Taming the Hydra: Ofcom and the British Broadcasting Market

Written By James Hodgkinson and Jasper Ostle

This new report by the Adam Smith Institute assesses broadcast regulation and the powers of Ofcom.

It traces the story of Ofcom from its origins of ‘competition policy-plus’ to its current ‘super-regulator’ activity. We find that, through mechanisms such as the Ofcom Broadcast Code, enforced neutrality, content moderation, and financial sanction, Ofcom: suppresses free speech, erodes trust in media, undermines competition in the broadcast market, and dampens media plurality.

To improve Britain’s broadcast sector, we propose the following changes:

  • Abolish principles two and five of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.

  • Replace the broadcast licensing regime with a general authorisation model.

  • Replace the ‘percentage of global qualifying revenue’ fine limit with a fixed sum limit.

  • Extend the provisions of the ‘BBC First’ clause to all broadcasters.

  • Remove the BBC’s regulatory privilege and replace it with an enhanced regulatory model.

  • Remove the provisions of the Media Act 2024 pertaining to the enforced prominence of Public Service Broadcasters on streaming services.

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Executive Summary

This new report by the Adam Smith Institute assesses broadcast regulation and the powers of Ofcom. This paper argues that:

  • Ofcom has strayed from its founding principles of ‘competition policy-plus’ designed to ‘reflect market realities’.
  • Instead, it has grown in power at the expense of economic growth and free speech.
  • The broadcast licence regime suppresses media plurality.
  • The ‘BBC First’ complaints procedure and special treatment of Public Service Broadcasters undermine trust in the media.
  • Enforced neutrality of reporting (enshrined in clause five of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code) also undermines trust in the media.
  • Clause two of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code undermines free speech by forcing broadcasters to navigate vague definitions of ‘harm and offence’ in their content.
  • Ofcom’s power to fine broadcasters by a percentage of their global qualifying revenue creates market uncertainty that deters investment and market entry.

To improve Britain’s broadcast sector, we propose the following changes:

  • Abolish principles two and five of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.
  • Replace the broadcast licensing regime with a general authorisation model.
  • Replace the ‘percentage of global qualifying revenue’ fine limit with a fixed sum limit.
  • Extend the provisions of the ‘BBC First’ clause to all broadcasters.
  • Remove the BBC’s regulatory privilege and replace it with an enhanced regulatory model.
  • Remove the provisions of the Media Act 2024 pertaining to the enforced prominence of Public Service Broadcasters on streaming services.

About the Authors

James Hodgkinson is a Research Associate at the Adam Smith Institute.

Before the ASI, James gained three A*s and an A in his A-Levels, and will continue his studies in History and Politics at Robinson College, University of Cambridge, from 2026.

James also serves as Kent’s youngest Parish Councillor, and Vice-Chair of the KALC Canterbury Area Committee.

Jasper Ostle is the Head of Research and Education of the Adam Smith Institute.

Before joining the ASI, he graduated from the University of Cambridge with a first-class BA in Human, Social and Political Sciences. He specialised in comparative politics and intellectual history.

Jasper manages the public policy research of the ASI. He has contributed towards publications on sanctions, housing, energy, tax and more. He also coordinates all educational projects, including talks at schools and universities, student outreach and academic publications.

Introduction

This paper seeks to address deficiencies in the UK’s broadcast regulation framework, with an eye to Ofcom as its key contributor and enforcer. We find the mandated licensing regime to suppress media plurality and competition amongst broadcasters. We find that double-standards applied to Public Service Broadcasters undermine British trust in the media, as does the enforcement of nominal neutrality in reporting.

Underpinning the UK’s broadcast regime is a belief that broadcast is not speech but rather a product in need of strict control. But public trust in media and business confidence in the British market continues to fall. At a time when the rate of innovation in the TMT sector is accelerating under the advent of artificial intelligence and greater digital interconnectedness, the need for a new broadcast regime becomes ever-greater. As public interest in broadcast decreases, the industry needs greater space to grow and innovate.

We believe that broadcast—like print media, books, magazines, pamphlets, and social media—is speech, and should be regulated as such. This is not only a principled argument but a practical one. The pursuit is not just the preservation of free-speech principles in practice, but a regulatory environment that delivers better for both consumers and providers of broadcast. Through both endogenous and comparative qualitative analysis, we have cultivated a set of proposals to bring the UK’s broadcast market into greater regulatory alignment with peer countries.

This paper begins with a broad overview of Ofcom’s powers as the UK’s broadcast ‘super-regulator’, followed by an assessment of the state of the British broadcast market. This is followed by a discussion of the negative impacts of Ofcom’s intrusive powers and broader regulatory hold-backs: reduced competition, suppressed media plurality, dampened public trust, regulatory sclerosis, and deterred investment. Then, we outline an alternative set of governing principles for how broadcast should be regulated—by viewers, not bureaucrats. Liberal protections for broadcast-as-speech will increase, not decrease, the quality and variety of broadcast on offer. We round off this paper with a set of reasonable proposals designed to action these goals, which include: trimming down the Ofcom Broadcasting Code, abolishing the broadcast licensing regime and equalising the treatment of commercial and Public Service Broadcasters.

Ofcom was originally founded with the intention of reversing the received wisdom that broadcast needs regulation. It has since strayed from this vision to the detriment of British consumers. It is high time that this spirit returns.

How Does Ofcom Work in the Broadcasting Sector?

Broadcasting Code

Under the Communications Act 2003 and the Communications Act (as amended) 1996, Ofcom is duty bound to ‘draft a broadcasting code for television and radio, covering: fairness and privacy; product placement in television programmes; standards in programmes; and sponsorship’.1

The Broadcasting Code is subject to continual updating and renewal, allowing Ofcom to respond to new technologies and legislative priorities. The last major update occurred on the 31st December 2020, in response to the UK’s departure from the European Union.2

Ofcom’s broadcasting code contains provisions under 10 sections, ‘organised into sections and a series of rules and clarifications:

  1. Protecting the Under-Eighteens
  2. Harm and Offence
  3. Crime, Disorder, Hatred and Abuse
  4. Religion
  5. Due Impartiality and Due Accuracy and Undue Prominence of Views and Opinions
  6. Elections and Referendums
  7. Fairness
  8. Privacy
  9. Commercial References in Television Programming
  10. Commercial Communications in Radio Programming’3

Compliance with Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code is a mandatory requirement for all broadcasters who hold a UK broadcasting licence.4 Although the BBC is subject to the Broadcasting Code, the exception to this rule is the BBC World Service, which is not bound by the Broadcasting Code in the same manner as the rest of the sector.5

Investigations are opened into broadcasters for breaches of the Codes in two ways—firstly (and most commonly) through audience complaints, and secondly through Ofcom-initiated investigations.6 Sanctions can be imposed for serious violations of Ofcom’s broadcasting codes.7 This will be explored in subsequent sections of this report.

Allocating Broadcasting Licences

Unlike the postal sector, which operates under a general authorisation regime,8 Ofcom issues Broadcasting Licences to every provider—although important distinctions remain between broadcast radio or television licences.9 Licences for television broadcasting vary from Digital TV Programme Services, Local TV, and restricted services for a particular event.10 Radio broadcast licences also vary, and include community radio, small-scale DAB, and restricted service licences.11 Television broadcast licences are issued by Ofcom with a target response time of 25 working days.12 Providers have to pay application fees to obtain a licence—£2,500 for most providers, or £30,000 for Public Service Broadcasters (PSBs).13

Powers

Financial Penalties

Financial penalties are issued across all of the jurisdictions that Ofcom regulates, and have their legal basis in the Communications Act 2003.14 Ofcom claims to take a holistic approach to the imposition of financial penalties, examining ‘all the circumstances of the case’.15 Amongst the considerations taken are the duration, seriousness and harm caused by the breach. Additionally, the regulator considers the extent to which the licensed body benefitted from the breach.16

In broadcast, in most cases the maximum financial penalty for ‘commercial television or radio licensees is £250,000 or 5% of the broadcaster’s ‘Qualifying Revenue’, whichever is the greater. For licensed PSBs the maximum financial penalty payable is 5% of ‘Qualifying Revenue’. For S4C, the maximum financial penalty payable is £250,000’.17 Ofcom does not financially benefit from the issuing of fines, and all monies received in fine income are transferred to HM Treasury.18

Fines are regularly utilised by Ofcom across all the sectors it regulates. In 2024–25, Ofcom levied penalties totalling £34.7m. Alongside the £21 million fine issued to Royal Mail, fines were issued across the broadcasting TV, radio, and networks and services sector—although are unevenly distributed.19 Financial penalties are the sanction most often deployed by Ofcom, and are applicable across all sectors. However, they are not the only sanction or enforcement method available to Ofcom, and other escalation mechanisms exist. These will be explored subsequently.

Corrections, Broadcast Statements, and Directions not to repeat content

In the event that a ‘broadcaster has seriously, deliberately, repeatedly or recklessly breached one of our [Ofcom’s] requirements’, Ofcom can direct them to issue a formal correction, a statement of Ofcom’s findings, or a direction not to repeat the content.20

Both powers are used relatively infrequently. However, in 2019 TalkSport Radio Ltd. was required to broadcast an Ofcom statement after it broke political impartiality regulations on an episode of the George Galloway programme which concerned the Salisbury Poisonings and allegations of antisemitism in the Labour Party.21 Directions for broadcasters not to repeat programming are also rare, and only appear in the most serious breaches of code. One such example occurred in 2023, when Ofcom directed the Islam Channel Ltd. not to repeat programming on Neo-Nazism that it found to be antisemitic.22

Revoking Licences

In broadcasting, Ofcom has the ability to suspend or revoke the licences of service operators.23 This is typically actioned only after other sanctions have failed, or when a breach presents an immediate risk to safety.24 In broadcast, risks to safety are likely to stem from infractions on Section Three of the Broadcasting Code, which aims to prevent ‘crime, disorder, hatred and abuse’.25 In all but the most extreme circumstances (such as where the risk to the public was immediate), in Ofcom’s own words, ‘we would normally expect to inform the subject of this and provide it with an opportunity to comment on our provisional decision’.26

One example of Ofcom revoking the operating licence of a broadcaster occurred in 2022, where Ofcom revoked the licence of ANO TV Novosti, Russia Today’s (RT’s) licensee. This decision was taken due to RT’s ‘relationship with the Russian Federation’ as well as its numerous historical regulatory breaches.27 This was in direct response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in that same year.

