, it supports this with the secure, permanent property rights that Ostrom herself recognised were vital to fostering stewardship.46
Quota allocation without true security of tenure
Britain’s Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA) system distributes quotas based on catch history from 1994 to 1996.47 In 2013, FQA units were confirmed by judicial review as assets with market value in R (UK Association of Fish Producer Organisations) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.48 Although the ruling confirmed quota as assets, it also permitted the unilateral removal and transfer of quota by the Government if it was not utilised.49 The Government also dictates that quota holders must maintain an economic link to Britain, or their quota can be removed and redistributed to the quota pool. Thus, British fishing quotas are subject to a ‘use it or lose it’ clause without any compensation requirements.50
The position for small vessels (those under 10 metres) is worse still. Catch limits in the under-10-metre pool are ‘set predominantly monthly but are also set weekly or quarterly for some stocks’. Significantly, for vessels not in a PO, quotas are decided on this basis centrally by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO).51 Boats under 10 metres do not operate within the tradeable quota system, and instead draw entirely from the pool allocated by the MMO. In some cases, it may be possible for an under-10-metre boat to access additional quota, subject to agreement with the MMO or a PO.52
With the rights to fish only having relative permanency, the spectre of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ remains.53 Without the full permanency of private property rights, and with the threat of the ‘use it or lose it’ approach to fish stocks, the incentive to fish right up to the maximum legal threshold persists.
An opaque allocation system
The management of British fisheries quotas begins with the Environment Secretary, who determines the maximum quantity of sea fish that may be caught by British fishing boats. These restrictions only apply to UK-registered vessels. Foreign-flagged vessels fishing in British waters have their catch limits determined by their home governments, within the overall limits set through international negotiation both within the EU and between Britain and the EU.54 In practice, the British government enacts in domestic law the annual TAC agreements made between Britain and the EU.55 Each constituent nation’s portion of the TAC is then distributed through the system of apportionment. Rather than centrally administering the entire quota, the British government divides this between the four devolved Fisheries Authorities (FAs).56 Each FA is then able to establish its own individual quota management rules to allocate its share to the industry, effectively creating four parallel management systems.57
Before reaching the FAs, the overall British quota is separated into two primary categories: Existing Quota (EQ), based broadly on historical shares under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, and Additional Quota (AQ) – new quota secured by Britain as an independent Coastal State.58
Once the EQ is calculated and any national deductions or special allocations are removed, the system exhibits further duplication by dividing the remaining EQ into three pools of quota to accommodate different categories within the fishing fleet. These pools are calculated and assigned in a specific order. Firstly, the under-10-metre pool (for small vessels not with a PO); secondly, the non-sector group (boats over 10 metres); and, finally, the POs.59 While a legal entity or person may own vessels across multiple groups, a single vessel is strictly limited to operating within only one of these three segments of quota according to Section 2.12 of the UK Quota Management Rules.60
It is possible for individual boats and POs to trade quotas, although this is supervised by the MMO. Members of POs are able to fluidly trade quota allocations between their memberships. However, for operators of boats not in POs, the situation is more complicated. When allocated quotas are used up, fishermen have two choices: apply to the MMO to have their allocation of the pool increased on a ‘case-by-case basis’, or approach a PO regarding the lease of quota. Should the PO consent to lease its quota to the non-PO craft, this must then be approved by the MMO.61 This approval process alone takes up to ten days, excluding the time consumed by preceding negotiations.62 Given the unpredictable nature of fishing, this could lead to lengthy (and costly) delays where boats are not able to put to sea while they await approval for additional quota.
The implications of the 2038 access deal
The May 2025 UK-EU summit agreement extended full reciprocal access between British and EU waters until June 2038.63 Under the extended Trade and Cooperation Agreement, annual consultations will continue to set TACs for approximately 95 shared stocks.64 Quota shares are, in effect, fixed at 2025 levels, as the agreement stipulates that both parties will ‘maintain existing levels of access for its vessels to British waters (and vice versa) for a further 12 years’.65 The deal functions as a roll-over of current arrangements, despite the original aim to dramatically scale back EU involvement in British waters by 2026.
This EU agreement could pose substantial ecological risks. Fish stocks need careful management to remain sustainable. In 2024, environmental group Blue Marine Foundation estimated that 54% of agreed TACs for the British fleet exceeded the scientific advice of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).66 The 2026 Fishing Opportunities Agreement involved Britain setting 18 TACs above ICES headline recommendations.67 The summit agreement signed in 2025 risks entrenching unsustainable stock use, and may harm the long-term potential output of fisheries in British waters.
Although the UK-EU 2038 deal has harmed the long-term health of both British fisheries and the British fishing industry, walking away unilaterally is infeasible. The deal was made as part of the general ‘reset’ of Anglo-European relations, and concessions on fisheries were considered essential for completing deals in other sectors – including energy. Reneging on the agreement unilaterally would likely harm other areas of the British economy, making this inadvisable.68 Policymaking should focus on how Britain’s TAC is governed, as this is not controlled through the treaty. This will be discussed in the policy recommendations section of this paper.