Complaints

Responding to complaints comprises a significant part of Ofcom’s day-to-day work. Despite this, Ofcom has a ‘very limited’ role in dealing with disputes between individuals and companies.28

The power of Ofcom to investigate complaints varies distinctly between the subsectors of the communications industry that it regulates. In the broadcast sector, Ofcom is able to investigate individual complaints against broadcasters, stating that they ‘consider every complaint [they] receive from viewers and listeners’.29 In 2025, Ofcom received 49,850 individual complaints about content across television, radio, and on-demand services—not including complaints about BBC shows, due to the ‘BBC first process’.30 The ‘BBC first process’ originates from the BBC framework agreement, which sits alongside the BBC Charter.31 While the Charter establishes Ofcom as the regulator for the BBC, the BBC framework agreement stipulates that the BBC must respond to all complaints before they are investigated by Ofcom.32

In contrast, Ofcom ‘cannot investigate individual complaints about postal operators’, and will only investigate individual complaints relating to wireless interference in ‘exceptional circumstances’.33 Additionally, Ofcom has ‘no power to adjudicate individual complaints relating to online safety issues’, highlighting the uneven nature of Ofcom’s ability to handle complaints across the different subsectors it regulates.34

Companies and organisations within Ofcom’s regulatory remit can also refer themselves to the regulator where serious breaches may have occurred. This occurred in 2009, when ITV reported itself to Ofcom over its failure to ensure a winner had been declared in a premium-rate phone in competition. Ofcom found ITV in breach of the code, but noted that the broadcaster had ‘acted in good faith at all times’.35

Capacity for Intrusion into Broadcasting

Ofcom’s size and scale presents it with clear capacity to intrude into the remit of the broadcasters that it regulates, and its powers in the sector allow this to occur often with little resistance.

Ofcom’s licence revocations provide an example of the potential threats to broadcasters. Ofcom states that they ‘would normally expect to inform the subject of this and provide it with an opportunity to comment on our provisional decision’.36 However ‘given the circumstances in which we would be considering taking urgent action, Ofcom will normally allow only a short period’ for these representations to be made.37

Additionally, Ofcom’s emphasis on ‘due impartiality’ presents further potential issues for broadcasters.38 As well as applying to ‘news’, impartiality requirements can also apply to ‘matters of political or industrial controversy and matters relating to current public policy’.39 This can include talk shows and current affairs programmes. Specifically, the terms of the code forbid politicians from acting as news presenters or reporters, both of which are activities that are expected to be conducted impartially and with a focus on the facts of events or news stories.40 In contrast, Ofcom guidelines do not prevent politicians presenting current affairs programmes, even if these cover political issues.41 The terms of these codes create clear ambiguities as to who can present broadcast shows—which has led to Ofcom pursuing broadcasters under code provisions that do not apply to the activities they are undertaking. The specifics of these cases will be covered in later sections of this paper.42

State of the UK Broadcast Market

The UK’s broadcasting sector forms part of a ‘hybrid media landscape’ of broadcasting and online media.43 Within the UK’s broadcasting industry there are two significant groups: PSBs, and market-led (commercial) broadcasters.44 The UK’s broadcast market is ‘dominated’ by the BBC and, through legislation and regulation enforced by Ofcom, is often described as ‘heavily regulated’.45

In recent years, the UK’s broadcast market has seen significant change. Audio broadcast services have been impacted by the rise of streaming services and online audio. The average UK listener now spends 30% of their weekly listening time listening to podcasts and streamed music.46 However, radio still maintains its popularity. According to RAJAR, almost nine in 10 UK adults aged 15 and over (87%) tuned into the radio for an average of 20.5 hours per week in the first quarter of 2025.47

Television broadcast has arguably seen a larger market realignment. In the early 2000s, most people used five free-to-air terrestrial channels provided by PSBs to access content.48 Now, 68% of UK households use a subscription video on demand (SVoD) service, and SVoD services are the most popular destination for children and young adults who use a television.49 With these developments, the role of PSBs is evolving, and ‘PSBs continue their transition towards online streaming’, and away from their traditional focus on broadcast television.50 The increased pace of change in broadcasting has led some academics to label its regulatory structure as ‘protectionist’.51

Additionally, a binary perception has been construed in Ofcom output surrounding PSBs and large American technology companies such as YouTube, Meta, and Netflix. In an open letter sent jointly by Ofcom’s CEO and Chair of the Board to senior government ministers in 2025, the distinction was clear. Ofcom referred to the creation of a ‘more level playing field between our traditional PSBs and the global streamers and tech companies’.52 The distinction between PSBs and commercial broadcasters is evidenced in contrasting viewing figures. In December 2025, four of the top five most viewed channels on broadcast television sets (excluding on demand) were PSBs.53

This distinction is particularly concerning for commercial broadcasters, who are competing for the same market share as the large American streaming firms, yet receive none of the focused reporting of the PSBs—despite being subject to many of the same regulatory burdens.54

In Europe, the broadcast market shares this ‘mixed media’ landscape. In Italy, the national broadcaster ‘Rai’ operates a wide range of programming over multiple channels in a manner similar to that of the BBC.55 Like the BBC, Rai occupies a large share of Italy’s primetime broadcast television viewing figures, accounting for 39% in 2023.56 The broadcaster is funded through a combination of household licences (similar to the BBC licence fee), and commercial revenues from advertising. Rai operates ‘more than 40 television and radio channels and also manages a range of commercial subsidiaries responsible for advertising sales, program distribution, and satellite television management’.57

France’s broadcasting sector is similarly divided into PSBs and private broadcasters. ‘France Televisions’, ‘Radio France’, and ‘France Medias Monde’ hold the status as the nation’s PSBs.58 However, France’s regulator, ARCOM, does not enforce specific regulations around PSB prominence. Instead, it only stipulates the prominence of works of ‘general interest’ to the viewing public (and even in this case only doing so in on-demand audiovisual services).59 Despite the lack of PSB protectionism, France Televisions still account for 29% of audience share and is the number one French media outlet for viewers.60

The American broadcast landscape is very different to that of Europe’s, and especially different to the UK’s. The USA does have a tradition of PSBs, and until recently these were at least partially funded by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). As of May 2025, CPB funding to both of the US’s PSBs—National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)—was terminated by executive order, leaving them to gather funding by other commercial means.61 Reflecting the regionalised nature of the USA, there are 330 local TV stations which broadcast PBS content throughout each of the states.62

More broadly, American media operates at scale and with a diversity of opinions. All of the top five broadcast media outlets are private broadcasters, and none of PBS’s local outlets feature in the top 100 channels.63 Additionally, the tone of American broadcasting is exceptionally varied—especially around political events. Analysis conducted into reporting on both the 2024 US Presidential and UK General elections found that ‘American news outlets had wider gaps in the levels of negative, positive, and neutral tonality exhibited toward political candidates than British outlets’.64 This style of broadcast would be unfeasible in the UK, due to Ofcom’s requirement for the ‘highest level of impartiality’ to apply during election periods.65

What Is Wrong with Ofcom Today?

Negative Economic Impact and Reduced Competition in Broadcast

Ofcom’s regulatory remit continues to increase.66 Ofcom is largely funded by the organisations that it regulates; each organisation must pay a fee to the regulator based on its revenue and the ‘amount of work’ Ofcom carry out in the sector that the company occupies.67 Additionally, Ofcom’s growing remit increases the number of firms who risk falling foul of its fines. In the past three full financial years alone, Ofcom levied fines totalling over £94 million.68 Ofcom’s new jurisdictions in the digital sphere demonstrate growing appetite for fine-based enforcement, with caps set at £18 million or 10% of global qualifying revenue, whichever is greater.69 Note that the top band of ‘per cent of global qualifying revenue’ is 5% greater for digital outlets compared to broadcasters. The breadth of Ofcom’s reach and the increasing lengths firms (especially in the online sector) are having to go to in order to comply with regulations has a significant ‘chilling’ effect on investment in the UK’s broadcast sector.70

Across all the sectors that Ofcom is responsible for, excessive regulations can ‘deter entry and expansion, hampering competition, raise prices, and reduce consumer choice; they can also depress investment by increasing the option value of waiting for clarity’.71 Through Ofcom’s strict political neutrality requirements, broadcast audiences are forbidden from receiving overtly partisan political content through requirements for ‘due accuracy’ and ‘due impartiality’, even if this is what consumers want to view.72 Concerns around ‘mission creep’ and the potential for the broadening of Ofcom’s regulatory scope have also been raised. Through the OSA 2023, Ofcom became responsible for the ‘prevention of harm’, through arguably the largest expansion of its regulatory jurisdictions.73 Additionally, recent cases of Ofcom acting beyond its powers, as well as breaking its own codes of practice contribute to further uncertainty. The specifics of these cases will be discussed in subsequent sections of this paper.

Furthermore, in sectors where Ofcom operates a licence-based model, this can function to ‘control market entry and therefore, can be used to shape the market by limiting, or not, the number of players or the types of services’.74 In other industries, the limiting effects of regulation on new market entry have been borne out. In the financial services sector, small UK lenders spend an average of 5 times more of their revenue on financial crime compliance compared to large lenders.75 As broadcast relies on numerous, complex regulations, it is reasonable to assume that similar market and regulatory conditions would favour larger, established companies. In television (a sector regulated under a licence-based model), Ofcom issued just 23 new broadcast licences in 2025.76

In addition to these metrics, recent legislation further entrenches operative disparities between PSBs and the rest of the broadcast sector. The Media Act 2024 imposed ‘new rules relating to the prominence of public service content on designated connected TV platforms, and the accessibility of these platforms’.77 The Act allows Ofcom and the Secretary of State to designate certain television service providers as ‘regulated television selection services’ (RTSS). When this occurs, those RTSS providers are obliged to give ‘an appropriate degree of prominence’ to PSBs and their content.78

In cases such as this, academics have noted that ‘granting prominence to one service often comes at the cost of others’.79 As, in the case of the Media Act, this involves the prioritisation of state-supported PSBs over commercial entities, it ‘raises complex questions about prioritisation, fairness, and potential market distortion’.80 At a time when the broadcast sector worldwide is increasingly competitive and traditional broadcast services are under threat from modern streamers, this presence of market distortions such as the Media Act 2024 could have profound effects on the sector as a whole.81

In addition to the initial provisions of the Media Act 2024, the government has enacted secondary legislation to further regulate video-on demand (VoD) and streaming services through the On-demand Programme Services (Tier 1 Services) Regulations 2026.82 This new legislation brings the ‘most popular’ VoD services (those with over 500,000 users) under Ofcom’s direct regulation. VoD providers will have to conform to new mandatory ‘accessibility codes’, as well as a new VoD standards code. This code will be similar in character to Ofcom’s broadcasting code, discussed elsewhere in this paper. This means that provisions concerning impartiality and protection from harm and offense will now apply to VoD providers in addition to traditional broadcasters.83

In addition to the obvious regulatory incumbrances that the new VoD code will have on streaming platforms, the seemingly ubiquitous theme—uncertainty—remains. Streaming platforms are now not only subject to Ofcom’s current regulatory burden, but to the threat of future Ofcom regulation, which may be enacted via secondary legislation. This paper has already outlined the negative effects of regulatory uncertainty on future media investment, and Ofcom’s ‘mission creep’ into sectors that were previously unregulated will only further dissuade future investment in UK broadcast.84

Negative Impact on Media Plurality and Free Speech

Ofcom’s broadcasting codes have long been used as a method to attempt to suppress the opinions of those whom complainants disagree with.85 In numerous cases, people from all political allegiances have sought to use ambiguous definitions contained within Ofcom’s codes and guidelines—such as the word ‘harm’—to achieve this aim.86

One recent example of this were complaints made regarding Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg presenting his ‘State of the Nation’ programme on GB News in 2023, due to perceived impartiality issues surrounding his status as an active politician.87 A second example from 2020 centres around the actions of the Diversity dance troupe, who were the subject of nearly 25,000 complaints following a performance featuring ‘palpable political partisanship’ on ITV’s hit show Britain’s Got Talent.88

Both of these examples saw the complaints dismissed. In Britain’s Got Talent’s case, by Ofcom itself, and in the case of GB News, by the high court (which found that Ofcom had breached its own rules over the matter).89 While, in both of these cases, decisions according with the principles of free speech prevailed, the ‘anxiety’ created by regulator-led investigations could lead to ‘over-compliance’ in the future.90 This may cause a narrowing of speech-related freedoms as broadcasters look to hedge against enforcement action taken by Ofcom.

These risks extend to Ofcom’s online jurisdictions. In the public consultation process, concerns were raised that ‘providers may be incentivised to be overly cautious in their takedown duties, to not fall foul of Ofcom’s rules’.91 The presence of regulation on speech and expression has a distortive effect on discourse—with both ‘chilling effects’ (where opinions that sit outside the regulatory sphere are suppressed), and ‘heating effects’ (where minority opinions are intensified by ‘altering the temperamental composition of the discursive community’) being observed.92

From ‘competition policy-plus’ to ‘enforcer of distinct laws’ In 1999, before the foundation of Ofcom, the then-Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) Secretary Chris Smith referred to new broadcast policy formulation as ‘competition policy-plus’, reflecting a preference for a light touch method of regulation.93 Conflicts arose between DCMS and the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI, which became the Department for Business and Trade) when formulating what the extent of this ‘plus’ element was. DCMS wanted a significant ‘plus’ replete with extensive content moderation of PSBs and stricter-than-proposed media ownership rules. Their rubric was that one ‘cannot simply regard [media] as another set of goods on the supermarket shelf’.94

When Ofcom was founded in 2003, it held two principal duties of: ‘(a) furthering the interests of citizens in relation to communication matters; and (b) furthering the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition’.95 Ofcom’s initial duties and enforcement action existed in this vein. This trend is exemplified by the functional separation of BT and Openreach in 2005. After a 2005 review by Ofcom found that the fixed telecom sector was not delivering satisfactory ‘end-to-end competition’, Ofcom negotiated an agreement with BT whereby the retail provider and the fixed-telecom network provider would be organisationally separate.96 The process was completed without the need for a referral to the competition commission for a market review, and allowed other companies to access fixed-telecom infrastructure (managed by Openreach), at the price at which BT obtained it.97

As Ofcom expanded into new areas of the communications market, its powers grew with it.98 The OSA 2023 provided the largest single expansion of Ofcom’s regulatory remit, amending the Communications Act 2003 to require Ofcom to ensure ‘the adequate protection of citizens from harm presented by content on regulated services of citizens into account’, through requiring Ofcom to ensure ‘the appropriate use by providers of such services of systems and processes designed to reduce the risk of such harm’.99 These provisions reinforce Ofcom’s role as the ‘enforcer of consumer law’, including the provisions of the OSA, in which the broad definition of harm can be regarded as ‘nebulous’.100

Ofcom’s transition from a competition-based regulator to an enforcer of laws can be demonstrated by the increasing number of fines it has issued for non-compliance with government legislation and its own codes. Fine collection was low and stable from 2004–2016 (except from a small peak between 2007–2009 as Ofcom issued numerous fines due to the premium rate television phone-in scandal).101 However, from 2017, the rate of fine-levying began to increase. In the last three full financial years, Ofcom has issued fines averaging £34.5 million per year.102 In the financial year-to-date, Ofcom has issued fines to the value of £47 million—just £7.2 million less than its highest fines total on record.103

While enforcement volumes may partly reflect increased statutory obligations, the sustained upward trend in fines coincides with Ofcom’s expanding role as a primary enforcement authority rather than a competition-focused regulator. The above graph illustrates the total value of fines collected by Ofcom per year, across all of its jurisdictions. There are two important points of note. Firstly, the average annual fines collected has increased steadily over time, reflecting both Ofcom’s widening jurisdiction and an increasingly active regulator. Secondly, the increasingly ‘peak and trough’ nature of the fines administered by Ofcom reflects a regulator increasingly fining large companies to, in effect, set an example. The high peak for 2017/18 reflects a £42 million fine issued to BT for irregularities in compensation payments that should have been made to customers of its network arm.104 The peak in the year 2022/23 was due to the collection of a £50 million fine paid by Royal Mail.105

Fines collected by Ofcom across all jurisdictions—2004–present106

Faced with the additional responsibilities it has gained, Ofcom must also determine how to prioritise resources across the sectors that it regulates. Additionally, it must balance priorities where conflicts in the statutory responsibilities it holds occur (for example, where the duty to provide a universal postal service may clash with the duty to encourage competition).107

Ofcom’s expanded regulatory scope, including the enforcement of the ‘controversial’ provisions of the OSA, has created regulatory resource asymmetries across the sectors Ofcom now has jurisdiction over.108 As of February 2025, the Online Safety division of Ofcom was the largest sector-specific team within Ofcom’s operating structure—despite being the newest addition.109

These structural imbalances have been accompanied by Ofcom’s failure to deliver on some of its core statutory responsibilities, such as the promotion of media literacy.110 From as early as 2016, Ofcom discharged this function ’exclusively through the provision of “market data research” for “stakeholders”’, rather than through the broader, holistic approach that was originally envisaged.111 In 2025, a House of Lords Committee noted that, despite Ofcom’s responsibilities, evidence showed ‘little improvement in key media literacy skills over the last six years’.112

This can be attributed to the potential risk of regulators engaging in ‘the cherry-picking of politically salient issues to the detriment of attention to other risks/problems’, as is well documented across multiple sectors.113 The extent to which Ofcom is guilty of this charge is debated, but concerns around the power of a regulator with ‘enormous’ size were raised in parliamentary debates even during the legislative stage of the Communications Act 2003.114 The non-delivery of key statutory obligations suggest that these concerns were well-founded.115

Reduced Public Trust in Media

In the UK, public trust in the media remains low and has been so since at least 2016.116 In 2026, according to the Edelman Trust Barometer, the UK had a trust index of just 39 (out of 100), the second lowest amongst the 28 nations it studied.117

Comparing UK respondents’ trust in the media to those from other nations referenced in this paper (Australia, Italy, the USA, and France) reveals a startling conclusion. Despite Ofcom’s abundant regulations, UK media is consistently the least trusted of any of these nations.118 It is also striking that American media, where ‘partisan alignment’ of outlets is a key feature, ranks above the UK in every year studied.119 UK-specific incidents, including the media phone hacking scandal revealed through the 2012 Leveson Inquiry, may partially explain the UK’s trust deficit.120 However, the scale of the disparity (and the partisan nature of media in nations with higher trust ratings than the UK), suggests that transparency of political orientation may be more conducive to public trust than attempts to enforce institutional neutrality.

The theory is supported by academics including Jay Rosen. His theory, termed ‘the View from Nowhere’ asserts that broadcasters often advertise ‘the viewlessness of the news producer’.121 Rosen states that it is easier to trust in a philosophy of journalism that openly states ‘this is where I’m coming from’ than ‘the View from Nowhere’, which operates under the veil of perceived neutrality.122

This argument is supported by the views of agnostic scholars who believe that it is ‘not only impossible, but also undesirable, to overcome ideological conflict and dissent’, instead arguing for a political space (and a media) ‘that transparently manifests existing differences and allows for respectful contestation between clearly differentiated political positions’.123 Thus, Ofcom’s model of enforced political neutrality (especially around the roles politicians can play in presenting news or current affairs content) can be seen as counterproductive in increasing trust in broadcast.124 Trust in the media by country (2016–2026)125

Central to trust in UK broadcasting is trust in the BBC. In recent polling, 52% of UK adults surveyed said that they did not trust the BBC to provide ‘high quality and impartial news coverage’.126 Additionally, just 22% of UK adults believed that the BBC licence fee was ‘good value for money’.127 Part of this reduction in trust can be attributed to the distinct regulatory privileges that the BBC enjoys—such as the existence of the BBC first clause—which will be explored further in later sections of this paper.128 As citizens expect neutrality from PSBs, conditions and frameworks that can be seen to harm accountability and transparency can have negative effects on their perception.129

Operative Incompetence

As Ofcom’s powers have grown, the extent to which it has attempted to engage in enforcement action has increased.130 Ofcom is encountering more barriers to achieving its regulatory agenda, especially around the enforcement of the OSA. The following section will outline these instances, and show how Ofcom’s regulatory competency is negatively affected.

In response to the increased prevalence of partisan broadcast media outlets in the UK, Ofcom attempted to fine GB News over Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg’s ‘State of the Nation’ programme.131 In 2025, Ofcom lost the case in the UK High Court. This was the first time that the regulator lost a case relating to its own broadcasting code. The case centred around the misapplication of the distinction between a ‘news’ and ‘current affairs’ programme, as Section 5.3 of the code only applied to ‘news’ programmes. The Court found that ‘State of the Nation’ was not a news programme, and that Ofcom had misapplied Section 5.3 of the code.132

Immediately after this, Ofcom opened a consultation looking to tighten regulation around politicians acting as presenters on broadcast. The consultation ultimately led Ofcom to make no significant changes to existing rules.133 In addition to the reputational and procedural impacts that the case had on both GB News and Ofcom, Ofcom’s spending on external advisers rose to £4.6 million in the year of the case, raising questions over financial sustainability should Ofcom’s regulation of future contentious programming require litigation.134

Furthermore, the international nature of the OSA has created further enforcement challenges for Ofcom. In October 2025, Ofcom took its first enforcement action against an overseas company under the OSA.135 The regulator opted to impose a £20,000 fine on image bulletin board provider 4chan for failure to comply with two statutory information requests.136 The company has declined to pay the fine, and is suing Ofcom in the US courts. While no decision has yet been reached on this specific case, 4chan’s lawyers have stated that Ofcom has ‘no authority to impose or enforce unconstitutional UK laws on American soil’.137 4chan is not alone in refusing to comply with Ofcom’s requests. Wikipedia co-founder Jimmy Wales similarly announced in October that his online encyclopedia will refuse future Ofcom demands to restrict access to its site.138 Concerns around Ofcom’s ability to regulate international companies were raised during the pre-implementation stage of the OSA.139 If the early precedent of overseas companies rejecting Ofcom’s enforcement actions continues, then these concerns will prove well-founded.

In addition to these specific incompetencies, the experience of Ofcom’s board has also been called into question.140 Ofcom’s board of directors exhibit a bias towards the public sector, with 55% of their cumulative experience being in the public sector or working for PSBs.141 The prevalence of public sector and PSB experience could correlate to a notion of ‘protectionism’ of PSBs which this report has articulated. Creating an Ofcom governance structure that broadly reflects the sectors that it regulates could lead to regulation more realistically suited to the sectors that Ofcom has jurisdiction over.