What a Property Rights Fishery Looks Like
A property rights fishery replaces legally impermanent quotas with permanent, tradeable entitlements to a share of the TAC. Rather than being granted access to fish on an annual or monthly basis, subject to discretion, pool exhaustion, or the ‘use it or lose it’ conditions that characterise British fishing rights, all fishermen would hold a perpetual stake in the resource itself.69
Under such a system, the Government would continue to set annual TACs in line with scientific advice. However, based on historic catch records, each fisherman would be allocated an ITQ share expressed as a fixed percentage of whichever species’ TAC applies to them. If the TAC for a given stock increases because the fishery is healthy, the value of that share rises; if the TAC is reduced to protect a struggling stock, the share falls proportionally. This design gives quota holders a direct, material interest in the long-term ecological health of the fishery.70
These shares would be registerable as assets in a publicly searchable national Quota Registry, mortgageable under standard commercial law, and freely tradeable by sale or lease without requiring government approval for domestic transactions. Quota transfers to overseas operators should be possible under the ITQ system, but only with specific government approval. It would then be a matter of policy for governments to decide whether they wish to permit overseas quota trading or not. All quota would be concentrated into a single pool, giving fishermen ultimate control over who they sell or lease their quota to.
To illustrate how this might work in practice, consider an under-10-metre boat skipper operating out of Newlyn who holds a 0.03% ITQ share in the South West demersal cod stock, carrying a TAC of 10,000 tonnes in a given year. That share entitles him to land 3 tonnes of cod. If a strong recovery in the stock leads scientists to recommend raising the TAC to 12,000 tonnes the following year, his entitlement automatically increases to 3.6 tonnes without any administrative intervention. Conversely, if the stock comes under pressure and the TAC is cut to 8,000 tonnes, his entitlement falls to 2.4 tonnes. Crucially, his percentage stake in the fishery is unchanged, and he retains the same proportional claim on any future recovery. Should he wish to retire or scale back operations (or transfer this allocation to a family member wishing to continue operations), he can list his ITQ share on the national Quota Registry and sell it outright to another fisher, or lease a portion of it for a season, receiving a market rate return without surrendering the underlying asset. A bank, recognising the share as a registered, permanent entitlement rather than a revocable licence, may also be willing to accept it as collateral against a loan to upgrade his vessel. This is a form of financing that the legal impermanence of current under-10-metre vessel quotas makes infeasible.
To prevent monopolisation, a statutory cap would limit the share of any given stock that a single entity could hold. Sales or transfers to foreign-owned or foreign-operated vessels would remain subject to government approval, preserving the national character of the resource.
This model differs from Britain’s FQA system in its legal security. FQA units are assets in a commercial sense, but they carry no guarantee of permanence. Units can be removed without compensation if unused, and are distributed through three convoluted non-transferable pools.71 A property rights fishery would replace this architecture with a single, unified national register (or, alternatively, four devolved registers), and confer on quota holders a durable, legal title that creates the incentive to manage the resource sustainably, promote efficiency, and resist the political pressures that have historically driven TACs above scientifically recommended levels.
The economic benefits of this system are clear. Efficiency dictates that quota will migrate to the most productive fishermen. A fisherman operating an efficient modern vessel with low running costs can afford to pay more for quota than one running an ageing boat with high fuel bills. Over time, market transactions will therefore tend to concentrate quota in the hands of those who are able to extract the greatest value per unit of catch (by virtue of having lower marginal costs).72 This is an observed outcome in every ITQ fishery studied at scale, including both Iceland and New Zealand.73
However, this assessment requires some qualification: fishermen who are marginal under the current system (small inshore operators or seasonal and part-time boat owners) are not necessarily inefficient. Their costs per unit of catch may be higher, but their quota holdings are correspondingly modest. Under a property rights system, a fisherman who cannot profitably deploy their quota in a given season can simply lease it rather than watching it lapse or be forfeited under ‘use it or lose it’ conditions. Ownership and use do not have to coincide. Crucially, as a result, the marginal fisherman is not ‘pushed out of the industry’. Instead, they are given – for the first time – an asset whose value they can realise without sacrificing it.
This points to an inherent mechanism by which a property rights fishery increases the value of quota held by small fishermen. Firstly, larger and more efficient operators (those best placed to extract value from additional catch) will bid competitively for quota that small fishermen choose to sell or lease, driving up its price.74 Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, the current system suppresses quota values through legal precariousness. Quota allocations can be reduced, reclassified, or administratively withdrawn and thus carry an uncertainty discount that no rational buyer will ignore. Permanent, legally secure entitlements eliminate this discount entirely. The same underlying fishing right, redefined as a perpetual share of the TAC rather than a share subject to the whims of government decision, is simply worth more. The fish stock (and its availability) may not change, but the permanence of the title would.
For asset-poor small fishermen, the change is material.75 A permanent quota share can serve as collateral for vessel investment, be passed to the next generation, or be sold at a time of the holder’s choosing. The property rights model does not guarantee that every small fisherman will prosper. Some will sell, some will consolidate, and some will exit. But it ensures that when they do, they leave with something, and that the decision is theirs to make, rather than one imposed upon them by a dysfunctional, restrictive regulatory structure.