‘Growing in Power to Justify Its Existence’

Ofcom’s powers have grown substantially with the onset of the OSA, as outlined in previous sections of this paper. In addition, Ofcom is set to gain regulatory responsibility for data centres through the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill.142 Furthermore, through the On-demand Programme Services (Tier 1 Services) Regulations 2026, Ofcom has also gained direct regulatory responsibility over the UK’s largest VoD services.143

The growth Ofcom has experienced can be, at least in part, attributed to public choice theory. Within every public sector organisation, reward comes from ‘seniority and responsibility’. There is thus a natural incentive structure for bureaucrats leading Ofcom to seek to expand the regulatory scope of their organisation, in order to increase the budgets and staff at their disposal.144

Ofcom has already exhibited evidence of its regulatory sprawl. Since 2011, the number of people employed by Ofcom has more than doubled. Ofcom’s staff count in 2025 was 1,608 full-time equivalent employees at a cost of £138,490,000.145

This analysis does not depend on assumptions about individual intent. Rather, it reflects well-documented dynamics of bureaucratic expansion that apply across public sector bodies when scope, funding, and prestige are aligned with jurisdictional growth.146

What Impact Is Ofcom Having on the Broadcast and Media Sector?

Investment and Profitability

Traditional broadcast revenues have been falling since the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2024, traditional broadcast revenues fell by £400 million, which had a collateral impact on independent film production due to falling commission budgets.147 In more recent years, the ongoing competition from streaming services has led to falling advertiser revenue, with ITV reporting a 9% decrease in advertising revenue for the last quarter of 2025.148 Meanwhile, shifts in audience behaviour — with platforms like YouTube overtaking traditional broadcasters in weekly reach — indicate competitive disruption that domestic firms must navigate under a static regulatory framework.149

Economic research on uncertainty within markets illustrates that ‘greater uncertainty in a firm’s environment significantly reduces investment’.150 Empirical analysis outlines that ‘on average, highly regulated firms have lower market-to-book ratios’. However, it also shows that regulated firms in highly regulated sectors ‘have higher markups and face lower entrance rates by new establishments, consistent with weakened competition’.151

Taken together, these trends suggest that the current regulatory regime is consistent with a broadcast economy where investment incentives are strained, entry is constrained, and economic resilience is uneven, even if causality cannot be definitively isolated.

The structure of UK broadcasting is on a trajectory of rapid change. In May 2025, streaming accounted for 45% of total TV set viewing.152 The trend is more pronounced among younger viewers, with Ofcom’s 2025 annual report stating that Gen Alpha turned to ‘YouTube first on their TV set at home’, and ‘fewer than 50% of 16–24 year olds watch broadcast TV weekly’.153 If these trends continue, this indicates a long-term move towards streaming as opposed to broadcast television.

In the radio sector, these trends are less pronounced. Across the UK, streaming services account for 30% of listening time. However, amongst people aged 15-34, 58% of listening time is now spent streaming music and podcasts.154

These differences in viewing figures have been accompanied by a decrease in TV company budgets, with spending reported in early 2025 being almost a quarter lower than the figures for the previous year.155

This provides evidence that, while constrained by Ofcom’s regulatory regime, traditional broadcasters are less able to compete with overseas streamers, which receive less focus from Ofcom, and benefit from ambiguity around Ofcom’s jurisdictional reach.156

How Should a Broadcast Market Be Regulated?

Lightly, is our answer. Ofcom was originally founded on the principle of ‘competition policy-plus’.157 Indeed, when DTI and DCMS discussed how Ofcom should operate prior to its establishment, this free-market sentiment was even stronger.158 In a co-published green paper in 1998, the vision for a new broadcast regulation regime was one that ‘reflects market realities’.159 This paper argued for a relatively radical reorientation of consensus thinking about communications and broadcast policy. It said that the lingering ideology that broadcasting should be regulated ‘should therefore in general be reversed’, with regulatory constriction being kept at ‘the minimum necessary to achieve clearly defined policy objectives’.160

We believe that the principle of competition should be upheld and enhanced for the modern day. Ofcom’s focus should return to promoting choice for consumers, in the spirit of its original creation in 2003.

To achieve this, Ofcom’s license-based model for broadcast regulation should be abolished in its entirety. Through the removal of the licensing model, all obligations for broadcasters to adhere to Ofcom’s stringent broadcasting codes would be eliminated. Impartiality requirements would cease to exist, and broadcasters could air whatever content they deem to be decent and within the law.

We do not believe that such deregulation would likely lead to a material increase in the prevalence of extreme, violent, or harmful content available on mainstream broadcasting services.

Broadcasters, like other for-profit enterprises, are motivated by commercial incentives. For broadcasters, these incentives exist in the form of viewing numbers (and the resultant revenue from advertising that these can bring). Advertisers demand ‘brand safe environments’, in which the content that is broadcast does not indirectly harm their offering or reputation amongst consumers. Although much of the contemporary literature examines digital platforms, the underlying mechanism (advertiser sensitivity to reputational risk) applies equally, and in many cases more strongly, to traditional broadcasters operating in concentrated advertising markets.161 Therefore it is not in the interests of channels to be needlessly or surprisingly offensive, as this would reduce the number of people who regularly viewed their services. Instead, to attract large audiences, broadcasters would likely pursue one of two courses of action:

  1. Appeal to the mass-market and the tastes of the ‘public at large’. This is likely to lead to broadcasters showing a wide range of content, to suit a variety of audiences. It is also likely to be content that is either politically neutral, or apolitical in nature.

  2. Appeal to a specific audience or market niche. This could take the form of politically partisan programming, where broadcasters are emboldened to be transparent in their political allegiances and empowered to tailor their content to relevant audiences accordingly. This would align political content with all other forms of broadcast content. For example, Sky Arts already offers programming focused on ‘music, theatre, film and design’.162

In either case, it would be audiences, rather than Ofcom, that could exercise quasi-regulatory powers over the broadcasting sector. Currently, Ofcom’s broadcasting codes require long, intensive and expensive consultations to amend. In some cases, despite the consultation, no amendments are made at all.163 Market mechanisms, and quasi-regulation through consumer habits, can offer an alternative (and more efficient) path.164 Companies (in this case broadcasters) feel an imperative to respond rapidly to the changing habits of their consumers. If they fail to do this, they will lose vital business.165

Despite the benefits of the market-led, ‘light touch approach’, it should not apply to broadcasters financed by public money: namely, the BBC. For years, through various policy based concessions including the existence of the BBC Trust, and the current BBC first clause has meant that the regulatory burden that the BBC has had to operate under can be said to be materially lower than that of other broadcasters.166

The BBC has, in recent years, repeatedly become embroiled in scandals. These have included concerns around political neutrality and impartiality (including the now infamous programme on the war in Gaza narrated by the son of a senior Hamas official).167 Additionally, concerns around the culture of the institution have also been raised—especially in the context of safeguarding.168 The lack of a clear safeguarding culture within the BBC became a matter of public discourse in 2024, when former primetime BBC news anchor Huw Edwards was given a suspended sentence for making indecent images of children and placed on the sex offenders’ register for 7 years. Details of the scandal broke while he was still employed by the publicly funded corporation.169

With trust in the BBC journalists decreasing from 81% in 2003 to just 38% in 2023, it is clear that an adjustment in its regulatory framework, with a far higher regulatory burden, is needed to promote accountability and transparency within the publicly-funded BBC.170

It is important to acknowledge that a broadcast sector without Ofcom is not a broadcast sector without rules. While minor, punitive aspects of Ofcom’s broadcasting codes—such as the requirement to uphold impartiality in broadcast—would be removed, other, more serious cases would be covered by existing UK law. Incidents of defamation, for example, can already be pursued in a UK court of law under the Defamation Act 2013.171 These cases continue to operate outside of the competencies of Ofcom. In 2024, Conservative Party donor Mohamed Amersi issued UK libel proceedings against the BBC after he was featured in the Panorama programme.172 International actors can also hold UK broadcasters to account through legal action. Infamously, US President Donald J. Trump has opened defamation proceedings against the BBC, following the editing of a speech he gave in the leadup to the Capitol Riots, again, by the Panorama programme. The multi-billion dollar lawsuit is set to be heard by a Florida court in early 2027.173 In addition to this, broadcasters are already prevented from showing content that incites hatred or violence, or is openly discriminatory, by existing legislation, such as the Public Order Act 1986, and the Equality Act 2010.174

In addition to these legislative safeguards, technology provides the option for people to shield themselves from broadcast content that they would rather themselves, or their children, did not see. Parental control services are available on ‘most smart TVs’.175 In the UK, 62% of UK adults now have access to this technology, which allows users to block or censor individual channels that they deem harmful to themselves or those they have caring responsibility for.176 Therefore, advancements in technology and its availability have reduced the need for Ofcom to act as a content moderator. Thus, it should cease to do so.

Scoping outwards with a historical perspective, changes in the revealed preferences of people’s taste in the content they consume have sparked reactionary backlash in pursuit of censorship. For example, in quattrocento Florence, Friar Girolamo Savonarola preached that the expressive colours and mythological subjects of early-Renaissance artwork constituted ‘secular art’ that drew citizens away from Christian virtues of penitence and temperance. Censorious callings such as these had real-world consequences; Savonarola stoked reactionary discontent and led a revolution against the governing elites, with the Dominican friar becoming the de facto ruler of the city. In 1497, zealous citizens and the Piagnoni—meaning ‘weepers’, Savonarola’s devotees—gathered in the Piazza della Signoria to burn what was deemed sinful art in every form so as to rid the city of vice in the Bonfire of the Vanities. Many artists lost their lives in the process of this censorship campaign.

Calls for censorship of new media take new forms throughout history, but always spring from the same source of unease with a changing world. They are regular vicissitudes that must be guarded against. Broadcast is no different from other forms of speech.

Obviously, broadcast that directly orders and organises violence against others should be prohibited. But it should be prohibited as the coordination to commit violence, not as speech. Beyond that limitation, the freedom to speak and express oneself in all mediums should be absolute.

Policy Recommendations: British Broadcasting for the Modern Day

Context and analysis up until this point has sought to demonstrate the following points:

  • British broadcasting is more heavily regulated compared to peer countries.
  • Ofcom has strayed from its founding principle of pro-market, ‘competition policy-plus’, and now operates as a ‘super-regulator’.
  • Ofcom now functions as a protectionist force in British broadcasting, reducing competition and media plurality.
  • The result of this is reduced investment in British broadcasting and reduced consumer choice.
  • Entry costs into the British broadcast market are made artificially higher by the ambiguity of Ofcom’s enforcement regimes.
  • Preferential support for PSBs is eroding trust in the media amongst British citizens.
  • Principles of ‘harm’ and their vague regulatory enforcement deter new broadcasters and suppress free speech.
  • Ofcom’s inability to regulate cross-jurisdictional digital outlets like 4chan shows that its regulatory model is obsolete in a 21st-century media landscape.

Against this, reform to broadcast regulation is needed. We suggest the following proposals:

  • Replace the broadcast licensing model with a general authorisation model.
  • Abolish principle 2 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.
  • Abolish principle 5 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code.
  • Replace the ‘percentage of global qualifying revenue’ fine limit with a fixed sum limit.
  • Give all broadcasters the right to respond to audience complaints before they are handled by Ofcom, extending the privileges of the BBC first clause to all.
  • Amend the Communications Act 2003 to remove Ofcom’s duty to protect consumers from ‘harm’.
  • Repeal the provisions of the Media Act 2024 pertaining to the prominence of PSBs on streaming services.

Replace the Broadcast Licensing Model with a General Authorisation Model

One of the biggest barriers to media plurality and competition in the broadcast market is the licensing power vested in Ofcom.

There are two mediums of broadcasting: spectrum and digital. Licences for high-demand spectrum are auctioned off, as they have been since 1998.177 The primary argument for creating a spectrum market was that spectrum is a finite resource; therefore, the government must control who enters and uses it. Studies have since questioned the validity of the spectrum scarcity argument in broadcast regulation.178 However, as spectrum broadcast decreases in proportional use compared to digital broadcast, the issue lessens in importance. Nonetheless, owners of spectrum licences must then also apply for another licence to broadcast on spectrum they already own.179

Digital broadcasters must apply for one of at least three licenses, including DTPS (Digital TV Programme Service), TLCS (Television Licensable Content Service), and DSP (Digital Sound Programme). There are two costs: a first-time application fee, and an annual renewal fee. Both are fixed sums. Once licenced, all broadcasters must pay a graduated administration fee to Ofcom, usually a small percentage of relevant turnover.

We have already discussed that economists have long noted how the presence of licensing regimes constitutes a protectionist gatekeeper on industries which mandate licensed operators. The persistence of licensing beyond a broadcast market tied to fixed-sum spectrum shows that ‘licensing is still used as an instrument to shape media systems in the public interest and to commit private broadcasters to societal objectives in most countries’.180

The setting of ‘public interest’ by an appointed regulator is predicated on the belief inherent in Ofcom’s founding structure that broadcast cannot be considered a market, that one ‘cannot simply regard [media] as another set of goods on the supermarket shelf’.181 This is because broadcast has the potential to shape public opinion and political discourse, an important principle in the ‘citizen-consumer dichotomy’.182

Unsurprisingly, we disagree with this view. Schweizer et al. make the keen observation that

‘books, newspapers and magazines have “political characteristics associated with the power to… shape public opinion,” and yet these publications are produced and distributed not by a “print allocation” authority but by decentralized market transactions’.183

Licence requirements for book publications would rightly accrue accusations of state overreach and suppression of free speech. We do not believe that broadcast is qualitatively different.

Instead, broadcast policy should regulate content, not permission to broadcast. If broadcasters have the necessary infrastructure, they should be entitled to provide broadcast material to viewers who vote with their eyes and their time like any other market. This would go a long way to improve media plurality, access to the broadcast market, and competition — all increasing the quantity and quality of what’s on offer to viewers.

Ofcom should, nonetheless, retain power to shut down broadcasters deemed to be breaching rules worth keeping. For example, Ofcom’s revocation of the broadcast licence held by Russia Today (RT) in 2022 was a direct response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. RT, a Russian, state-funded broadcaster, was deemed to be broadcasting in service of Russian ends by spreading misinformation about the invasion. Considering RT, by virtue of its patronage to the Kremlin, was not free to say otherwise, we deem it not a breach of the principle of free speech to silence the broadcast of hostile foreign state actors.

Abolish Principle 2 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code

Principle 2 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code outlines Ofcom’s power to regulate and deter broadcasted material that causes ‘harm or offence’.184 This duty was enshrined and extended throughout Ofcom’s jurisdictions via the OSA 2023.185

As this paper has outlined, what constitutes ‘harm’ in the eyes of the regulator is often ‘nebulous’, leading to the risk of confusion and risk-induced over-compliance.186 The risk of over-compliance stifling both artistic expression and free speech is compounded by the size of potential fines. At a maximum of 5% of broadcasters’ global revenues, these are a significant risk factor for any firm involved in the broadcast sector.187 As this paper has demonstrated, the market uncertainties created by an increasingly assertive regulator with the power to impose significant harms has a ‘chilling’ effect on the market and new entrants.188

Abolishing Section 2 of Ofcom’s broadcasting code would remove its ability to impose sanctions and fines in regard to these issues. To provide the legal basis for the removal of Section 2 of the broadcasting code, it would be necessary to repeal Section 3(2)g of the Communications Act 2003, which imposes the legal duty on Ofcom to provide ‘the adequate protection of citizens from harm presented by content on regulated services,’.189

While the prevalence of thought-provoking and controversial content may increase, we believe that the presence of content that could reasonably be deemed as ‘harmful’ would not. Under a framework in which all broadcasters function as market actors, it is unlikely that a broadcaster would allow content which directly harmed or offended its audience to be screened.

In order to secure this, the following amendment could be used:

1. Amendment of General Duties of OFCOM (1) Section 3 of the Communications Act 2003 (General duties of OFCOM) is amended as follows.

  1. In subsection (2)—

  1. Omit paragraph (e) (the desirability of securing that the public are adequately protected from the inclusion of offensive and harmful material in relevant television and radio services);

  2. Omit paragraph (g) (the need to secure that the relevant statutory standards are achieved in relation to the contents of programmes included in television and radio services).

  1. In subsection (4), omit paragraph (f) (the desirability of promoting and facilitating the development of a world-class infrastructure)

2. Consequential Amendments to Content Standards (1) Section 319 of the Communications Act 2003 (OFCOM’s standards code) is amended as follows.

  1. In subsection (2), omit paragraph (f) (standard that offensive and harmful material is to be excluded from those services).

  2. In subsection (8), the definition of “relevant television and radio services” shall be construed as excluding any requirement to regulate for “harm and offence” as previously defined under the omitted sections.

Abolish Principle 5 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code

This paper has outlined that, despite principle 5 of Ofcom’s broadcasting codes enforcing strict impartiality rules, trust in UK media remains lower than each of the peer nations throughout this paper.190

UK broadcasting has a long history of requiring political impartiality.191 However, new media outlets have been established to satisfy consumer demand for a different style of broadcast programming. This is particularly visible in the case of GB News, which was established in 2021, promising to ‘change the face of news and debate in the UK’.192

Despite being repeatedly labeled by other outlets as right-of-centre, it is bound by the same rules as all other non-PSBs and has been subjected to numerous Ofcom-led investigations.193

Instead of pursuing a superficial ‘veil of impartiality’, we propose the abolition of principle 5 of Ofcom’s broadcasting code. Providing the opportunity for viewers to use broadcasters with which they hold a political affinity may improve trust in the media by removing the expectation of enforced neutrality.

As with the American model of broadcast regulation, some safeguards would be reasonably required. These could include prohibition on ‘news distortion’ for ‘significant events’; a requirement that broadcasters give equal opportunities to candidates for public office; and a requirement that broadcasters disclose sponsors of on-air programming—as are seen in US broadcast regulation today.194

Importantly, some outlets would preserve their neutrality to create a market niche. For example, In America this role is seen as being fulfilled by Reuters, which is consistently described as a reliable, non-partisan broadcast media outlet.195 In the online sphere, the growing prevalence of AI has provided opportunities for commercial entities established to offset media bias. American company Ground News provides users with the opportunity to ‘read the news from multiple perspectives’, using AI algorithms to show a balance of ideological publications.196 Therefore it is reasonable to assume that if there was appropriate demand from UK consumers, UK broadcasters could follow this course of commercial neutrality.

Replace the ‘Percentage of Global Qualifying Revenue’ Fine Limit with a Fixed Sum Limit

Across all of Ofcom’s jurisdictions, the threat of fines capped at a proportion of global qualifying revenue is an unreasonable burden to place on larger service providers. This paper has articulated that uncertainty can hamper investment and business involvement within a sector.197 For global firms with large turnovers, the ability for the regulator to impose such fines creates significant financial uncertainty.

Additionally, in instances where fines could be applied to global broadcasters, Ofcom’s ability to act in an international jurisdiction would once again be called into question. Any international broadcaster which received a large fine from Ofcom would likely leave the UK. As seen with Ofcom’s inability to fine technology companies, the likelihood of Ofcom being able to recover any additional funds from assets abroad is low—especially if these assets are located in countries with legislative priorities that deviate from the UK’s.198

The introduction of capped fine limits, irrespective of broadcaster revenues, would thus create a more certain regulatory environment, inspiring business confidence and investment within the sector.

For the smallest broadcasters with low turnovers, a fixed cap could prove to be prohibitively expensive (due to the cap needing to be large enough to encourage compliance from larger broadcasters). Some would argue that the absence of proportional fines would prove prohibitive for small-scale market entrants, as they would be more vulnerable to a fine for an infraction than larger broadcasters would. However, due to the reduced scope that Ofcom would have, the likelihood of a broadcaster (large or small) falling foul of the fines is low, unless the broadcaster was operatively incompetent or negligent. Nonetheless, if a small broadcaster were to commit such an egregious breach of conduct that it gets levied a fine it cannot pay, it is in all likelihood that said broadcaster deserves to fail by virtue of not following the rules.

Extend the Provisions of the ‘BBC First’ Clause to All Broadcasters

Amongst UK broadcasters, the BBC stands alone in having the right to respond to audience complaints before they reach the regulator.199 For all other broadcasters, complaints made to Ofcom are investigated formally by the regulator from the outset, without the opportunity for them to allay concerns or rectify situations before regulator involvement.

Aligning regulation of all broadcasters with the structure currently applied to the BBC would allow all commercial broadcasters (whether PSB or non-PSB) to operate within an equal regulatory framework. Additionally, such a policy would align UK broadcast regulation with the Canadian system, which already mandates a broadcaster-first complaints process as the normal method of complaint resolution.200

A recent report by academics at the University of Leeds and the University of Derby found that public confidence in journalism increases when media outlets operate under independent, uniform, transparent regulation, and when audiences understand how regulation works. This suggests equal regulation across broadcast outlets improves trust.201

Remove the BBC’s Regulatory Privilege. Replace It with an Enhanced Regulatory Model.

This paper has outlined the extent of the regulatory privilege enjoyed by the BBC when compared with non-PSB broadcasting outlets. It has also shown that public trust in BBC journalists has declined markedly in recent years, while the organisation has become repeatedly embroiled in controversies relating to perceived impartiality issues and its institutional culture.

Given the BBC’s unique funding model, based on a compulsory licence fee rather than commercial advertising revenue, there is a strong case that regulatory scrutiny should increase, rather than diminish, as audience scepticism grows.202 Unlike commercial broadcasters, the BBC ‘is able to pursue creative risks without the pressure of immediate financial returns or reliance solely on audience numbers and advertising revenue’.203 This weakens the corrective mechanisms that would otherwise operate in our proposed ‘light touch’ broadcasting market and strengthens the case for external oversight.