International Comparators
New Zealand
New Zealand introduced individual transferable quota management, known as the Quota Management System (QMS), for 26 of its most commercially significant fish species in October 1986 through an amendment of the Fisheries Act 1983.76 The QMS was instigated due to two main pressures. Firstly, fish stocks were rapidly declining following years of unquoted fishing.77 Secondly, the New Zealand government wanted to replace foreign-dominated deep-water fleets with a competitive domestic industry.78 As part of the discussion surrounding this, it was recognised that the consolidation of fisheries would be required. One discussion paper prior to the introduction of the QMS in 1983 estimated that the inshore fleet alone was overcapitalised by about NZ$28 million.79
Key features of the system
The system centres around the quota share, which is an entitlement to a defined percentage of the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) for each species within a given Quota Management Area (QMA), of which there are ten.80 Today, there are 642 distinct fish stocks which are subject to the QMS – comprising 98 different species.81 Each individual fish stock is made up of 100 million ITQ shares in total.82 Shares are granted in perpetuity, freely transferable by sale or lease, and registerable as security under standard commercial law.83 Crucially, there is no requirement for domestic transfers of New Zealand’s ITQ shares to be approved by the government. Instead, transfers, leases, and sales only need to be registered to ensure regulatory compliance.84 The Quota Register, maintained by the Ministry for Primary Industries, provides a publicly searchable record of all details of quota ownership, mortgages, and transfers.85
Inshore buyback and a conciliatory approach
Key to the initial implementation of New Zealand’s ITQ scheme was a government buyback scheme, based on inshore catch histories. Initially, ITQ allocations (initially in weight of catch rather than proportion of the TAC) were made on the basis of each individual’s catch history (between 1983 and 1986).86 It was clear that due to the scale of overfishing that was carried out before the implementation of the ITQ, simply rolling all historical catch into the new ITQ quota was infeasible. To promote sustainable fisheries and ensure that the permanent allocations made to those gaining ITQ quotas could be reliably upheld, the number of operators within the fisheries had to decrease. To maintain the support of industry, the New Zealand government offered a voluntary buyback scheme. In exchange for not carrying their historical catch over into ITQ, fishermen could opt for a lump-sum cash payment instead. Through this scheme, the government was able to buy back 15,700 tonnes of quota, at a cost of NZ$42.4 million (at 1986 prices).87
Additionally, the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 allocated Māori (the indigenous Polynesian people of New Zealand) a 20% share of commercial fishing quota and a 50% interest in Sealord, New Zealand’s largest seafood company.88 Now, Māori quotas are integrated within the ITQ, and are subject to similar sale restrictions as the rest of the pool. Māori people can legally sell their ITQ, provided they can demonstrate that they cannot find another Māori buyer first. In reality, most choose to take advantage of the low-regulation leasing to allow larger, commercial operators to fish their allocation for a year, while maintaining the right to the stock in perpetuity.89 Without the support this garnered from Māori communities, the ITQ might not have retained its status as an enduring component of New Zealand’s economic and ecological policy.90
A simplified system
The unified ITQ system is central to what differentiates the New Zealand system from its British counterpart. This paper has outlined the multiplicity of British fisheries regulation, and the difficulties that this presents in terms of fish stock trading, management, and allocation.91 Instead of a system of quota devolution (and allocation) involving the four devolved governments, New Zealand’s policy is administered by its national government, with the country’s TAC divided into ten geographic zones, administered centrally.92 Additionally, all commercial craft (and those connected to the indigenous community) operate within a single, harmonised quota market. This removes the necessity for the existence of the various pools for different vessel classes (as there are in Britain). This system is only feasible as the initial transfer to the ITQ model was carried out in a manner that protected the rights of fishermen of all sizes – large and small.
In addition to the core principles of free trade and property rights, safeguards exist to ensure competition within the New Zealand fishery. Firstly, to protect the country’s national fishing industry (a key reason why the ITQ model was originally adopted in 1986), sales, leases, or transfers of stock to overseas owned or operated boats must still be approved by the New Zealand government.93 Additionally, Section 59 of the Fisheries Act 1996 ensures that no single actor has a monopoly over specific fish in the market.94
Outcomes
New Zealand’s fisheries were in exceptionally poor health prior to the introduction of the QMS.95 Large numbers of species core to New Zealand’s economy were under severe stress from overfishing. These included Snapper 1, which declined to a low proportion of its original biomass throughout the 1970s and 1980s.96 Today, New Zealand’s fisheries are recognised as some of the most environmentally sustainable in the world.97 New Zealand’s TACs follow a ‘science-first’ approach, with quotas being set in accordance with the health of the specific fish stock that the quota applies to. If a fish stock is in poor health, the quota is reduced, and vice versa.98
Additionally, the efficiency of New Zealand’s fishery has increased markedly. Across New Zealand, the number of commercial fishing boats decreased by 50% between 2002 and 2022.99 Despite the decrease in boat operators, employment levels in New Zealand’s primary fishing sector have stayed broadly static, with only a 200-person decrease since 1995.100 This suggests that after the initial restructuring of the market, mass job losses are unlikely to materialise.
The final important conclusion to make from the New Zealand system is that a fixed, numerical quota allocation system is suboptimal. To sustainably manage stocks, fishermen must instead have a share of a total available catch (as they do now in New Zealand). This ensures all fishermen remain engaged in the ecological preservation of the fishery, and ensures that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is not repeated.
Iceland
Iceland moved to a comprehensive ITQ system between 1975 and 1990, beginning with the herring fishery and extending progressively to other stocks. The initial impetus was created by the near-collapse of the herring and cod fisheries, which led to a focused search for a sustainable solution to the fishing rights issues.101
Key features of the system
Icelandic ITQs are expressed as percentage shares of annual TACs, fully transferable by sale or lease, with an active secondary market. Arnason (1995) documented the development of active quota markets with genuine price discovery in the years following introduction.102 The system is administered by Fiskistofa (the Directorate of Fisheries), which maintains the quota register and publishes market prices.103
Treatment of small-scale fishing operators
When the ITQ system was first introduced to the demersal fisheries in 1984, vessels under 10 tonnes of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) were exempt. The government took this course of action as these craft were numerous, and only accounted for about 2% of the total demersal catch. It was thus deemed that the gains from managing these under the ITQ were not worth the administrative burden it would create. However, these exemptions were rolled back as the number of small boats and catch volume increased, due to operators wishing to take advantage of the system. In 2006, Iceland’s government mandated all boats under 6 tonnes join a bespoke ITQ.104
While Iceland’s fisheries recovered ecologically and the industry became more efficient, criticisms of the Icelandic model remain. Quota has become concentrated in the hands of large commercial operators, and small-scale vessels have lost access to stocks that they once fished.105 These outcomes are not an argument against ITQ systems themselves, but they highlight the importance of transition design to create a sustainable fishing industry. This paper will propose measures including statutory ownership caps, a voluntary buyback scheme, and ITQ allocations for under-10-metre vessels based on their own catch histories precisely to prevent excessive consolidation dynamics from replicating themselves in British waters.
The ability to trade
As in New Zealand, Iceland’s ITQ system has almost full property trading rights. The two exceptions concern foreign ownership (Iceland forbids the transfer of quota overseas), and the amount of quota that can be transferred per annum (only 50% of the quota attached to a vessel each year).106
The Case for Reform Before 2038
Using the period to 2038 strategically
This paper has articulated that the May 2025 deal represents a significant constraint on Britain’s ability to use water access as a future tool in UK-EU negotiations.107
However, the 12-year period to 2038 should be understood as a strategic window, not a concession. Britain’s hand in post-2038 negotiations will be determined primarily by two factors: the environmental credibility of British fisheries management (which determines whether Britain can make a convincing scientific case for revised TAC shares), and the economic strength of the British industry (which determines domestic political support for tougher negotiations).
An ITQ-based system with statutory science-based TAC adherence creates the conditions for both. A fleet rationalised by market signals, harvesting at or below the maximum sustainable yield, presents a fundamentally stronger case for quota renegotiation than an overcapitalised fleet whose catch systematically exceeds scientific advice.
The SPS Lever and Reciprocity Conditionality
The May 2025 deal grouped fisheries access with a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement removing significant trade barriers for British seafood exports to the EU.108 The EU accounts for 67% of British seafood exports, meaning the SPS deal is materially valuable to the industry.109 This creates a useful architectural logic for post-2038 negotiations: British water access and EU market access are now fundamentally connected, giving both sides a stake in a cooperative outcome.
Britain should use the period to 2038 to build institutional and scientific capacity to negotiate on equal terms. The UK should look to invest in the MMO’s stock assessment capabilities and expand bilateral scientific cooperation with ICES member states; publish comprehensive annual assessments of TAC performance against ICES advice for all 95 UK-EU shared stocks, building the evidentiary record for renegotiation; and develop a formal reciprocity framework within the Specialised Committee on Fisheries (SCF), specifying how quota share adjustments would be triggered if scientific targets are not met.
Importantly, the Government should legislate now for the ITQ system, so that by 2038 the British industry has a decade of performance data, including efficiency gains, stock improvements, and improved environmental compliance, to present at the negotiating table.
The Licensing Lever
Even within the 2038 access deal, Britain retains the right to issue vessel licences to EU operators. This should be used proactively. Conditions attached to licences, for example regarding gear selectivity, electronic monitoring, data-sharing with British stock assessment bodies, and compliance with British technical measures, could incrementally raise management standards applied to EU vessels in British waters without renegotiating access terms.
Policy Recommendations: Fisheries Fit for the Future
Create an ITQ system for all British components of TAC
The Government should legislate to convert existing FQA into permanent, legally protected, and fully transferable quota shares. A single, UK-wide system is desirable, although the devolved administrations would have to consent to this arrangement.110 Should this prove unachievable, each should adopt an ITQ framework that permits unrestricted quota trading within its jurisdiction.
For fish stocks where FQA shares already exist (for example, in the case of vessels over 10 metres operating within a producer organisation), these should be fully translated to the new system. As these shares are incorporated into the unified ITQ system, the proportional holdings of some existing FQA holders may be marginally diluted (although the volume of fish they are able to catch in practice would remain largely unchanged).
The greatest extension in property rights would be granted to the operators of vessels in the under-10-metre sector. Currently restricted by weekly or monthly catch limits, these vessels would be granted permanent ITQ on the basis of a three-year catch history.111 These units would be fully amalgamated into the ITQ system, and the quantity of fish would remain in broad accordance with current levels.
The Government should also consider existing non-quota species for inclusion into the ITQ scheme.112 In these cases, the MMO (in consultation with other authorities) would have discretion over which species warranted inclusion into the ITQ scheme. The criteria should consider both the economic importance of the stock, and its ecological vulnerability. The ten most-landed British shellfish, including crabs, scallops, lobsters, and whelks, should be included in the ITQ scheme in the first instance.113
Chart 1: Hypothetical Transition of an Unsustainable Catch
The above graph presents a ‘worst case scenario’. That is, where stock of a species is identified as being fished in excess of its sustainable levels. This would not be the case for every fish stock. Where current catch levels are equal to the sustainable catch, consolidation into the ITQ would occur, but the number of fish caught by each fisherman would not be impacted.
Chart 2: Hypothetical Transition of a Sustainable Catch
Note that, in the example, a fisherman currently catching 0.2AU per annum in the pre-reform system continues to own and catch two arbitrary units of fish in the post-reform system, as part of the generally allocated ITQ system.
In any case, TACs would need to continue to be set each year. Where scientific capacity is currently limited, the Government should prioritise expanding stock assessment capability to ensure that quota allocations remain consistent with long-term stock sustainability.