In this context, the ‘BBC First’ model of broadcast regulation should cease. In its place, all complaints concerning BBC content should be fully investigated by Ofcom, rather than being filtered or resolved through internal BBC processes. Ofcom’s existing requirements concerning political impartiality should remain fully applicable to the BBC, as should prohibitions on harmful or unlawful content. This is especially pertinent as, under the current BBC licensing model, viewers have no ‘opt out’. Should they wish to watch any live television in the UK, they must pay to fund the BBC’s content and operations.204

Where the BBC is found to have breached impartiality requirements, it should be subject to the same sanctions and enforcement mechanisms that have historically applied to commercial broadcasters. This includes the possibility of formal findings, financial penalties, and mandatory remedial action. There is no principled justification for shielding a publicly funded broadcaster from regulatory consequences that have previously applied to privately funded competitors.

Removing the BBC’s regulatory privilege while maintaining, and where necessary strengthening external oversight would better align regulatory burden with funding structure. Such an approach may enhance public confidence and trust in the institution, and rectify a regulatory disparity where the only broadcaster that the public is forced to fund is subjected to the weakest external scrutiny.

Remove the Provisions of the Media Act 2024 Pertaining to the Enforced Prominence of PSBs on Streaming Services

This paper has outlined Ofcom’s damaging divergence from its historic role as a pro-competition regulator to its present position as a ‘superregulator’, which has strayed from its pro-market foundations.205

The ‘protectionist’ nature of Ofcom’s broadcast regulation is particularly visible when considering its attitudes to PSBs. The false binary between PSBs and private broadcasters constructed through Ofcom’s literature, as well as provisions in the Media Act 2024 requiring designated streaming services to give an ‘appropriate degree of prominence’ to PSBs and their content provide evidence of this.206

‘Protectionist’ regulations can dissuade future investment, decrease competition, and reduce the economic vitality of markets.207 Regulations that actively promote PSBs over other commercial broadcast outlets are thus economically disadvantageous. In addition to the economic argument, the principle that market incumbents (PSBs) are given concessions to continue their influence over the sector is in tension with principles of competitive neutrality and proportionality, as it effectively insulates incumbents from market discipline while imposing asymmetric burdens on new entrants.

Abolishing the PSB prominence requirements for designated streaming providers would thus provide parity—both in economic terms and those of principle.

To facilitate this, the following amendment could be passed:

(1) The Media Act 2024 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 28 (further amendments relating to public service television) is repealed. In addition, we would propose that the On-demand Programme Services (Tier 1 Services) Regulations (which relate to the direct regulation of VoD services by Ofcom) be repealed.

Conclusion

Britain has a proud heritage of broadcasting. British television is seen as one of the bastions of taste and proper televisual integrity. This is something to be nurtured. However, the UK’s broadcast policy has grown to a point beyond the purposes of free speech or value for consumers.

It is fair to say that Ofcom has mutated beyond a well-intentioned arm in support of the broadcast sector. Now it is better seen as a regulatory hydra, growing in heads and tails that further constrict media plurality, broadcast competition, and broader trust in the media.

Deregulating broadcast is not, as some may believe, a descent into a ‘wild west’ of misinformation. In fact, as we hope to have illustrated, it would actually increase people’s trust in more traditional media sources at a time when more and more people consume content online.

As would replacing enforced nominal neutrality with transparency of broadcasters’ biases and beliefs. Put simply, viewers are not stupid. They can recognise bias and take it into account. We believe a broadcast market works best when broadcasters wear their hearts on their sleeves, and viewers can decide for themselves what they consume and how they consume it.

We can’t tell how the broadcast industry will evolve over the next 10 or so years, nor whether it will survive at all. Nonetheless, the government should be forward-looking in creating a regulatory framework that rewards market entry, competition, and transparency. The proposals in this paper seek to provide solutions in service of this objective. Thank you for reading.

  1. Legislation.gov.uk. ‘Communications Act 2003’, accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents; Legislation.gov.uk. ‘Broadcasting Act 1996’, accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/55/contents; Eren Waitzman. ‘Regulation of news broadcasting companies’, House of Lords Library (2024), accessed 23/01/2026, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/regulation-of-news-broadcasting-companies/↩︎

  2. ‘The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (with the Cross-promotion Code and the On Demand Programme Service Rules)’, Ofcom (2020), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/broadcast-code↩︎

  3. Ibid.↩︎

  4. Licence information, Ofcom, accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/licence-information↩︎

  5. ‘THE OFCOM BROADCASTING CODE’, Ofcom (2019), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/code—jan-2019/broadcast-code-full.pdf?v=323671↩︎

  6. ‘General procedures for investigating breaches of broadcast licences’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/consultations/category-1-10-weeks/general-procedures-for-investigating-breaches-of-broadcast-licences/main-documents/general-procedures-for-investigating-breaches-of-broadcast-licences.pdf?v=398958↩︎

  7. ‘Broadcasting and on demand sanction decisions’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 23/01/2026. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/content-sanctions-adjudications#:↩︎

  8. ‘Conditions imposed on postal operators’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 07/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/5/contents↩︎

  9. ‘TV broadcast licence’, GOV.UK, accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.gov.uk/find-licences/tv-broadcast-licence; ‘Radio broadcast licences’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/licences/radio-broadcast↩︎

  10. ‘Apply for a TV broadcast licence’, Ofcom (2022), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/digital-tv/apply-for-a-tv-broadcast-licence↩︎

  11. ‘Radio broadcast licences’, Ofcom, accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/licences/radio-broadcast↩︎

  12. ‘Television Licensable Content Service (TLCS)’ Ofcom (2025), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/manage-your-licence/tv/guidance/tlcs-guidance-notes-for-applicants.pdf?v=402922↩︎

  13. ‘Television Licensable Content Service (TLCS)’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/manage-your-licence/tv/guidance/tlcs-guidance-notes-for-applicants.pdf; ‘Ofcom Tariff Tables 2025/26’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 23/01 2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/how-ofcom-is-run/annual-reports/plans-and-financial-reporting/tariff-tables/ofcom-tariff-tables-2025-26-v3.pdf?v=393475↩︎

  14. Communications Act 2003’, accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents↩︎

  15. ‘Penalty guidelines’, Ofcom (2017), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/corporate-policies/penalty-guidelines↩︎

  16. Ibid.↩︎

  17. ‘Procedures for the consideration of statutory sanctions in breaches of broadcast licences’, Ofcom (2017), accessed 23/01/2026, http://ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-guidance/july-2013/procedures_for_consideration.pdf?v=382851#:↩︎

  18. ‘Broadcasting and on demand sanction decisions’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/content-sanctions-adjudications↩︎

  19. See page 9 of this report; ‘The Office of Communications Section 400 Licence Fees and Penalties Accounts’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/annual-reports/2024-25/section-400-licence-fees-and-penalties-accounts-2024-2025.pdf?v=400015↩︎

  20. ‘Broadcasting and on demand sanction decisions’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/content-sanctions-adjudications↩︎

  21. Julian Wilkins.’Ofcom imposes GBP 75 000 fine against Talksport Ltd for breaches of impartiality rules’, IRS Merlin (2020), accessed 08/01/2026, https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/8843↩︎

  22. ‘Decision – Islam Channel Limited’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/decision-islam-channel-ltd↩︎

  23. ‘Legislation.gov.uk. ‘Communications Act 2003’, accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/notes/division/5/3/2?wrap=true↩︎

  24. ‘Regulatory Enforcement Guidelines for investigations’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.oCrime, Disorder, Hatred and Abuserg.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/consultations/category-2-6-weeks/238024-revising-the-regulatory-enforcement-guidelines/associated-documents/enforcement-guidelines.pdf?v=401913↩︎

  25. ‘Section Three: Crime, Disorder, Hatred and Abuse’, Ofcom Broadcasting Code (2019), accessed 16/02/2026, ‘https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/code—jan-2019/broadcast-code-section-3?v=323676↩︎

  26. Ibid.↩︎

  27. ‘Ofcom revokes RT’s broadcast licence’, Ofcom (2022), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/ofcom-revokes-rt-broadcast-licence↩︎

  28. ‘Ofcom’s Consumer Policy’, Ofcom (2006), accessed 07/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/consultations/uncategorised/8654-ocp/associated-documents/secondary-documents/ocp_web.pdf?v=331193↩︎

  29. ‘What is Ofcom?’, Ofcom (2010), accessed 07/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/what-we-do/what-is-ofcom↩︎

  30. ‘TV’s most complained-about shows of 2025: the official Ofcom breakdown’, Ofcom (2025) accessed 07/01/2025, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/tvs-most-complained-about-shows-of-2025-the-official-ofcom-breakdown↩︎

  31. ‘BBC Framework Agreement’, Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (2025), accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bbc-charter-and-framework-agreement/bbc-framework-agreement↩︎

  32. ‘About the BBC’, BBC, accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/charter; ‘BBC Framework Agreement’, Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (2025), accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bbc-charter-and-framework-agreement/bbc-framework-agreement↩︎

  33. ‘The types of complaint Ofcom deals with’, Ofcom, accessed 07/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/make-a-complaint/complaints-ofcom-deals-with↩︎

  34. Freedom of Information request: Right to know request: Reference: 2053420. ‘Ofcom Information Requests’ (2025), accessed 07/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/foi/2025/october/online-safety-act-complaint-monitoring.pdf?v=406540↩︎

  35. Mark Sweney. ‘ITV escapes fine after premium call competition fails to name winner’ (2009), accessed 23/01/2026, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/dec/21/itv-premium-phoneline-competition-fails↩︎

  36. ‘Regulatory Enforcement Guidelines for investigations’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 08/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/consultations/category-2-6-weeks/238024-revising-the-regulatory-enforcement-guidelines/associated-documents/enforcement-guidelines.pdf?v=401913↩︎

  37. Ibid.↩︎

  38. ‘Section five: Due impartiality and due accuracy’, Ofcom (2021), accessed 26/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/section-five-due-impartiality-accuracy↩︎

  39. Ibid.↩︎

  40. Ibid; ‘Collins Dictionary’, Collins, accessed 26/01/2026, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/news-presenter↩︎

  41. ‘GB News -v- Ofcom’. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2025), accessed 15/01/2026, https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/gb-news-v-ofcom/↩︎

  42. ‘Politicians acting as news presenters on GB News broke broadcasting rules’, Ofcom (2024), accessed 26/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/politicians-acting-as-news-presenters-on-gb-news-broke-broadcasting-rules↩︎

  43. Martin Moore & Gordon Ramsay. ‘Economic challenges, market consolidation↩︎

  44. House of Lords Select Committee on Communications and Digital. ‘Public service broadcasting: as vital as ever’, House of Lords (2019), accessed 27/01/2026, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201919/ldselect/ldcomuni/16/16.pdf↩︎