Initiate a government ‘buyback’ scheme for overfished stocks
A substantial proportion of British fish stocks are still being fished above the levels recommended by ICES. While permanent property rights would encourage long-term stewardship of fish stocks, the current ecological condition of many British fisheries may require a short-term reduction in fishing pressure to allow stocks to return to sustainable levels.
Fishermen would be free to sell their quota to any entity – including the Government. To preserve the integrity (by volume of fish landed) of British fish stocks, it may be necessary for the state to purchase some quota from fishermen to allow the fishery to recover.
Policies to this effect were enacted in New Zealand, although the New Zealand system was initially complicated by the fact that property rights extended to a fixed number of fish per annum, rather than a fixed proportion of the TAC.
The Government should establish a voluntary quota buyback programme for stocks identified as overexploited by scientific assessment. Under the scheme, the Government would purchase quota shares from willing sellers at prevailing market rates and remove them from the active fishery. This should be conducted through a reverse auction. By reducing the total volume of quota in circulation, the scheme would lower fishing pressure and allow depleted stocks to rebuild more rapidly. As in New Zealand, the Government should tender for any quota that it wishes to acquire. This ensures legitimacy and increased fisherman participation in quota rationalisation, and allows those for whom the quota is most valuable (those who fish it most efficiently) to prioritise continued operations over an instant windfall. All of this ensures that the transition to ITQ is both politically durable and equitable.
Chart 3: Using a Voluntary State Tender to Manage Overfishing
In the chart above, the post-tender system is shown as resulting in a moderate consolidation in favour of the larger fishermen who tend to have lower marginal costs and, therefore, are able to use the resource most efficiently.
Where fiscal constraints preclude a full state buyout, the cost of adjustment may be split equally between industry and the taxpayer. Fishermen are first issued property rights over the pre-reform TAC in proportion to their historic shares. Each then retires a fixed proportion uncompensated, delivering half the required reduction while preserving relative shares, and the state funds the remainder through a voluntary sealed-bid auction. This halves the fiscal cost of a New-Zealand-style buyout and retains a market mechanism, at the cost of weaker legitimacy and potential exposure to legal challenge on expropriation grounds. The strategy is not fiscally neutral to fishermen, although it should be considered if fiscal constraints preclude the delivery of the policy as set out above.
Chart 4 & 5: Using a Partial State Tender to Manage Overfishing
Renegotiate fish quotas for European vessels in British waters to be a fixed quantity of stock, rather than a percentage of Britain’s TAC
While the Lancaster House Agreement of 2025 mandates reciprocal access until 2038, Britain should seek to renegotiate the mechanism of EU access.114 Under the current percentage-based framework, any ‘sustainability dividend’ generated by the transition to ITQs, such as an increase in TACs due to ecologically sustainable stock management, would be automatically shared with EU vessels. This represents a significant leakage of the benefits derived from British domestic reform.
Chart 6: European Consequences of Reform with Proportional Shares
We propose that Britain aim to convert EU percentage shares into fixed tonnages, benchmarked against the average catch in the three years preceding the implementation of ITQs. This would ensure EU fishermen are not disadvantaged in absolute terms (making the EU more likely to accept such a deal) while allowing their relative stake in British waters to be proportionally diluted as stocks recover under sustainable British management.
Chart 7: European Consequences of Reform with Fixed Numerical Catches
Upon the expiry of the transition period in 2038, these fixed tonnages should then be converted into a new asset class: ‘Overseas Tradeable Quota’. This quota would be fully integrated into the national ITQ registry and allocated via public auction, ensuring that the scarcity value of the resource is captured by HM Treasury and that all British operators conduct business in a single, market-based system. After this auction, the only difference between ‘Overseas Tradeable Quota’ and the rest of Britain’s ITQ is that it would not be subject to foreign investment controls.
Establish a single electronic quota trading market
The British fishery quota allocation and trading system is both fragmented and exclusionary for new market entrants.115 The Government has recorded transfers of the current FQA units since their implementation in the 1990s.116 This practice continues today. However, transfers are not publicly available in real time.117
Once quota shares are made fully and permanently divisible and transferable under the ITQ system, policy should focus on establishing the infrastructure required for a transparent and efficient quota market. The Government should therefore create a single electronic trading platform through which quota shares can be bought, sold, or leased between vessels. All transactions should be recorded centrally and reported in real time, allowing market participants to observe current prices and available quota. The platform would operate primarily as a registry and exchange, rather than as a mechanism for direct government control of the market.
In addition to recording quota transactions, the platform should also function as the central reporting system for fish landings.118 All catches landed by British vessels should be logged on the platform and automatically deducted from the quota holdings of the relevant vessel. Integrating landing records with quota ownership would significantly improve monitoring and enforcement by providing regulators with a continuous and transparent record of quota usage across the fleet.
The publication of real-time trading data would allow quota prices to emerge through open market competition, improving price discovery and reducing the informational advantages currently enjoyed by larger operators.119 Additionally, a single trading platform would lower barriers to entry by allowing new fishermen to identify and acquire quota without relying on existing industry networks. Finally, a transparent market would improve regulatory oversight by providing government authorities with a clear and comprehensive record of quota ownership and transfers.
Digital registry systems already operate in several property-rights-based fisheries, including those of New Zealand and Iceland.120 Establishing a comparable platform in the United Kingdom and extending this to directly facilitate trading would therefore represent a natural institutional complement to the introduction of permanent transferable quota rights, helping to ensure that the reformed fisheries management system operates efficiently, transparently, and in a manner accessible to both established operators and new entrants.