  45. Martin Moore & Gordon Ramsay. ‘Economic challenges, market consolidation↩︎

  46. Ibid.↩︎

  47. Ibid.↩︎

  48. House of Lords Select Committee on Communications and Digital. ‘Public service broadcasting: as vital as ever’, House of Lords (2019), accessed 27/01/2026, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201919/ldselect/ldcomuni/16/16.pdf↩︎

  49. ‘Further findings from our latest look at the UK’s media habits’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 28/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-adults/further-findings-from-our-latest-look-at-the-uks-media-habits↩︎

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  51. Philip Booth. ‘Institute of Economic Affairs—written evidence (PSB0001)’, UK Parliament Select Committees (2019), accessed 28/01/2026, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/101684/pdf/↩︎

  52. Dame Melanie Davies and Lord Grade of Yarmouth. ‘Letter to The Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer MP, The Rt Hon Rachel Reeves MP, The Rt Hon Jonathan Reynolds MP’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 19/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/public-correspondence/2025/open-letter-how-ofcom-contributes-to-uk-growth.pdf?v=395523↩︎

  53. C.f ‘TV Sets Viewing December 2025’, Barb, accessed 27/01/2026, https://www.barb.co.uk/tv-sets-viewing/?period=202512. BBC, ITV, Channels 4 and 5 are PSBs. The only non-PSB in the top five of viewing figures for December 2025 was Sky News.↩︎

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  57. C.f ‘Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI)’, State Media Monitor, accessed 28/01/2026, https://statemediamonitor.com/2025/08/radiotelevisione-italiana-rai: Three Rai-run radio channels daily average viewers (Q3, 2025) aggregated—3,057,000; 2,307,000; 1,218,000—total 6,582,000. Divided by total daily radio listeners—34,504,000=19%↩︎

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  86. See page one of this report.↩︎

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  89. ‘GB News -v- Ofcom’. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2025), accessed 15/01/2026, https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/gb-news-v-ofcom/↩︎

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  97. Ibid.; legislation.gov.uk. ‘Communications Act 2003’ (2003), accessed 28/12/2025, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/3/enacted↩︎

  98. Ibid.↩︎

  99. Legislation.gov,uk. Communications Act 2003, accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/3#commentary-key-cf7fc7df7a85071402b131cebd71ad06↩︎

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  102. C.f: ‘Office of Communications Section 400 Licence Fees and Penalties Accounts 2023/24’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/how-ofcom-is-run/annual-reports/plans-and-financial-reporting/annual-reports/annual-report-2022/23/english/section-400-licence-fees-and-penalties-accounts-2022-23.pdf?v=329868; ‘The Office of Communications Section 400 Licence Fees and Penalties Accounts 2024/25’, Ofcom (2025), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/annual-reports/2024-25/section-400-licence-fees-and-penalties-accounts-2024-2025.pdf?v=400015↩︎

  103. ‘Other Financial Reporting’, Ofcom, accessed 29/12/2025, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/annual-reports-and-plans/other-financial-reporting;↩︎

  104. Gordon Moir and Annemaree McDonough. ‘Ofcom fine BT a record breaking £42 million. A more to a more punitive approach?’, Shepherd + Wedderburn (2017), accessed 16/02/2026, https://shepwedd.com/knowledge/ofcom-fine-bt-record-breaking-42-million-move-more-punitive-approach/↩︎

  105. ‘Office of Communications Section 400 Licence Fees and Penalties Accounts’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/how-ofcom-is-run/annual-reports/plans-and-financial-reporting/annual-reports/annual-report-2022/23/english/section-400-licence-fees-and-penalties-accounts-2022-23.pdf?v=329868↩︎

  106. Table created from Ofcom’s licence fees and penalties accounts—2004–present.↩︎

  107. Institute for Government. ‘Written evidence from the Institute for Government (UKR0006)’ UK Parliament Select Committees (2023), accessed 12/01/2026, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/126602/pdf/↩︎

  108. ‘Lisa-Maria Neudert’. ‘Regulatory capacity capture: The United Kingdom’s online safety regime’, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, United Kingdom (2023), accessed 12/01/2026, https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulatory-capacity-capture-united-kingdoms-online-safety-regime↩︎

  109. ‘Ofcom: Staff’, Parallel Parliament (2025), accessed 13/01/2026, https://www.parallelparliament.co.uk/question/HL4944/ofcom-staff↩︎

  110. ‘The Communications Act 2003’. Legislation.gov.uk, accessed 13/01/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents; Richard Wallis and David Buckingham. ‘Media Literacy: the UK’s undead cultural policy’, International Journal of Cultural Policy (2019), accessed 13/01/2026, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/10286632.2016.1229314?needAccess=true↩︎

  111. Ibid.↩︎

  112. Communications and Digital Committee. ‘Media Literacy’ (2025), accessed 13/01/2026, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5901/ldselect/ldcomm/163/16302.htm↩︎

  113. Robert Baldwin and Julia Black. ‘Driving priorities in risk-based regulation: what’s the problem?’, London School of Economics (2016), https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67037/7/Baldwin_Driving%20priorities_2016.pdf↩︎

  114. Mr. John Whittingdale MP. Comments on ‘Communications Bill HC Deb 03 December 2002 vol 395 cc782-864782’, Hansard (2002), accessed 13/01/2026, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2002/dec/03/communications-bill↩︎

  115. Communications and Digital Committee. ‘Media Literacy’ (2025), accessed 13/01/2026, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5901/ldselect/ldcomm/163/16302.htm↩︎

  116. According to Edelman Trust Barometer (2016–2026)↩︎

  117. The Edelman Trust Barometer is a yearly survey focussing on public trust of various institutions. The media section refers to trust in media specifically, and does not refer to other institutions: ‘2026 Edelman Trust Barometer’, Edelman Trust Institute (2026), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2026-01/2026%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report_01.21.26_0.pdf↩︎

  118. According to Edelman Trust Barometers (2016–2026)↩︎

  119. Elizabeth Grieco. ‘Americans’ main sources for political news vary by party and age’, Pew Research Centre (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/04/01/americans-main-sources-for-political-news-vary-by-party-and-age/↩︎

  120. ‘Leveson Inquiry - Report into the culture, practices and ethics of the press’, GOV.UK (2012), accessed 17/02/2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-inquiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press↩︎

  121. ‘The View from Nowhere: Questions and Answers’, PressThink (2010), accessed 17/02/2026, https://pressthink.org/2010/11/the-view-from-nowhere-questions-and-answers/↩︎

  122. Ibid.↩︎

  123. Danielle Raeijmaekers and Pieter Maeseele. ‘Media, pluralism and democracy: what’s in a name’, Media, Culture, and Society (2020), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273203703_Media_pluralism_democracy_what’s_in_a_name↩︎

  124. ‘GB News -v- Ofcom’. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (2025), accessed 15/01/2026, https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/gb-news-v-ofcom/↩︎

  125. According to Edelman Trust Barometers (2016–2026)↩︎

  126. Tyron Surmon. ‘BBC Polling’, Findoutnow (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://findoutnow.co.uk/blog/bbc-polling/↩︎

  127. Ibid.↩︎

  128. See page 30 of this report.↩︎

  129. Taka‑aki Asano, Atsushi Tago and Seiki Tanaka. ‘The Role of Public Broadcasting in Media Bias: Do People↩︎

  130. In 2024, Conservative MP Greg Smith stated that Ofcom was ‘intent on silencing alternative and outspoken viewpoints’. See: Greg Smith. ‘Ofcom is intent on SILENCING alternative and outspoken views - Greg Smith MP’, GB News (2024), accessed 14/01/2026, https://www.gbnews.com/opinion/ofcom-silence-gb-news-shut-down-views-greg-smith↩︎

  131. Andrew Tettenborn. ‘Ofcom is a menace to our freedom of speech’, The Critic (2020), accessed 15/01/2026, https://thecritic.co.uk/ofcom-is-a-menace-to-our-freedom-of-speech/↩︎

  132. Helen Bushby. ‘GB News wins Ofcom legal challenge over Jacob Rees-Mogg shows’, BBC News (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c86pp6wq1xno↩︎

  133. ‘Ofcom updates guidance around politicians presenting news’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/ofcom-updates-guidance-around-politicians-presenting-news↩︎

  134. James Warrington. ‘Ofcom costs hit £4.6m after losing GB News legal battle’, The Telegraph (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/07/10/ofcom-costs-hit-46m-after-losing-gb-news-legal-battle/↩︎

  135. Terry Green and Larry Wong. ‘Lessons Learnt from Ofcom’s First Enforcement of the Online Safety Act - Lessons from 4chan’, Katten (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://quickreads.ext.katten.com/post/102lvg1/lessons-learnt-from-ofcoms-first-enforcement-of-the-online-safety-act-lessons↩︎

  136. ‘Investigation into 4chan and its compliance with duties to protect its users from illegal content’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/investigation-into-4chan-and-its-compliance-with-duties-to-protect-its-users-from-illegal-content↩︎

  137. Chris Vallance. ‘4chan launches legal action against Ofcom in US’, BBC News (2025), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/clyjq40vjl7o↩︎

  138. Adam Edwards. ‘Why is Ofcom trying to censor Americans?’, Spiked (2025), accessed 03/02/2026, https://www.spiked-online.com/2025/11/05/why-is-ofcom-trying-to-censor-americans/↩︎

  139. Committee of Public Accounts. ‘Preparedness for online safety regulation’, UK Parliament (2024), accessed 29/01/2026, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmpubacc/73/report.html?↩︎

  140. Dan Milmo. ‘Michael Grade confirmed as Ofcom chair despite MPs’ warning’, The Guardian (2022), accessed 03/02/2026, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/apr/01/mps-voice-fears-over-michael-grade-in-depth-knowledge-of-ofcom-remit↩︎

  141. Calculated from aggregated profiles on LinkedIn and other sources where available. Reliable data was not available for two of Ofcom’s board members.↩︎

  142. ‘Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill’, UK Parliament Government Bills (2026), accessed 30/01/2026; Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. ‘Data Centres’, GOV.UK (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-network-and-information-systems-bill-factsheets/data-centres↩︎

  143. ‘The On-demand Programme Services (Tier 1 Services) Regulations 2026’, Statutory Instruments (2026), accessed 04/03/2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/699c5a2c882eb23165f1274b/The_On-demand_Programme_Services__Tier_1_Services_Regulations_2026_accessible.pdf↩︎

  144. James Lawson and Madsen Pirie. ‘Micropolitics Revisited’, The Adam Smith Institute (2026), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.adamsmith.org/books/micropolitics-revisited#the-public-sector=↩︎

  145. C.f.: ‘THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS’, Ofcom (2011), accessed 19/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/how-ofcom-is-run/annual-reports/plans-and-financial-reporting/annual-reports/annrep1011.pdf?v=331718; ‘The Office of Communications Annual Report and Accounts’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 19/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/annual-reports/2024-25/ofcom-annual-report-and-accounts-2024-2025.pdf?v=401870↩︎