Introduce mandatory ownership caps
Ownership caps are a helpful tool to promote competition, prevent monopolisation, and protect the interests of small- and medium-sized fishermen. These were a feature of New Zealand’s ITQ implementation – set at 20% for inshore stocks and 35% for deep-water stocks.121 Given the higher prevalence of Britain’s under-10-metre fishing industry, and the absence of New Zealand’s continental shelf, these alone would not work. Instead, a three-tier structure should be used: 15% ownership caps for shellfish, 25% for demersal species, and 35% for pelagic fish. These proportions reflect existing fleet dynamics and the commercial realities of fishing these three different categories of fish. As is now the case in New Zealand, these distinctions should be considered a ‘starting point’.122 The precise figures for each species should be determined through scientific advice and industry consultation (and should be subject to a maximum variation restriction of c. 5% of the total percentage maximum). In addition, these restrictions would not apply to any entity that held a higher proportion of the pre-reform TAC than it would be legally entitled to under the new legislation. In a similar manner to the New Zealand model, these caps would apply only to ownership of quota.123 It would thus be possible for larger operators to lease quota from smaller operators in addition to their ownership capped amounts. Such leases would provide additional income for smaller fishermen wishing to diversify their revenue streams.
To add further specificity, these ownership caps should apply down to the area-based stock classification for each species. For example, an entity could thus own no more than 15% of the shellfish stocks in a given area, further protecting coastal communities nationwide.
For ownership caps to function as intended, they must apply on a beneficial ownership basis. Without this, caps can be circumvented through holding companies, trusts, or coordinated ownership by related parties. The legislation should therefore aggregate quota held by related entities, including parent and subsidiary companies, entities under common directorship, and immediate family members, for the purpose of calculating compliance with the cap. Additionally, long-term leases should be treated as de facto ownership transfers. Leases exceeding five years in duration, or rolling arrangements which collectively exceed this threshold, should count towards the lessee’s cap allocation. This preserves the flexibility of short-term leasing (which provides genuine income diversification for smaller fishermen) while preventing a monopolist from establishing effective control over a stock. The experience of Iceland, where formal caps existed alongside significant concentration, demonstrates that these provisions are not optional additions to the cap regime but essential to its operation.
A Roadmap for Implementation
This paper has identified the need for a single, harmonised quota system for fisheries management in Britain. The major constraint to achieving this is constitutional. Fisheries management is devolved under the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 2006, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998.124 While the Westminster parliament remains sovereign, the Sewel Convention makes the prospect of unilateral reform politically impractical.125 Reform should therefore proceed through coordinated adoption rather than imposition.
Option One: Voluntary Harmonisation Framework
The Government should pursue a UK-wide joint fisheries reform agreement. This would involve permitting the Westminster government to legislate on fisheries in the devolved nations to facilitate the implementation of a UK-wide ITQ system. This would involve a commitment to:
Transition from FQA units to permanent quota shares
Establish compatible quota registries
Enable cross-border quota trading over time
There is precedent for this approach. Britain’s FMPs are already developed on a cross-nation basis, demonstrating that coordination is feasible where incentives align.126
Option Two: A ‘First Mover’ Approach
If political progress towards a UK-wide agreement is slow, reform should proceed on a ‘first mover’ basis. The two credible ‘first movers’ are England (due to its large fleet size, which is arguably most in need of rationalisation) and Scotland (because it has the largest stock share by value, and thus the most to gain from efficiency and revaluation).127 For these reasons, there are clear incentives for either of these nations to be the first mover towards the ITQ system.
Early adoption would likely lead to observable efficiency gains, improved sustainability, and a viable quota market. Once these concepts were proven, political resistance in other administrations would decrease rapidly. Then, Westminster could attempt option 1 again.
Option Three: Competitive emulation and full UK market integration
Fisheries policy does not exist in isolation, particularly in the unique devolved arrangement of the United Kingdom. If one jurisdiction unlocks the benefits of the ITQ system, the rest will face political pressure to follow suit. Fishermen operating under the current system would be structurally disadvantaged when compared to those in neighbouring nations.
There would therefore be an incentive for all nations to rapidly align with the ‘first mover’. Instead of Westminster taking action at this stage, this could be done by the ‘first mover’ opening its own quota system to any second-mover jurisdictions, gradually creating a harmonised, UK-wide ITQ.
Conclusion
British fisheries management is at a turning point. Brexit’s promises remain unfulfilled following the 2025 Lancaster House summit. We are locked-in to a suboptimal deal with the EU for a further twelve years. However, this should not be treated as an excuse for inaction. Instead, this period offers a unique chance to rebuild the British industry on a more economically- and environmentally-sustainable basis, to maximise our bargaining power in 2038.
The diagnosis this paper has set out is clear. The current system – featuring fragmented quota pools, insecure tenure, politically driven TAC setting, and a bureaucratic trading infrastructure that disadvantages smaller operators – has not served British fisheries well. Half of Britain’s most commercially important stocks are overfished or overexploited. These failures stem directly from a system where no fisherman has a stake in the resource’s long-term health.
New Zealand and Iceland faced comparable crises of stock depletion and fleet overcapacity, and resolved them through individual transferable quota systems that conferred permanent property rights on those fishing the resource. The results were consistent: stocks recovered, fleets became more efficient, and fishing communities found themselves operating within a more stable and economically coherent industry. The tools are well understood. We simply need the political will to apply them.
This paper has proposed five interlocking reforms: a unified ITQ system covering all commercial species; a targeted government buyback programme for the most depleted stocks; a roadmap for partial dilution of EU claims to British fish stocks to protect British sustainability dividends; a single electronic trading platform to replace the currently opaque quota market; and statutory ownership caps to guard against monopolisation. None of these need wait for 2038, as they concern only Britain’s domestic fisheries. A fleet operating under science-aligned property rights for a decade will arrive at the next round of access negotiations in a far stronger position than one still trapped in the same cycle of overcapacity and political exemptions.
Protecting our remaining fish stocks requires secure ownership. Permanent rights ensure the industry and the environment prosper together.
Evolved Research and Consulting, Deep Decline: The State of UK Fish Populations in 2025, Oceana UK (2025).↩︎
John Lewis Partnership, ‘A better catch: Waitrose becomes first UK supermarket to suspend mackerel sourcing over sustainability concerns’ (2026).↩︎
Rebekha Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024, Marine Management Organisation (2025).↩︎
Guy Standing, ‘Labour must Revive the Blue Commons’, Progressive Economy Forum (2022); Ruth Thurstan et al., ‘The effects of 118 years of industrial fishing on UK bottom trawl fisheries’, Nature Communications (2010).↩︎
Elena Ares, UK-EU Relations: Fisheries, House of Commons Library (2023).↩︎
Jon Stone et al., ‘EU and UK ink post-Brexit deal on security, fish and energy’, Politico (19 May 2025).↩︎
National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations, ‘NFFO comment on 19th May UK-EU “reset” summit’ (2025).↩︎
Stone et al., ‘EU and UK ink post-Brexit deal’.↩︎
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, United Kingdom Sea Fisheries Statistics (1995).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Rögnvaldur Hannesson, ‘Sharing the Northeast Atlantic mackerel’, ICES Journal of Marine Science (2013).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘The Herring’ (n.d.).↩︎
Scottish Government, Proposed North Sea and Eastern Channel Whiting Fisheries Management Plan (2021).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Scottish Government, Proposed North Sea and West Coast of Scotland Haddock Fisheries Management Plan (2022).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘UK sea fisheries annual statistics report 2024: Section 1 - Fleet’ (2025).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘UK sea fisheries annual statistics report 2023: Section 2 - Landings’ (2023).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎
As measured by Landings per Unit of Fishing Power (LUFP). See: Thurstan et al., ‘The effects of 118 years of industrial fishing’.↩︎
Michael Gove, ‘Green Brexit: a new era for farming, fishing and the environment’ (2018).↩︎
Evolved Research and Consulting, Deep Decline.↩︎
John Lewis Partnership, ‘A better catch’.↩︎
Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science, Assessing the sustainability of fisheries catch limits negotiated by the UK for 2024 (2024).↩︎
Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science (1968).↩︎
Scottish Government, ‘Commercial shellfish’ (2020).↩︎
Evolved Research and Consulting, Deep Decline; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Collaborative multi-year strategy for the king scallop fishery’ (8 December 2025).↩︎
Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.↩︎
Ross Bramble, ‘The surprising truth about Britain’s most dangerous jobs’, Crunch (2025). The ‘umbrella sector’ of agriculture, forestry and fishing ranks third lowest in Britain by pay. See: ‘Highest Paid Industries in the UK Revealed as Wage Disparity Continues to Grow’, Financial News (2024).↩︎
Keith Findlay, ‘Inflation impact on Scottish fishing industry profits revealed’, The Press and Journal (2023).↩︎
Phoebe Lewis et al., ‘The UK is losing its small fishing boats-and the communities they support’, Phys.org (2025).↩︎
Duncan Vaughan et al., ‘Revisiting fuel tax concessions (FTCs)’, Marine Policy (2023).↩︎
H. Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery’, Journal of Political Economy (1954).↩︎
Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.↩︎
Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Introduction’ (n.d.).↩︎
Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Introduction’.↩︎
Pew Charitable Trusts, ‘Fleet Overcapacity is Driving Overfishing’ (2011).↩︎
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press (1990).↩︎
Ostrom, Governing the Commons.↩︎
Andy Forse et al., ‘Beyond Brexit - Is Britain’s Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA) system in need of a fix?’, University of Portsmouth (2021).↩︎
High Court, R (UKAFPO) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2013).↩︎
R (UKAFPO).↩︎
Elena Ares, Debate on the impact of quota negotiations on the UK fishing fleet in 2025, House of Commons Library (2025).↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Manage and lease fishing quota’ (2014); ‘Marine Management Organisation’, GOV.UK (n.d.).↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Manage and lease fishing quota’.↩︎
Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Manage and lease fishing quota’.↩︎
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘UK and EU reach agreement on fishing opportunities for 2022’ (2022).↩︎
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs et al., UK Quota Management Rules (2024).↩︎
UK Quota Management Rules.↩︎
Scottish Government, Use of quota to incentivise low impact fishing 2023 (2025).↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Manage and lease fishing quota’.↩︎