  146. James Lawson and Madsen Pirie. ‘Micropolitics Revisited’, The Adam Smith Institute (2026), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.adamsmith.org/books/micropolitics-revisited#the-public-sector=↩︎

  147. Mark Sweney. ‘UK TV production sector income falls by £400m as programming budgets cut’, Mark Sweney (2024), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.theguardian.com/media/article/2024/sep/11/uk-tv-production-sector-income-falls-by-400m-as-programming-budgets-cut↩︎

  148. Daniel Thomas. ‘ITV blames late Budget for sharp fall in advertising’, The Financial Times (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.ft.com/content/e9d56e0d-0759-49e6-8f8e-30c0cdcc302c↩︎

  149. Daniel Thomas. ‘YouTube most popular TV choice for younger Brits, Ofcom finds’, The Financial Times (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.ft.com/content/3d3d2769-ea15-4454-91b2-b43a00cc4fe9↩︎

  150. Laarni T. Bulan. ‘Real options, irreversible investment and firm uncertainty: New evidence from U.S. firms’, Review of Financial Economics (2005), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1058330005000029↩︎

  151. Alan Crane and Andrew Koch. ‘The Impact of Regulation on Firm Value: Evidence from Political Connections’, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/article/14/4/1058/8219471↩︎

  152. ‘Cable vs. Streaming Viewing Share: Current Market Data’, Adwave Insights (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://adwave.com/resources/cable-vs-streaming-viewing-share↩︎

  153. ‘Tuning into YouTube: UK’s media habits revealed’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-adults/tuning-into-youtube-uks-media-habits-revealed↩︎

  154. ‘Further findings from our latest look at the UK’s media habits’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-adults/further-findings-from-our-latest-look-at-the-uks-media-habits↩︎

  155. Mark Sweney. ‘BBC and ITV slash big-budget TV spend as US streamers pour money into UK’, The Guardian (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2025/feb/06/bbc-itv-slash-big-budget-tv-spend-us-streamers-netflix-disney-amazon-uk-investment↩︎

  156. Streamers based overseas benefit from doubt around Ofcom’s jurisdictional applicability. This has been seen in Online Safety Act related enforcement, including the ongoing dispute with 4chan (see previous sections of this paper).↩︎

  157. Charles Goldsmith. ‘British Law Will Recognize Telecom, Broadcasting Link’, Wall Street Journal (1999) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB944088582397541218?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdAUd8QeRpt9i40pCbe3Tyr_FIMPkRy_KOGs36T9DjA-t-0ZakmLTPoFRakGwY%3D&gaa_ts=69721b2d&gaa_sig=_UQZ9Bk43HEeljYF3AepSp1pmfU2elfsPNyv5iuysJglWCR-MuRj8JqoM3JCsl1mkl0c1nxORE5LnQzPc1AIAQ%3D%3D↩︎

  158. ‘A new future for communications’, Department for Trade and Industry and Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (2000), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.key4biz.it/files/000038/00003816.pdf↩︎

  159. ‘Regulating Communications: Approaching Convergence in the Information Age’ (Cm 4022), DCMS and DTI, July 1998↩︎

  160. Ibid.↩︎

  161. Steph Hill. ‘Stop hate for profit: Evaluating the mobilisation of advertisers and the advertising industry to regulate content moderation on digital platforms’, Internet Policy Review (2025), accessed 13/02/2026, https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/stop-hate-profit-evaluating-mobilisation-advertisers-and-advertising-industry↩︎

  162. ‘Sky Arts’, Sky, accessed 12/02/2026, https://www.sky.com/watch/channel/sky-arts↩︎

  163. ‘Ofcom updates guidance around politicians presenting news’, Ofcom (2025), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/ofcom-updates-guidance-around-politicians-presenting-news↩︎

  164. John Ayres and Ian Braithwaite. ‘Responsive Regulation’, Oxford Socio-Legal studies (1992), accessed 13/02/2026, https://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Responsive-Regulation-Transce.pdf↩︎

  165. Ibid.↩︎

  166. ‘BBC Trust’, BBC, accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/index.html; ‘The types of complaint Ofcom deals with’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/make-a-complaint/complaints-ofcom-deals-with↩︎

  167. Ian Youngs. ‘BBC Gaza documentary a ‘serious’ breach of rules, Ofcom says’, BBC News (2025), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c629j5m2n01o↩︎

  168. Nathan Bevan. ‘Huw Edwards groomed me as a school pupil, man claims’, BBC News (2024), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2l4pxr5e7o↩︎

  169. Noor Nanji and Jacqueline Howard. ‘Edwards given suspended jail term for abuse images’, BBC News, accessed 17/02/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgm7dvv128ro↩︎

  170. ‘How much do you trust the following to tell the truth?’, YouGov (2023), accessed 13/02/2026, https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/v32hkc6t9y/YG%20trackers%20-%20Trust.pdf↩︎

  171. ‘The Defamation Act 2013’, Legislation.gov.uk (2013), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/contents↩︎

  172. Maria Ward-Brennan. ‘BBC faces £100k libel trial by Tory donor over Pandora Papers Panorama’, City AM (2024), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.cityam.com/bbc-faces-100k-libel-trial-by-tory-donor-over-pandora-papers-panorama/↩︎

  173. Steven McIntosh. ‘Trial date set for Trump’s legal case against BBC’, BBC News (2026), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqxdwlqx8qqo↩︎

  174. ‘Public Order Act 1986’, Legislation.gov.uk (1986), accessed 13/02/2026. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/enacted?view=plain; ‘Equality Act 2010’, Legislation.gov.uk (2010), accessed 13/02/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents↩︎

  175. Brad Bartlett. ‘Smart TV Parental Controls – A Parents Guide’, Kidslox (2026), accessed 13/02/2026, https://kidslox.com/guide-to/smart-tv-parental-controls/↩︎

  176. ‘Understanding TV ownership and screen size preferences in UK homes’, YouGov (2025), accessed 13/02/2026, https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/51823-understanding-tv-ownership-and-screen-size-preferences-in-uk-homes↩︎

  177. ‘Spectrum awards’, Ofcom, accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/spectrum/spectrum-awards↩︎

  178. Cf. Hazlett, T. W. (2014). ‘The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum in the 1934 Communications Act’. Review of Industrial Organization, 45(3)↩︎

  179. ‘Spectrum licenses’, Ofcom, accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/licences/spectrum↩︎

  180. CORINNE SCHWEIZER, MANUEL PUPPIS, MATTHIAS KÜNZLER, AND SAMUEL STUDER (2014). ‘Blast from the past? A comparative analysis of broadcast licensing in the digital era’, Journal of Information Policy (4).↩︎

  181. Harding, J. (2000a) ‘Blair’s Law of Convergence’, Financial Times, 17 Oct.: 30., as cited in Smith, P. (2006). ‘The politics of UK television policy: the making of Ofcom’. Media, Culture & Society, 28(6), 929-940.↩︎

  182. Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone (2011). ‘Media Regulation: Governance and the Interests of Citizens and Consumers’, SAGE Publications, London.↩︎

  183. CORINNE SCHWEIZER, MANUEL PUPPIS, MATTHIAS KÜNZLER, AND SAMUEL STUDER (2014). ‘Blast from the past? A comparative analysis of broadcast licensing in the digital era’, Journal of Information Policy (4).↩︎

  184. ‘The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (with the Cross-promotion Code and the On Demand Programme Service Rules)’, Ofcom (2023), accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-standards/broadcast-code↩︎

  185. Legislation.gov.uk. ‘Online Safety Act 2023’ (2023), accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50↩︎

  186. See page 18 of this report.↩︎

  187. ‘Procedures for the consideration of statutory sanctions in breaches of broadcast licences’, Ofcom (2017), accessed 23/01/2026, http://ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-guidance/july-2013/procedures_for_consideration.pdf?v=382851#:↩︎

  188. Robert Mark Simpson. ‘Self-Censorship: The Chilling Effect and the Heating Effect’, Open Library of the Humanities (2024), accessed 29/01/2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383034103_Self-Censorship_The_Chilling_Effect_and_the_Heating_Effec↩︎

  189. Legislation.gov.uk. ‘Communications Act 2003’, accessed 05/02/2026, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/part/1↩︎

  190. See page 22 of this report.↩︎

  191. Stephen Cushion, ‘How UK broadcasting’s key principle of impartiality has been eroded over the years’, LSE Blogs (2023), accessed 04/02/2026, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2023/04/03/how-uk-broadcastings-key-principle-of-impartiality-has-been-eroded-over-the-years/↩︎

  192. ‘GB News: New TV channel to launch on 13 June’, BBC News (2021), accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-57252833↩︎

  193. ‘How GB News became the pulpit of rightwing politics in Britain’, Financial Times (2024), accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.ft.com/content/e2f6e6fe-5451-45ec-95f6-dcdb4f511114; ‘Freedom of Information request: Right to know request’, Ofcom (2024), accessed 04/02/2026, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/about-ofcom/foi/2024/june/gb-news-serial-complainants-over-the-last-12-months.pdf?v=361368↩︎

  194. ‘COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934’, Federal Communications Commission, accessed 26/01/2026, https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf↩︎

  195. ‘Reuters Bias and Reliability’, ad fontes media, accessed 04/02/2026, https://adfontesmedia.com/reuters-bias-and-reliability/↩︎

  196. ‘See every side of every news story’, Ground News, accessed 04/02/2026↩︎

  197. Alan Crane and Andrew Koch. ‘The Impact of Regulation on Firm Value: Evidence from Political Connections’, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2025), accessed 30/01/2026, https://academic.oup.com/rcfs/article/14/4/1058/8219471↩︎

  198. See page 23 of this report.↩︎

  199. See page 18 of this report.↩︎

  200. See page 22 of this report.↩︎

  201. Julie Firmstone, John Steel, Harry Hodges-Long et al. ‘Engaging the public in regulating for ethical journalism:, Part 2 - Focus Groups’, Impress (2024), accessed 16/02/2026, https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/216039/1/Engaging%20the%20public%20Part%202%20Focus%20Groups.pdf↩︎

  202. ‘Licence fee and funding’, BBC, accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/licencefee↩︎

  203. ‘Britain’s Story: The Next Chapter - BBC Royal Charter Review, Green Paper and public consultation’, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2025), accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/britains-story-the-next-chapter-the-bbc-royal-charter-review-green-paper-and-public-consultation/britains-story-the-next-chapter-bbc-royal-charter-review-green-paper-and-public-consultation#consultation-questions↩︎

  204. ‘What does your TV Licence fee pay for?’, TV Licensing, accessed 16/02/2026, https://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/check-if-you-need-one/topics/what-does-your-licence-fee-pay-for-top13↩︎

  205. See page 36 of this report.↩︎

  206. See page 34 of this report.↩︎

  207. See page 32 of this report.↩︎

James Hodgkinson and Jasper Ostle
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The Freedom of Speech Bill (2026)