UK Quota Management Rules, s. 2.12.↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Leasing extra quota’ (2020).↩︎
Stone et al., ‘EU and UK ink post-Brexit deal’.↩︎
Stone et al., ‘EU and UK ink post-Brexit deal’.↩︎
Council of the European Union, ‘Council approves EU-UK fishing deal for 2026’ (10 December 2025).↩︎
Foreign Affairs Committee, From a Common Understanding to Common Ground: Building a UK-EU Strategic Partnership fit for the future, House of Commons (2026).↩︎
Blue Marine Foundation, ‘EU and UK agree to share overfished waters for 12 more years’ (2025).↩︎
Dame Angela Eagle, ‘Fishing Opportunities Agreement 2026’, House of Commons (10 December 2025).↩︎
Stefano Fella et al., The UK-EU reset: Next steps after the May 2025 summit, House of Commons Library (2025).↩︎
For details on the nature of Britain’s quota allocation system, see pages eight and nine of this report.↩︎
Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.↩︎
See pages eight and nine of this report.↩︎
Jesper Stage et al., ‘The economics of the Swedish individual transferable quota system’, Marine Policy (2016).↩︎
Paul Marchal et al., ‘Quota allocation in mixed fisheries’, ICES Journal of Marine Science (2011).↩︎
Rafael León et al., ‘Changes in the lease and permanent sale quota markets of a rock lobster fishery’, ICES Journal of Marine Science (2015).↩︎
The financial position of fishermen (especially those who operate smaller craft) has often been described as precarious. See: Seafarers UK, Fishing Without a Safety Net (2020).↩︎
R. Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota in New Zealand fisheries’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (2000).↩︎
Jim Anderton, ‘Fisheries quota management system celebrated’, New Zealand Government (2007).↩︎
Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota’.↩︎
Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota’.↩︎
Ministry for Primary Industries, ‘How we manage New Zealand’s fisheries’ (n.d.).↩︎
Sanford, ‘Fisheries Management’ (n.d.).↩︎
Ministry for Primary Industries, ‘How we manage New Zealand’s fisheries’.↩︎
Open Seas, ‘Fishing Rules’ (2019).↩︎
FishServe, ‘Application to Register a Transfer of Quota Shares’ (n.d.).↩︎
Ministry for Primary Industries, ‘How we manage New Zealand’s fisheries’.↩︎
Earth Science New Zealand, ‘The pearl of New Zealand fishing’ (2016); Michael P. Sissenwine and Pamela M. Mace, ‘ITQs in New Zealand: the era of fixed quota in perpetuity’, Fishery Bulletin (1992).↩︎
Sissenwine and Mace, ‘ITQs in New Zealand’.↩︎
Paul Meredith, ‘Te hi ika - Maori fishing’, Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand (2012).↩︎
Parliament of New Zealand, Maori Fisheries Act 2004.↩︎
B. Hersoug, Unfinished Business: New Zealand’s Experience with Rights-Based Fisheries Management, Eburon (2002).↩︎
See page six of this report.↩︎
Ministry for Primary Industries, ‘How we manage New Zealand’s fisheries’.↩︎
See page seven of this report; FishServe, ‘Application to Register a Transfer of Quota Shares’.↩︎
Parliament of New Zealand, Fisheries Act 1996, s. 59.↩︎
G. Clement, ‘The Orange Roughy Management Company Limited’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (2001).↩︎
‘The price of fish’, New Zealand Geographic (n.d.).↩︎
Shane Jones, ‘Global report praises NZ’s sustainable fisheries’, New Zealand Government (2025).↩︎
‘The price of fish’, New Zealand Geographic.↩︎
From 2,000 to 1,000. See: Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Fisheries and Aquaculture: New Zealand’ (n.d.).↩︎
Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Fisheries and Aquaculture: New Zealand’.↩︎
Ragnar Arnason, ‘Property Rights in Fisheries: Iceland’s Experience with ITQs’, Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries (2005).↩︎
Arnason, ‘Property Rights in Fisheries’.↩︎
Food and Agriculture Organisation, ‘Fisheries and Aquaculture: Iceland’ (2024).↩︎
Arnason, ‘Property Rights in Fisheries’.↩︎
‘Species-level quota concentration in the Icelandic harvesting sector’, Marine Policy (2020).↩︎
Arnason, ‘Property Rights in Fisheries’.↩︎
HM Government, ‘UK-EU Summit: Joint Statement’ (2025).↩︎
Cabinet Office, ‘UK-EU Summit: Common Understanding’ (2025).↩︎
Seafish, ‘Exports from the UK’ (2025).↩︎
HM Government, Fisheries Management and Support Common Framework (2022).↩︎
See page eight of this report.↩︎
See page four of this report.↩︎
‘Summary analysis of UK landings data 2018’, Fishing News (2019).↩︎
HM Government, Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2021); Stone et al., ‘EU and UK ink post-Brexit deal’.↩︎
Much of the trading of quota is conducted through POs, which increases resistance for new market entrants as the trading is internalised. See page nine of this report.↩︎
Aberdeen Fish Producers’ Organisation Limited, ‘Submission to the Seafishing Inquiry’, Select Committee on Agriculture (1999).↩︎
Marine Management Organisation, ‘Fishing quota trading and swaps’ (2025).↩︎
A central, continually updated registry of landings was proposed by Madsen Pirie in 2016. See: Madsen Pirie, ‘Catch of Today: A ten point plan for British fishing’, Adam Smith Institute (2016).↩︎
F. A. Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, The American Economic Review (1945).↩︎
Christopher Costello et al., ‘Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?’, Science (2008).↩︎
Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota’.↩︎
Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota’.↩︎
Connor, ‘Initial allocation of individual transferable quota’.↩︎
Scotland Act 1998; Government of Wales Act 2006; Northern Ireland Act 1998.↩︎
UK Parliament, ‘Sewel Convention’ (n.d.).↩︎
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Fisheries Management Plans’ (2023).↩︎
Paul, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2024.↩︎